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“Creativity is intelligence having fun” 
- Albert Einstein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis summary 
 
Culture is a key element in human evolution and one of the driving forces to greater intelligence. The 
capacity to attend to and learn necessary skills provided by our socio-cultural environment has been 
highly selected for and is a fundamental component of human nature. Nevertheless culture is not 
unique to humans. Accumulating evidence for culture in non-human animals has altered the question 
toward how cultural processes link to cognition and the evolution of intelligence: i.e. cultural 
intelligence. The principle behind the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis is that increased opportunities 
to learn skills socially during development improve an individual’s intellectual abilities. In species 
where such opportunities are abundant and frequent, it can be assumed that this makes it possible for 
selection to act upon underlying cognitive mechanisms and consequently promote intelligence on an 
evolutionary time scale. The core of my work is to apply the Cultural Intelligence Hypotheses to one of 
our closest living relatives, the orangutans (Pongo spp) and thereby feature the shared evolutionary 
history of cultural processes shaping intelligence.  
 
Like in humans, culture in animals represents behavioral traditions founded on innovations, as the 
units of diversification. Thus, understanding the process of innovativeness is crucial in order to explain 
culture. It is commonly assumed that innovations arise in response to novelty, and therefore that 
innovative species are attracted to new things. Orangutan cultural diversity result from behavioral 
innovations, yet little is known about how orangutans respond to novelty. In my first study (chapter 
2), I examined reactions toward novelty in wild orangutans through a set of field experiments. Results 
demonstrated strong conservatism, in form of passive avoidance of novelty. Although this outcome 
was expected based on previous experience with orangutans, it demonstrated that the intuitive link 
between innovativeness and a positive response to novelty does not hold for orangutans. I could show 
that they do not touch unfamiliar objects and thus are naturally not drawn to novelty and yet 
extensively explore familiar items within their habitats. These contradictive findings only make sense 
in the light of cultural intelligence: the pathway through which individuals integrate novel innovations 
is not by exploration of novel items, but rather due to social learning, which may include individual 
exploration of familiar items. In order to investigate the environmental influences of captivity, the 
same novel items were then presented to zoo-housed orangutans. Beyond the risk-free existence of a 
captive habitat, orangutans brought up in zoos experience increased social contact with conspecifics 
and social contact also with human caretakers, which is lacking in their natural habitat. In contrast to 
their wild conspecifics, all zoo individuals took an instant interest in the novel objects.  
 
Inspired by the contrasting results on novelty response in captive and wild orangutans, I conducted an 
extensive review of the literature where I examine variation in neophobia in a broad comparative 
framework (chapter 3). In the review I predict that species with slow-paced life history, such as the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
great apes, benefit from conservativeness in their natural habitats, because they can rely mainly on 
social learning rather than independent exploration. Interestingly, in captivity, trust in humans as role 
models erodes their innate neophobia, and even makes them rather neophilic due to their strong 
exploration tendency. The innovation paradox can thus be understood by considering a species 
dependence on role models, i.e. social learning, which is critically supportive of the Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis. 
 
In my fourth chapter I examine the outcomes of a strong adaptation for social learning and focus on 
actually empirically testing the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. Since cultural species develop their 
skill set through social learning, selection on learning mechanisms must have been high. Consequently, 
species with systematically richer social environment may over time evolve to become more 
intelligent, reflected by larger brain size. To test this evolutionary perspective of the Cultural 
Intelligence Hypothesis was the primary goal of chapter 4. Over an evolutionary time scale, the two 
orangutan species, Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus, have experienced different socio-ecological 
environments, reflected in higher social tolerance and greater sociability in Sumatran P. abelii. This in 
turn has favored transmission of skills resulting in larger skill pool and thus more frequent 
opportunities for social learning in Pongo abelii. In order to control for the variation in social- and 
ecological factors of the natural habitat, I performed a zoo study to compare cognitive abilities between 
the two Pongo species. The homogenous environments provided by zoos allowed me to detect any 
intrinsic differences between the two species. The findings illustrate the ultimate product of cultural 
intelligence and suggest a clear intrinsic difference in how the two Pongo species apply their learning 
ability, with Pongo abelii showing better problem solving skills. Not only did I find a species difference 
in cognitive performance but P.abelii also showed higher levels of inhibition and different styles of 
exploration. I conclude that this species difference in learning ability is consistent with a history of 
greater sociability and social tolerance in Pongo abelii.  
 
My last chapter returns to how a captive life influences cognitive abilities and focuses on causes to 
inter-individual variation of problem-solving abilities. In collaboration with my colleague Laura 
Damerius we measured novelty response, exploration and cognitive performance in a large sample of 
captive housed orangutans from both zoos and rehabilitation stations. Our sample consisted of 
individuals varying in rearing conditions and duration of human exposure, which both are predicted 
to strongly alter an individual’s cognitive performance. To estimate variation in reactions to humans 
among individuals with different rearing backgrounds, which we expected to be at least partly 
responsible for the variation in cognitive performance, we developed human orientation indices (HOI-
index). Our results revealed that none of the other factors, such as the time in captivity, zoo versus 
sanctuary housing, species, age or rearing conditions influenced cognitive performance in any way. 
Instead, the social element of human attentiveness, i.e. the outcome of the HOI- test, was the strongest 
predictor of explorative behaviors leading to higher cognitive performance. In favor of the Cultural 
 
 
 
 
Intelligence Hypothesis individuals that exhibit a high HOI exhibit a different attention structure and 
may have experienced a different nature of learning opportunities by attentiveness to humans. Thus, 
as humans become additional trusted role models for apes housed in captive environments their 
influence does not only wear down neophobia, as stated in chapter 2 and 3 but it also promotes 
creativity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Kultur ist ein wesentliches Element der menschlichen Evolution und ein einflussreicher Antrieb für 
die Entstehung höherer Intelligenz. Die soziale Kompetenz, notwendige Fähigkeiten von unserem 
sozio-kulturellen Umfeld zu lernen, ist eine fundamentale Komponente des menschlichen Charakters 
und ein Produkt der natürlichen Auslese. Dennoch ist Kultur kein Alleinstellungmerkmal des 
Menschen, wie die zunehmende Zahl von Nachweisen von Kultur bei anderen Tieren zeigt. Die 
entscheidende Frage ist, wie kulturelle Prozesse mit Kognition und der Evolution von Intelligenz 
verbunden sind, ob es also eine sogenannte kulturelle Intelligenz gibt. Das Prinzip hinter der 
Kulturellen Intelligenzhypothese ist, dass ein Individuum über umso bessere intellektuelle Fähigkeiten 
verfügt, je mehr Gelegenheit zu sozialem Lernen es im Laufe seiner  Entwicklung erhält. Bei Arten, mit 
stark ausgeprägtem sozialen Lernen führt die natürliche Auslese der involvierten kognitiven 
Mechanismen im Laufe der Evolution zur Förderung der Intelligenz. Das primäre Ziel meiner 
Doktorarbeit ist es, die Kulturelle Intelligenzhypothese anhand eines unserer nächsten Verwandten, 
den Orang-Utans (Pongo spp), zu prüfen und die Rolle der kulturellen Prozesse in unserer 
gemeinsamen Evolutionsgeschichte zu untersuchen.  
 
Genau wie beim Menschen besteht Kultur bei den Tieren aus verschiedenen Verhaltenstraditionen, die 
auf Innovationen aufgebaut sind. Um Kultur erklären zu können, müssen wir daher auch den 
Innovationsprozess verstehen. Es wird häufig behauptet, dass Innovationen als Reaktion auf Neues 
entstehen und dass dabei Arten, die innovativ sind, besonders neugierig (neophil) reagieren. Obwohl 
auch bei Orang-Utans die kulturelle Diversität aus verschiedenen Verhaltensinnovationen resultiert, 
ist noch wenig darüber bekannt, wie Orang-Utans sich gegenüber Neuem verhalten. Anhand 
empirischer Feldexperimente habe ich in meiner ersten Studie (Kapitel 2) untersucht, wie wilde 
Orang-Utans auf neue Objekte in ihrem Umfeld reagieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass wilde Orang-
Utans eher konservativ sind und diese Objekte passiv meiden. Da Orang-Utans, wie die anderen 
Menschenaffen, zu den innovativsten nicht-menschlichen Arten gehören, sind diese Ergebnisse 
unerwartet. Anhand meiner Studie konnte ich zeigen, dass Orang-Utans es vermeiden unbekannte 
Objekte anzufassen (und daher nicht neophil sind), obwohl sie bereits bekannte Objekte in ihrem 
Lebensraum neugierig erforschen. Diese widersprüchlichen Ergebnisse lassen sich anhand des 
Konzeptes der Kulturellen Intelligenz erklären: ein Orang-Utan integriert Innovationen nicht in sein 
Verhaltensrepertoire indem er Neues erforscht, sondern durch soziales Lernen. Um zu ergründen, wie 
diese Umwelteinflüsse das Leben in Gefangenschaft beeinflussen, konfrontierte ich Zoo-Orang-Utans 
mit denselben neuen Objekten. In Gefangenschaft lebende Orang-Utans sind keinen natürlichen 
Gefahren ausgesetzt und haben beim Aufwachsen im Zoo durch die erhöhte Sozialität mit 
Artgenossenen und den Kontakt mit Tierpflegern, deutlich mehr Gelegenheit zu sozialem Lernen als 
in ihrem natürlichen Lebensraum. Im Gegensatz zu ihren wilden Artgenossenen zeigten die Zoo-
 
 
 
 
Individuen sofortiges Interesse an neuen Objekten. Dieser Unterschied in der Neophobie-Ausprägung 
wilder und gefangener Orang-Utans inspirierte mich dazu, eine umfangreiche Übersicht der 
bestehenden Literatur zu verfassen, in welcher ich die Variation in der Ausprägung von Neophobie bei 
weiteren Arten erkläre (Kapitel 3). In dieser Übersichtsstudie betone ich zuerst, dass jene Tiere, die 
wie die Menschenaffen einen langsamen Lebenslauf (Life-history) aufweisen, davon profitieren, sich 
in der freien Wildbahn konservativ zu verhalten. Dieses Verhalten begründet sich vermutlich darin, 
dass die Tiere viel stärker auf soziales Lernen als auf individuelle Exploration angewiesen sind. In 
Gefangenschaft hingegen, sind dieselben Arten neuen Objekten gegenüber eher aufgeschlossen 
(Neuophilie), da sie intensivere Sozialkontakte zu Artgenossen und eine vertrauten Umgang mit 
Menschen haben. Das Innovationsparadox kann folglich damit erklärt werden, wie sehr eine Art auf 
soziales Lernen angewiesen ist und spricht somit für die Kulturelle Intelligenzhypothese.   
 
In meinem vierten Kapitel untersuche ich die Bedeutung einer starken Anpassung an soziales Lernen 
und teste die Kulturelle Intelligenzhypothese empirisch. Da kulturelle Arten ihre Fähigkeiten durch 
soziales Lernen entwickeln, ist anzunehmen, dass eine starke natürliche Auslese in Bezug auf 
Lernmechanismen stattgefunden hat. Bei  Arten, deren soziale Umwelt systematisch vielfältige 
Lernmöglichkeiten anbietet, sollte sich folglich  im Laufe der Evolutionsgeschichte höhere Intelligenz 
entwickelt haben, die sich auch in einer Zunahme der Gehirngrösse widerspiegelt. Die Überprüfung 
dieser evolutionären Perspektive der Kulturellen Intelligenzhypothese war mein Hauptziel in Kapitel 
4. Die beiden Orang-Utan Arten, der Sumatra- (Pongo abelii) und der Borneo-Orang-Utan (Pongo 
pygmaeus), haben im Laufe der Evolution verschiedene soziale und ökologische Umweltbedingungen 
erfahren, was dazu geführt hat, dass der Sumatra-Orang-Utan über eine höhere soziale Toleranz mit 
häufigeren Gelegenheiten für soziales Lernen verfügt. Dadurch wurde wiederum die Kumulierung 
neuer Fähigkeiten in der Population ermöglicht. Um den Einfluss von Unterschieden hinsichtlich 
sozialer und ökologischen Faktoren des natürlichen Lebensraums kontrollieren zu können, habe ich 
meine Studie über Unterschiede der kognitiven Fähigkeiten der beiden Pongo Arten in mehreren Zoos 
durchgeführt. Die homogenen Umweltverhältnisse der Zoos ermöglichten es mir, intrinsische 
Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Arten zu aufzudecken. Meine Ergebnisse illustrieren das ultimative 
Produkt kultureller Intelligenz und zeigen klare Unterschiede im Bereich der intrinsischen 
Lernkapazität der beiden Arten. Der Sumatra-Orang-Utan  besitzt dabei die besseren Fähigkeiten, 
Probleme zu lösen als der Borneo-Orang-Utan. Diesen Artunterschied konnte ich nicht nur hinsichtlich 
der kognitiven Leistungen, sondern auch des Explorationsstils und der inhibitorischen Kontrolle zur 
Unterdrückung bestehender Verhaltenstendenzen zeigen. Ich schliesse daraus, dass der Sumatra-
Orang-Utan im Vergleich zum Borneo-Orang-Utan vermutlich eine stärkere natürliche Auslese 
hinsichtlich jener Mechanismen erfahren hat, die dem Lernen zugrunde liegen. 
 
Mein fünftes und letztes Kapitel setzt sich ebenfalls mit der Frage auseinander, wie ein Leben in 
Gefangenschaft kognitive Fähigkeiten beeinflusst und wie individuelle Unterschiede der 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Problemlösefähigkeiten zustande kommen. In Zusammenarbeit mit meiner Arbeitskollegin Laura 
Damerius, habe ich die Reaktionen auf Neues, das Explorationsverhalten und die kognitiven 
Fähigkeiten von Orang-Utans mittels einer großen Stichprobe aus mehreren Zoos und 
Auffangstationen gemessen. Unsere Stichprobe bestand aus Individuen, die unterschiedliche 
Aufzuchtbedingungen erfahren und unterschiedlich viel Zeit mit Menschen verbracht hatten - 
Faktoren von denen angenommen wird, dass sie kognitive Fähigkeiten beeinflussen. Zusätzlich haben 
wir ein Instrument entwickelt, welches die Reaktionen eines Einzelindividuums auf den Menschen 
misst. Es handelt sich dabei um den sogenannten Human Orientation Index (HOI). Dieser Methode 
erlaubten uns mit einem einfachen Test zu untersuchen wie fest jedes Individuum auf Menschen 
fokussiert ist und weder sie auf Menschen mit positiven oder negativen verhalten reagieren. Wir 
konnten zeigen, dass unterschiedliche Aufzucht- und Haltungsbedingungen keinen Einfluss auf die 
kognitive Leistungsfähigkeit der Orang-Utans hatten, wohingegen unterschiedliche Reaktionen auf 
den Menschen kognitive Leistungsunterschiede am besten voraussagten. Im Einklang mit der 
Kulturellen Intelligenzhypothese zeigten Individuen mit einem höherem HOI-index ein besseres 
Aufmerksamkeitsvermögen und bessere Problemlösefähigkeiten. In Gefangenschaft aufwachsende 
Affen nutzen also nicht nur den Menschen als soziales Vorbild, was zu verminderter Neophobie führt 
(Kapitel 1 und 2), sondern der Kontakt  mit Menschen trägt darüber hinaus auch zu kreativerem 
Verhalten bei.  
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1.1 The evolution of intelligence 
 
Without a doubt humans stand out among animals with regards to our advanced cognitive capacities, 
innovativeness and flexibility, in other words those abilities we like to call intelligence. While humans 
are exceptional in the extent to which we possess such higher cognitive capacities, we are far from 
unique in being an intelligent species. To understand what the concept of intelligence means and why 
it became so extremely prominent in our own linage is one of the most intriguing but challenging topics 
in evolutionary research. Throughout this dissertation I will refer to intelligence as defined by 
Rumbaugh and Washburn (2003): “the ability of using acquired skills and knowledge innovatively, to 
unique advantages in solving novel problems”.  
 
While intelligence has been shown to partly consist of a heritable, genetically determined component 
in humans (Bates et al., 2013; Bouchard 2004; Deary et al., 2009; Davies et al., 2011; Nisbett et al., 
2012; Turkheimer et al., 2013; Joshi et al., 2015) but also in other animals (Galsworthy et al., 2005; 
Hopkins et al., 2014), it most certainly also represents effects of experiences acquired through learning 
processes (Wilson, 1991; Reader & Laland, 2002; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007; van Schaik & Burkart, 
2011; Galef, 2015). Consequently, in order to understand evolution of intelligence we need to improve 
our insight into the - what and how - underlying mechanisms promote learning and information 
processing in animals.  
 
Evolutionary histories, characterized by distinctive selective pressures, have produced species 
differences in brain size and cognitive plasticity. In species exhibiting high plasticity, environmental 
factors generate broad intraspecific variation in cognitive abilities. Accordingly, species differ in 
cognitive flexibility and further individuals within species differ depending on past experiences. 
Although constructed somewhat differently across animal taxa, the brain is responsible for 
information processing and cognitive functions. Since enlarged brains are connected with both 
increased cognitive capacities and flexibility (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Harvey, 1990; Dunbar, 1995; 
Byrne, 1997; Reader & Laland, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Lefebvre et al., 2004; Deaner et al., 2007), 
correspondingly, entangled with the evolution of intelligence is of course an interest in the evolution 
of larger brains (Isler & van Schaik, 2009; Navarette et al., 2011; van Schaik et al., 2012). Because brain 
expansion plays such a central role in human evolution, factors promoting intelligence have received 
intense interest, which has resulted in multiple hypotheses, all of which aim to explain the selection 
pressures responsible for the evolution of intelligence, as well as its convergent presence in animal 
taxa.  
 
Among these ideas, two have become most prominent. First, Richard Byrne put forward intelligence 
as a response to ecological challenges, evolved to succeed in extractive foraging - an idea referred to 
as the Technical- or Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis. The hypothesis assumes that animals confronted 
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with a challenging foraging niche, such as food items that are hidden and require pre-processing (e.g. 
extractive foraging), experience selection for higher-level cognition (Byrne, 1997). Second, based upon 
work suggesting that the cognitively most demanding aspects of primate life is their living in complex 
social groups (Humphrey, 1976), the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis covers the connection 
between intelligence and the complexity of an animal’s social environment, and thus argues 
intelligence evolved from the need to manage successfully in an ever-changing, and complicated social 
environment (Whiten & Byrne, 1988). In support of Machiavellian intelligence, correlated evolution 
between group size and the relative size of the neocortex ratio has been established among primates 
(Aiello & Dunbar, 1993). However, because many non-primate species also live in equally complex 
social groups, but are small-brained (Holekamp, 2007), an updated version of this idea states that the 
demands of maintaining pair bonds and social coordination have selected for larger brain size (Dunbar 
& Shultz, 2007). 
 
While both ecological and social challenges surely create selective pressures shaping the evolution of 
intelligence, it is highly debated to what extent cognitive abilities among non-human animals are 
domain-specific responses to particular ecological or social challenges rather than an expression of 
more human-like, general and flexible capacity to learn, commonly referred to as ‘g’ (Carroll, 1993; 
Reader & Laland, 2002; Deary et al., 2010; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011; Major et al., 2012;  Burkart et 
al., in review). Reader and Laland (2002) argued that selection on a general ability to learn is more 
efficient as an adaptive advantage in itself, rather than as a consequence of selection on separate 
domains. A focus on selection pressure targeting learning ability per se, combined with the 
breakthrough of extensive research on animal cultures, shifted the attention toward how underlying 
cultural processes link to cognition and the evolution of intelligence: i.e. cultural intelligence 
(Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 2000; Whiten, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2007; Whiten & van Schaik, 
2007; Reader et al., 2011; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011).  
 
At first, the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis was presented as a concept describing specialized socio-
cognitive skills unique to humans, in order to cope with our enriched cultural niche (Tomasello, 1999); 
or as Alice Roberts quipped: “fish are born expecting water, and humans are born expecting culture”. 
The quote symbolizes the nature of cultural complexity in humans, founded strongly upon specialized 
socio-cognitive abilities enabling exchange of knowledge across our cooperative and social lifestyle 
(Vygotsky, 1978; Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2007). Although this 
hypothesis was initially thought to apply to humans only, the context of cultural intelligence has since 
been expanded to all non-human animals adapted to rely on social learning (Whiten & van Schaik, 
2007; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis, as argued by van Schaik and 
Burkart (2011), expects intelligence to be affected by culture and underlying learning mechanisms on 
two different time scales. Over evolutionary time, the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis assumes that 
opportunities for social learning influence selection on the underlying learning processes. Because 
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selection on the effectiveness of social learning is largely selection on asocial learning abilities, species 
with systematically richer social environment may over time evolve to become more intelligent, 
reflected by larger brain size (van Schaik & Burkhart, 2011). Secondly, the Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis also predicts an influence on intelligence during the lifetime of an individual, by stating that 
individuals within a species (with very similar brain size and behavioral predispositions) show 
variation in cognitive performance and learning ability (intelligence) depending on the opportunities 
for social learning experienced during ontogeny. Thus, individuals growing up in a stimulus-rich 
environment can reach a higher degree of intelligence than an individual of the same species exposed 
to poor social conditions during the developmental phase. 
 
1.2 Orangutans as a model taxon 
 
The purpose of my dissertation was to test the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis as well as the related 
sub-hypothesis of the captivity effect (see below) by using orangutans as a model taxon. Orangutans 
are ideal for this objective. The genus Pongo contains some of our closest living relatives, representing 
two separate species where social learning plays an evident role in how they acquire their adult 
competence and culture-specific foraging niche, portrayed by broad diets and complex food processing 
techniques (van Schaik et al., 1996; van Schaik et al., 2003; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Schuppli et al., 2012; 
Schuppli et al., in prep.). Thus there are evident reasons to why orangutans need to develop 
intelligence. Orangutans live long lives characterized by a very slow life history, reaching adult skill 
competence only around the age of 12 (Schuppli et al., in prep.) and first reproduction around the age 
of 15 (Knott et al., 2009), which means they are the slowest-lived among non-human primates. 
Orangutans’ extended developmental phase is described by a long lasting tolerant mother-infant 
connection, which provides the infant with plenty of opportunities to learn the specific foraging 
complexity.  
 
Moreover, orangutan sociality varies among habitats and also species. The often volcanic and generally 
more fertile soils of Sumatra generate higher plant productivity and fruit availability than on Borneo 
(Marshall et al., 2009). This higher habitat productivity is the foundation for fundamental differences 
in socio-ecology between Pongo abelii and the Pongo pygmaeus species, allowing for higher densities 
within the populations of orangutans in Sumatra than Borneo. Consequently, the Sumatran orangutans 
show higher degrees of sociality and gregariousness, which also allows for intensified social 
transmission of skills and opportunities for social learning (van Schaik, 1999; Wich et al., 2006). As a 
result the cultural repertoires of the different orangutan species studied to date contain a broader 
dietary range and more complex feeding techniques amongst the Sumatran populations (van Schaik et 
al., 2003; Schuppli et al., in prep.). A further consequence of habitat productivity and feeding ecology 
is an increase in cranial capacity, and relative brain size from east to west across the range of orangutan 
habitats. Thus, the largest cranial capacity is documented from Pongo abelii, whereas Pongo pygmaeus 
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morio have significantly smaller brain sizes (Taylor & van Schaik, 2007). The significant differences in 
socio-ecological conditions gives us an excellent foundation for testing the evolutionary prediction of 
the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. However, because of the diverse biogeography any intrinsic 
difference between the two Pongo species is impossible to assess in their natural habitats, which is 
why a large part of my dissertation work was carried out under zoo conditions.  
 
The data collection on wild orangutans was conducted between July 2010 and April 2011 at two 
different study sites run by the Anthropological Institute and Museum of Zurich University: Suaq 
Balimbing, Sumatra and Tuanan, Borneo. Suaq Balimbing constitutes of a research area of 640 hectares 
located in the Gunung Leuser ecosystem in the province of Aceh in north Sumatra (3˚42’N, 97˚26’E) 
with an orangutan density of estimated 7 individuals per km2. The Tuanan research areal is situated 
in the Mawas reserve of central Kalimantan (2°09’S, 114°26’E) and reach over 1000 hectares with a 
density of 4 orangutans per km2. 
           Figure 2: Orangutan distribution and species division in their natural habitat (map: E. Willems). 
 
While the data conducted with field experiments in the natural habitat allowed me to investigate the 
ecological relevance of novelty response in orangutans, the data collection on zoo housed individuals 
allowed me to examine exploration and problem-solving abilities in greater detail and the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, the second data set upon which my thesis is constructed was 
conducted at the following European zoological gardens housing orangutans from both species of 
Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus: Zürich Zoo, Zoo Dortmund, Durrell Wildlife Trust, Twyycross Zoo, 
Allwetter Zoo Münster, Zoo Basel, Apenheul Primate Park, Paignton Zoo, Blackpool Zoo and Wolfgang 
Köhler Primate Center at Leipzig Zoo (Table 1).  
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Because the division of the Bornean Pongo taxa into three subspecies, Pongo pygmaeus pygmaeus, 
Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii and Pongo pygmaeus morio, was recently established (Zhi et al., 1996; 
Warren et al., 2001; Steiper, 2006), these subspecies of Bornean orangutans have not been managed 
separately in zoos and thus represent a general Pongo pygmaeus spp. Therefore zoo orangutans from 
Borneo are not monophyletic and probably carries genes from all three subspecies, which future 
genomic work will be able to revise (Greminger, 2015). The experimental study was supported by the 
British and Irish association for zoos and aquariums, BIAZA, and fully comply with the ethical 
guidelines for zoo housed non-human primates of each study facility, the European Directive 
2010/63/EU and are approved by the ethics committee of the University of Zurich in Switzerland. 
 
Table 1:  Zoological gardens where data collection took place.     
 
 
1.3 What is animal intelligence and how can we measure it? 
 
Human intelligence is typically measured with multiple tests assaying an array of cognitive abilities 
such as memory span, processing speed, visualization ability, mathematical achievement, verbal 
comprehension, spatial orientation etc., commonly classified together as a general intelligence factor 
‘g’ (Plomin, 2001; Colom et al., 2006; Gläscher et al., 2010; Burgess et al., 2011). Thus as we are 
interested in the evolutionary history of this ability, we need to measure comparable traits in non-
human animals. Since animals cannot partake in intelligence tests requiring language or advanced 
mathematical skills, the focus lies on detecting and measuring behaviors that require cognitive 
capacities. In nature animals use their cognitive abilities in various ways to overcome both ecological 
challenges, related to foraging and spatial orientation, as well as managing and maintaining social 
interactions. 
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One proxy for animal intelligence, which has been studied both in the wild and in the lab, is the concept 
of innovation. An influential and widely adopted definition of innovation was given by Kummer and 
Goodall (1985): “a solution to a novel problem or a novel solution to an old problem”. More recently van 
Schaik et al (2016) refer to innovativeness as “novel behaviors brought into a population through an 
individual invention” and link innovation capability to problem-solving skills and behavioral flexibility. 
In nature innovations remain rare and their emergence is critically influenced by ecological factors 
(van Schaik et al., 2016).  Furthermore, a positive relationship between innovativeness and brain size 
has been established across species in birds (Lefebvre et al., 1997; Timmermans et al., 2000; Sol et al., 
2005; Overington et al., 2009) and primates (Reader & Laland, 2002), supporting its validation as a 
measurement for animal intelligence (Reader & Laland, 2002; Lefebvre et al., 2004; Reader et al., 
2011).  
 
Innovativeness and underlying mechanisms have been extensively studied in captive settings where 
animals are presented with novel problems. This approach is increasingly also applied to wild 
populations (Webster & Lefebvre, 2001; Bouchard et al., 2007; Laidre, 2007; Liker & Bókony, 2009; 
Morand-Ferron et al., 2011; Overington et al., 2011; Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Thornton & 
Samson, 2012). However, problem-solving tasks, which are introduced only once for each animal, have 
been criticized for not capturing true individual cognitive variation and the lack ecological relevance 
(Rowe & Healy, 2014; Thornton et al., 2014). In nature it is hard to control for ecological influences 
and different experiences any individuals carry with them. In order to detect true differences in 
innovative problem solving, a task ideally represent a novel problem, which would not be encountered 
in the natural habitat, and be performed under identical conditions for all participants. Thus, in order 
to understand the process of innovativeness, natural observations provide insight in under what 
ecological conditions innovations occur and further experimental settings in captivity can expose 
animals with truly novel challenges, which are of great importance to complete the picture of what 
underlies an individual’s capacity to invent.   
 
1.4 How can intelligence evolve? 
 
The main adaptive value of intelligence is phenotypic plasticity, allowing for inter- and intraspecific 
variation under variable external conditions. Thus, because the end product of intelligence is acquired 
through learning, any species expressing higher levels of intelligence has to have undergone selection 
on learning mechanisms. Rumbaugh and Washburn (2003) described learning as “the foundation of 
intelligence”. Moreover, the learning to learn effect (Heinrich, 2016) illustrates the ability to modify 
and adjust behavior according to sensory information and inputs from one’s environment.  
 
When individuals live in social groups they can not only adjust their behavior and learn from 
environmental inputs but also from other individuals or the products of their actions, in other words 
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through socially meditated learning. First, socially facilitated learning allows for a naïve individual to 
use information in order to attend to relevant stimuli. Second, through social learning fitness-
enhancing skills can be acquired in both a faster and safer way than through asocial learning, which 
can be both time and energy consuming but also involves potential risks during independent 
exploration. Third, social learning enables individuals to directly construct their knowledge around an 
innovation originated by another, and thus social learning promotes conditions resulting in 
accumulation of skills and modification of previous innovations. As a result, social learning should 
favor the evolution of intelligence because skills necessary for fitness are acquired more efficiently and 
over time improve the learning-to-learn ability, especially because social learning ability improves 
asocial learning proficiency as well, as a result of many overlapping psychological mechanisms of 
information processing (Heyes, 2011; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011).  
 
The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis predicts that social learning is essential to the evolution of 
intelligence. Consequently, individuals that experience a high frequency of opportunities for social 
learning during development, should not only acquire more skills, but also become more intelligent. 
Thereby, asocial learning ability may well initially not have been directly selected for, although its 
function as a byproduct is of adaptive value, as it generates a higher innovative ability. This in turn can 
eventually lead to new innovations, which boost the cultural repertoire through an increase in the skill 
pool, which also in turn generates more opportunities for social learning and promotes selection for 
it. This loop of responses, all involving learning mechanisms, is what constitutes the evolutionary 
prediction of the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. The evolutionary perspective argues that species 
with a long history of enriched opportunities for social learning may over time improve both social 
and asocial learning abilities and therefore intelligence should be higher where opportunities for social 
learning have persistently been more frequent. 
 
         
Figure 1: The model of learning processes involved in cultural intelligence  
(Adapted from van Schaik and Burkart, 2011). 
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1.5 The effects of captivity – what can we learn? 
 
Animals housed in human structured environments differ a great deal from their wild conspecifics. 
Physiological differences caused by improved nutrition affect body condition and the rate of 
development (Hediger, 2013). Wild and captive individuals may also differ in endocrine profiles: in 
some species, captive individuals show higher cortisol levels compared to free living conspecifics 
(Rangel-Negrín et al., 2009; Weingrill et al., 2011). These differences may reflect the fact that the social 
conditions in captivity do not reflect their natural social structure in the wild (Weingrill et al., 2011). 
In this dissertation, however, I will ignore such physiological differences and focus on behavioral ones. 
Thus the captivity effect I will refer to throughout my thesis describes cognitive variation within 
species as a consequence of factors related to living in a captive habitat. Captive individuals differ in 
their cognitive skills and may even develop a different mindset than they would in their natural habitat 
(Call & Tomasello, 1996; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 2007). Although we must always study animal 
behavior in the natural world to understand its functional or adaptive aspects, the differences between 
wild and captive can contribute significantly to our understanding of phenotypic plasticity or the width 
of reaction norms. In particular, contrasts in cognition provide us with insights into how underlying 
psychological mechanisms develop depending on both physical and social environmental inputs.  
 
Among extractive foragers tool use is one cognitively regulated behavior boosted in captive conditions. 
Some species that do not generally use tools in their natural habitat do so in captivity (Bentley-Condit 
& Smith, 2010)—a phenomenon especially pronounced in both primates (Beck, 1972; Beck, 1976; 
Jordan, 1982; Boysen et al., 1999; Hihara et al., 2003; Santos et al., 2006; Gruber et al., 2010) and birds 
(Borsari & Ottoni, 2005; Bird & Emery, 2009; Seed et al., 2006; Auersperg et al., 2011; Gajdon et al., 
2011). Second, tool use tends to become more complex and diverse in captivity, a fact also found to be 
true for both primates (Haslam, 2013) and birds (Auersperg et al., 2011; Wimpenny et al., 2011). Some 
species that use simpler tools in the wild, modify and even manufacture tools in under captive settings 
(Hunt, 1996; Lehner et al., 2011; Shumaker et al., 2011).  
 
Many factors combined are believed to contribute to such an intensification of tool use in captivity. 
First, the absence of predators and a general risk free habitat increase free time and provide a 
reduction in cognitive load, which in turn promote explorative behaviors (Kummer & Goodall, 1985; 
Haslam, 2013; van Schaik et al., 2016). Second, arboreal species found in captivity increase their 
terrestriality, which is also argued to promote tool use (Meulman et al., 2012). As a third factor 
intensified social conditions, as often found in captivity, stimulate social transmission processes once 
a behavior has been invented (Haslam, 2013).  
 
The same factors influencing tool use can also cause increased exploration tendency and 
innovativeness in captive versus wild individuals, as reported in primates (Laidre, 2007; Russon et al., 
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2009; Lehner et al., 2010; Russon et al., 2010). When studied, other animals also show the same 
pattern: captive hyenas were more habituated towards man-made objects, and consequently showed 
lowered neophobia toward the test apparatus, which resulted in higher success in problem-solving 
compared to wild conspecifics (Benson-Amram et al., 2013). The same pattern was expressed in 
orangutans, when wild and captive individuals were compared (Forss et al., 2015). As a matter of fact, 
a lot of the cognitive differences between wild and captive individuals may be a direct or indirect 
consequence of the reduced neophobia observed in captivity.  
 
Thus in sum, cognitive differences between wild and captive primates have so far been attributed to 
reduced ecological costs, whereas social and developmental influences have - up to now – been 
understudied. Because primates have evolved to pay attention to others’ actions, captivity offers 
increased learning opportunities, which also extends beyond conspecifics to humans. The question 
remains whether this close contact with humans reflects a fundamental change in cognition. However, 
if it does we can use it as a tool to improve our knowledge of the plasticity of experience-based 
cognition in non-human species. Consequently, the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis is also testable 
using the captivity effect. A captive environment in general consist of intense social contacts, including 
more nearby conspecifics than in the wild and animal keepers that act as additional role models. 
Because different captive conditions, such as variable housing and rearing histories, generate variation 
in the amount of social- and skill learning inputs, variation in intelligence across captive housed 
individuals may vary. This diversity provides us with excellent conditions for testing the hypothesis 
and the impact of learning opportunities during an individual’s lifetime. 
 
1.6 Aims and content of the thesis 
 
This dissertation is based upon four main chapters representing original research. Each chapter has 
been written to stand independently and either has been or will be published in scientific journals. 
Three chapters are founded on empirical work performed with both wild and captive orangutans and 
one chapter consist of an extensive review of the current literature.  
 
This dissertation is divided into two major parts. In the first part I examine response to novelty and its 
link to innovation and social learning. In the second part I specifically test the Cultural Intelligence 
Hypothesis from two distinct perspectives: an evolutionary one (chapter 3) and a developmental one 
(chapter 4). In addition, throughout my dissertation the captivity effect plays an important role. I am 
specifically assessing the influence of a captive lifestyle on psychological mechanisms underlying 
novelty response and cognitive performance (chapter 1 & 4), whilst in chapter 3 captive conditions are 
used to control for biographic diversity and makes it possible to conduct an otherwise impossible 
honest comparative study of the cognition of the two Pongo species. 
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1.6.1 Novelty response 
 
How animals respond to novelty is highly interesting because it presents animals with new potential 
benefits in terms of niche expansion and resource use. However, responding to something novel also 
carries great risks and thus animals may differ in willingness to face such situations. Because neophilia 
has been reported to correlate with innovativeness (Seferta et al., 2001; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001; 
Bouchard, 2002; Reader, 2003), a positive novelty response has widely been assumed an important 
step toward innovation, and because large-brained species are highly innovative it is often believed 
they exhibit a drive to explore novelty (Sol et al., 2005; Overington et al. 2009). This assumption 
implies that innovations arise through an adaptive pathway on the individual level involving curiosity 
and novelty attraction. In most natural habitats attraction toward novelty is risky, and thus can only 
evolve where risk levels are reduced and investment in individual exploration is rewarding.  
Alternatively, innovations result from a social pathway, where individuals incorporate and modify 
novel behaviors under influence of social cues.  
 
In my first chapter I examined response to novelty in an innovative species, the orangutan. Systematic 
comparisons between wild and captive individuals of the same species is to date still very rare, 
although they are of great importance in our understanding of animal cognition. Furthermore, novelty 
response has never before been methodically assessed in a great ape species, especially not in their 
natural habitat. I started off by performing field experiments with wild orangutans on both the islands 
of Sumatra and Borneo. Since wild but habituated great apes can attend to humans one has to be 
cautious not to contaminate their natural behavior whilst introducing field experiments. Consequently 
field experiments introducing novelty to great apes are rare, and very little is known on how exactly 
they respond to new things, especially without any humans present. I was able to investigate the topic 
by using motion-triggered video camera traps, monitoring multiple locations in the forest canopy, 
complemented by focal follows of individuals. Because wild orangutans are known to produce 
innovations, and among the Sumatran species even more so than the Bornean (van Schaik et al., 1996; 
van Schaik & Knott, 2001; van Schaik, 2004; van Schaik et al., 2006), one would initially expect them 
to respond more positively towards novelty than their Bornean conspecifics. Remarkably the results 
reported orangutans of both species to be extremely conservative and indifferent towards novelty, be 
it potential food or objects. In contrast, a systematic control study on captive housed orangutans that 
relied on the same novel items revealed loss of neophobia. Zoo-housed orangutans reacted with a 
direct interest in novel items presented to them. These results document the paradox of an innovative 
species showing very low novelty response in the wild, but a contrasting novelty interest in captivity 
(chapter 2).  
 
My findings from the empirical study served as inspiration for the third chapter, an extensive literature 
review examining novelty response across taxa, with special focus of the paradoxical combination of 
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high exploration tendency and high neophobia, which seems to best describe species such as the great 
apes. In the review I argue that species with slow life history and relying on social learning can in fact 
afford to be rather neophobic in their natural habitat, which is crucial for our understanding of the 
significance and the behavioral outcomes of social learning (chapter 3). If innovative species, such as 
the great apes are not naturally particularly novelty-seeking, the pathway to innovation through 
novelty response is prevented in this lineage. Thus, such species are more likely to acquire their 
innovations in other ways, and presumably often through socially mediated learning, which also makes 
sense in the context of cultural intelligence.  
 
1.6.2 Testing the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis 
 
The second part of my dissertation concerns the consequences of strong reliance on social learning. 
When social learning is adaptive, the selection pressure on improving it must have been high. 
Accordingly the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis predicts that species systematically experiencing a 
higher number of social learning opportunities will end up evolving higher cognitive capacity. First, I 
aimed to test the evolutionary prediction of the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis by comparing cognitive 
abilities between two closely related species (Pongo abelii and Pongo pygmaeus) that have over an 
evolutionary time scale experienced variation in both niche complexity, sociality and thus underlying 
occasions for learning opportunities (chapter 4). In order to identify intrinsic differences between the 
two species, I carried out the comparison under constant zoo conditions. This allowed me to control 
for ecological and social variation, which inevitably generates species differences in multiple 
behavioral domains in the wild and thus confounds any comparisons of intrinsic differences. 
 
The zoo environment in which I performed my experimental study on cognition, also allowed me to 
examine the captivity effect in greater detail. Some species and definitely great apes, are able to attend 
to humans as a source of social information and thus social inputs are extended beyond conspecifics 
alone (Russon et al., 1998; Russon, 2003; Forss et al., 2015) and may serve as guidance for acquiring 
certain cognitively constructed skills. This may be especially pronounced in enculturated great apes, 
who also develop an enhanced ability in understanding human communicative actions (Call & 
Tomasello, 1996; Tomasello & Call, 2004).  
 
The second level at which I tested the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis was to test the prediction that 
captive orangutans should vary in intelligence (problem-solving and learning abilities) depending on 
their social experiences during ontogeny. This fifth chapter of my dissertation is the outcome of a close 
collaboration with my colleague Laura Damerius. By combining our separate data sets collected with 
identical methods, we could study within-taxon variation in intelligence across different captive 
conditions, with individual backgrounds ranging from recent arrivals from the wild to those that had 
spent their entire life in captivity, in rehabilitation centers on Sumatra and Borneo and throughout 
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European zoos. Our large sample included over 100 individuals, which therefore provided us with 
excellent conditions for testing the impact of learning opportunities, neophobia and human exposure 
during an individual’s lifetime. We especially investigated the relationship between human orientation 
and cognitive performance in physical cognition tasks. The results show that already before extreme 
enculturation, human orientation among captive great apes predicts their attitude and knowledge 
about problem-solving tasks, and thus influences within-species variation in performance levels 
(chapter 5). 
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2.1 Abstract 
 
Several studies have suggested that wild primates tend to behave with caution toward novelty, 
whereas captive primates are thought to be less neophobic, more exploratory and more innovative. 
However, few studies have systematically compared captive and wild individuals of the same species 
to document this “captivity effect” in greater detail. Here we report the responses of both wild and 
captive orangutans to the same novel items. Novel objects were presented to wild orangutans on 
multiple platforms placed in the canopy and equipped with motion-triggered video cameras. The same 
and different novel objects were also presented to orangutans in two different zoos. The results 
demonstrate extreme conservatism in both Bornean and Sumatran wild orangutans, who gradually 
approached the novel objects more closely as they became familiar, but avoided contact with them 
over many encounters spanning several months. Their zoo-living conspecifics, in contrast, showed an 
immediate neophilic response. Our results thus confirm the “captivity effect”. To the various ecological 
explanations proposed before (reduced risk and increased time and energy balance for captive 
individuals relative to wild ones), we add the social information hypothesis, which claims that 
individuals confronted with novel items preferentially rely on social cues whenever possible. This 
caution toward novelty disappears when human caretakers become additional role models and can 
also be eroded when all experience with novelty is positive. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
 
In recent years, interest in novelty response has soared because it is generally seen as a major source 
of behavioral innovations and creativity (Auersperg et al., 2011; Greenberg, 1990; Kaufman & 
Kaufman, 2004; Kaufman et al., 2011; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002; Reader, 2003), which in turn are 
regarded as a good measure of cognitive abilities (Reader et al., 2011; Reader & Laland, 2002). Novelty 
response is usually described by two main outcomes, neophilia and neophobia, which are generally 
considered two independent mechanisms (Carter et al., 2012; Greenberg, 2003; Greenberg & Mettke-
Hofmann, 2001; Hughes, 2007; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002; Mettke-Hofmann, 2014; Miranda et al., 
2013; Pisula et al., 2012; Russell, 1973; Sabbatini et al., 2007). While neophilia refers to the seeking, 
approaching and exploration of novelty, neophobia refers to avoidance of, reluctance to approach, or 
even fear of, novelty (Greenberg, 1990; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006; Mettke-Hofmann, 2014).  
 
The aim of this study was to examine how wild and captive orangutans respond to novel artifacts. Since 
what is novel is highly context dependent, responses may differ both qualitatively and quantitatively 
(Heyser & Chemero, 2011; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006). Because we could not measure the subjects’ 
internal state (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006), and thus could not estimate distress and fear, our focus 
here is on the observable behaviors. Various other studies have also estimated neophilia/ neophobia 
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as approach rates to novel artifacts and/or willingness to feed near them (Benson-Amram et al., 2013; 
Bergman & Kitchen, 2009; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001). 
 
In primates, most studies of novelty response conducted on captive groups describe neophilia 
(Addessi et al., 2007; Chamove, 1983; Ehrlich, 1970; Glickman & Sroges, 1966; Joubert & Vauclair, 
1986; Visalberghi, 1988). In contrast, the few available studies of wild primates report cautiousness 
toward novel artifacts (Menzel, 1966; Visalberghi et al., 2003). To ensure that this difference reflects 
the contrast between wild and captive conditions, within-species comparisons are required. We know 
of only two such comparisons with primates. First, after a habituation phase of banana provisioning 
on platforms, Visalberghi et al. (2003) investigated reactions towards novel food and novel objects in 
a group of free-ranging capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella. In contrast to captive capuchins (Visalberghi, 
1988; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1995), wild capuchins consumed very little of the novel food presented 
to them; furthermore they delayed approaching both novel food and novel objects compared to 
familiar food. A second study, involving rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, compared captive with 
semi-free ranging individuals, with similar results (Johnson, 2000). Thus, in contrast to the curiosity 
and neophilia reported from captivity, among wild primates novelty seems to elicit avoidance. Among 
non-primates, the only such comparison involves spotted hyenas, Crocuta crocuta, again with the same 
outcome (Benson-Amram et al., 2013). Moreover, among primates, there is growing evidence for social 
influences on the integration of novel food items into feeding repertoires (Addessi et al., 2007; Leca et 
al., 2007; Schuppli et al., 2012; Ueno & Matsuzawa, 2004; Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000; Visalberghi & 
Fragaszy, 1995), suggesting that upon encounter with novelty, primates use social cues rather than 
risky independent exploration.  
 
Other differences between wild and captive primates in the cognitive domain are consistent with 
differential responses to novelty, although they may also have other causes. Some primate species are 
known to use tools only in captivity, and some species using tools in the wild only manufacture them 
in captivity (Haslam, 2013; van Schaik et al., 1999). Wild orangutans (Pongo spp.), for instance, use a 
handful of simple tools, such as sticks and leaves, whereas their captive counterparts have a broader 
tool repertoire, perhaps because human induced artifacts create a broader range of opportunities than 
possible with naturally occurring objects (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Russon & Galdikas, 1993; Shumaker 
et al., 2011). Moreover, captive baboons, Papio anubis, performed better in problem-solving tasks than 
wild conspecifics (Laidre, 2007), a pattern also confirmed in spotted hyeans (Benson-Amram et al., 
2013).  
 
This captivity effect has mostly been explained with reference to environmental factors. Reduced 
predation and foraging pressure provide captive individuals with a risk-free environment, abundant 
free time, and excess energy (Benson-Amram et al., 2013; Haslam, 2013; Kummer & Goodall, 1985, 
Laidre, 2007). In addition it has been suggested that the exposure to man-made objects reduces 
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neophobia and enhances object handling (Benson-Amram et al., 2013; Laidre, 2007; van de Waal & 
Bshary, 2010). Further, in some species the social environment also differ in captivity not only 
resulting in increased social contacts with conspecifics (Haslam, 2013), but also social influence on 
behavior caused by the ability to attend to humans (Fredman & Whiten, 2008; Hirata et al., 2009). It is 
therefore worth exploring the role of novelty response in the overall cognitive differences between 
wild and captive conspecifics. 
 
The purpose of this study was to compare the novelty response between wild and zoo-living 
orangutans in order to examine to what extent we could replicate the “captivity effect” in novelty 
reactions within this species. We tested novelty responses in two wild populations, one on Sumatra 
(Pongo abelii) and one on Borneo (Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii). We also did two different kinds of zoo 
controls, one in which the exact same items were used and one in which other novel items were used. 
 
2.3 Methods 
 
2.3.1 The wild populations 
 
The experiments on novelty response were conducted on wild orangutans in Indonesia at two study 
sites: Suaq Balimbing on Sumatra, and Tuanan on Borneo. The study site of Suaq Balimbing is situated 
in the Kluet region of the Gunung Leuser National Park in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
(03°39'N, 97°25'E). The Tuanan research site is located in the Mawas Reserve in the Central 
Kalimantan province (2°09´S, 114°26´E). At Suaq, the experiment was run between November 2010 
and April 2011, and at Tuanan between August 2010 and April 2011. During these periods, 28 
orangutans were followed as focal subjects and regularily seen in the study area of Suaq Balimbing; 
eight adult females, two flanged males, four unflanged males, seven adolescents and seven infants. At 
Tuanan, 28 individuals were regular subjects of focal follows; seven adult females, seven flanged males, 
two unflanged males, five adolescents and seven infants.  The procedures for these experiments were 
approved by the Department of Forestry and Nature Conservation (PHKA) of the Republic of 
Indonesia.  
 
During the time period of these experiments we exposed the orangutans in their natural habitat to 
items they had never encountered before. The novel materials presented were placed upon natural-
looking platforms high in the canopy at various sites in the center of the study area, where the home 
ranges of many known females overlap. Because wild orangutans are occasionally seen exploring old 
nests in search of insects or re-building them for their own resting purpose, the platforms were 
established on a rattan base covered with leaves and branches of familiar tree species woven together 
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to resemble orangutan nests, so the subjects would react toward the novel items rather than the 
construction itself (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Platforms and novel objects presented to the wild orangutans: A fresh made orangutan night nest, a 
platform nest made to present the novel objects in the forest, a quadratic red Swiss flag presented together with 
plastic fruits or plastic flowers, and an orangutan doll. 
 
In Suaq, fifteen such platforms were placed at the most common travel height of orangutans within 
this habitat, 15- 30 meters (Prasetyo et al. , 2009), in four different tree species: Tetramerista glabra, 
Horsfieldia polyspherulla, Parastemon urophyllus and Sandoricum beccarianum. The tree species and 
exact location for the platforms were selected based on ranging patterns and most visited feeding 
trees, where the orangutans passed by on a regular basis (Figure 2). In Tuanan, where the forest 
canopy is lower, ten platforms were put up on a height of 10-15 meters in the following species in the 
center of the study area (Figure 2): Syzygium sp., Notophoebe umbeliflora, Shorea parvistipulata, Dyera 
lowii, Neoscortechinia kingii, Sandoricum borneense and Payena leerii.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Suaq Balimbing and Tuanan: orangutan travel routes and passes by the platform locations (30 m, 60 
m and 90 m) during the experimental time period 2010- 2011 c and d: Suaq Balimbing and Tuanan: travel routes 
and passes by the platform locations (no platform) during the control period (Suaq Balimbing: 2013- 2014, 
Tuanan: 2012- 2013). 
 
The novel objects presented on the platforms were yellow, white or pink plastic flowers, a small red 
quadratic flag (Swiss) in combination with plastic fruits and a small plush orangutan doll (40 cm) 
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(Figure 1). Plastic flowers were chosen because their colors stood out against the otherwise green 
canopy but also might be visually recognized from a distance as a potential food item. Orangutans 
occasionally feed on flowers from multiple different species familiar to them. The red quadratic flag 
represented a shape-color combination not naturally occurring in orangutan habitats. It was placed 
above the platform in order to draw attention to the location and the explorable plastic fruits on the 
platform below it. The orangutan doll could potentially at a distance resemble an infant sitting on a 
nest, but at closer proximity perceived as a novel stimulus.  
 
During focal follows at both Suaq Balimbing and Tuanan throughout the experimental period, we 
recorded all approaches toward a platform within 30 m (the approximate distance at which objects 
can be seen in the mid-canopy) using standardized focal protocols and ad libitum data (Martin & 
Bateson, 2007). Focal methods basically followed van Schaik (1999); a complete description can be 
found at: www.aim.uzh.ch/Research/orangutannetwork.html. At Suaq Balimbing, we additionally 
recorded all approaches to < 10 m to a platform, gaze direction if at < 10 m and any other responses 
(when present) of the orangutan. In order to maximize data collection but also to control for human 
influences on novelty response, five of the fifteen platforms at Suaq Balimbing and four out of ten at 
Tuanan (one camera less due to technical problems) were equipped with small and inconspicuously 
placed infra-red-motion-detection video cameras (DVREye Pixcontroller). The cameras were installed 
to record videos both day and night; batteries lasted up to three weeks, mainly depending on the 
number of motion-triggered events. The cameras were situated two meters in front of the platform to 
ensure covering all possible physical interactions on or with the platform. 
 
2.3.2 The captive populations 
 
It may be difficult to compare wild and captive conspecifics, because zoo-living subjects have been 
exposed to a wide variety of artifacts, making it harder to decide what is truly novel for them rather 
than merely similar and thus somewhat novel. We thus use the term ‘novel’ for artifacts never seen 
before by our subjects and adopted a dual approach. In our first control experiment with a zoo group, 
we used the same objects that had previously been tested in the wild populations. For the objects used 
in the wild we chose natural-looking artifacts in order to reduce the degree of novelty, since captive 
subjects may have more experience with artifacts in general. In an additional experiment on another 
zoo group, we presented subjects with two novel items of different categories, albeit different from the 
ones used in the wild, presented in the open. The data collected with the captive populations complied 
with the Swiss animal protection law and consisted only of non-invasive experiments and behavioral 
observations in accordance with the principles of the American Society of Primatologists (ASP). 
The first control experiment was conducted on seven Sumatran orangutans, Pongo abelii, housed in 
the Zurich Zoo: one unflanged male, one male infant, and five adult females, one of whom experienced 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
26 
 
her first pregnancy. The captive subjects were housed in an indoor enclosure of 480 m3 connected with 
an outdoor area of 188 m3. Every morning these orangutans are briefly sent into their sleeping 
quarters or a smaller room while their enclosure is being cleaned. As the orangutans are let back into 
their main enclosure, they can encounter enrichment objects such as old footballs, rubber pieces, 
cardboard boxes and paper sacks, within which food is occasionally hidden. These are provided 
routinely and the orangutans are very familiar with the cleaning process and the objects normally lying 
around in their enclosure. In order to keep everything as normal as possible during the experimental 
observations, in the morning after enclosure cleaning, the zookeeper placed the novel objects on the 
floor in the middle of the enclosure. The orangutans would enter their enclosure from different 
sleeping quarters at slightly different angles to the object location, but the objects were detectable 
from all different perspectives. We performed the novelty experiments during three continuous days 
in December 2011, presenting one type of novel object each day.  
 
Based upon information by the keepers, this group of subjects had never encountered any of these or 
similar artifacts before. However, the red quadratic flag was excluded from the captive part of this 
study, because these zoo orangutans are provided with red rectangular paper sacks on a regular basis, 
and a red flag would therefore not represent any particular novel shape or item to them, and also was 
not needed to draw attention in the open enclosure. The experimental time was set to one hour, 
although in all sessions the experiments were discontinued earlier because the objects had been torn 
into small pieces. The enclosure was video recorded from two different angles throughout the 
experimental sessions with two SONY HDV handy cameras. Time to first approach until contact with 
the objects, exploration spans, defined as durations of the manipulations of the objects and distances 
to other group members were recorded directly at the test sessions as well as subsequently from the 
videos. As a control condition we used the video recordings of one morning without any novel objects; 
the same data were collected on interactions with objects familiar to the orangutans in this zoo. On 
this randomly picked day the familiar enrichment items were red paper sacks and cardboard boxes.  
 
The second control experiment involved slightly different novel artifacts. It was conducted in February 
2009 on seven Sumatran orangutans, Pongo abelii, housed in Frankfurt zoo. This group of captive 
subjects was kept in a 253 m2 enclosure and consisted of one flanged male, three adult females, two 
immature males and one immature female. In this data set each subject was tested individually, except 
for mothers with dependent offspring (the latter would not participate in the test). On any given day, 
one individual was tested with one novel item in their main sleeping quarter. The following novel 
artifacts were presented on a small open platform: a soft blue rubber ball (diameter 13.5 cm) normally 
functioning as a dog toy and an Osram LED light, as a control condition approach latencies towards an 
empty platform were used. The degree of novelty inevitably differed somewhat between the used 
artifacts: due to the subjects’ previous experience with old footballs, the blue rubber ball might be less 
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novel to them than the flashlight. All experiments were video recorded and analyzed using Mangold 
interact 8.  
 
All statistical tests were run in SPSS 19. For the wild population of Suaq we had more detailed data on 
distances and gaze direction; here we used binary logistic regression to calculate the minimal distance 
at which gaze directed toward novelty occurred, and thus the platform was noticed by the orangutan. 
We used Spearman rank correlations to investigate the relationship between approaches to novelty 
and exposure time. For the zoo population, we used the non-parametric Friedman’s test, with 
additional post hoc analysis (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) in order to correct for multiple comparisons 
with the same subjects. All the data on the captive study at Zurich zoo was taken by SF and in Frankfurt 
zoo by DH. The data on the wild populations was taken by SF and NZ, accompanied by well-trained 
field assistants. All the data used in the analyses from the wild involve distances; these are frequently 
measured by all field staff in our study and trained with calibrated poles. 
 
2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Response to novelty in wild orangutans 
 
At Suaq Balimbing, platforms were maintained for 145 days and at Tuanan for 251 days. We first 
needed to exclude the possibility that there was something about the platform locations, other than 
the novel objects per se, that kept the orangutans from approaching them. The tree species itself, in 
which the novel objects were placed, did not influence the likelihood of approaching a platform (χ2 
(1,6)=8.316, P=0.216, N=71). Furthermore, we used ArcGis and GPS data to compare the range use 
patterns of the focal orangutans in the area with the platforms during the experimental period to a 
control period (the following year: Suaq Balimbing 2013- 2014, Tuanan 2012- 2013), when 
orangutans were followed during the exact same time period (and fruiting season), but in the absence 
of any platforms or cameras. We calculated the rates at which the orangutans passed the platforms at 
a distance of < 30 m, < 60 m and < 90 m during the experimental period (Figure 2A and 2B), and 
repeated exactly the same analysis during the subsequent period, examining the passing of the same 
locations as where the platforms had been situated (Figure 2C and 2D).  
 
The average passes per focal follow for both study sites, Suaq Balimbing and Tuanan (test- and control 
period), are plotted in Figure 3. The passing rates of the imaginary circles (30 m, 60 m and 90 m) of 
the platforms during the control phase were slightly lower, because we had used the observed traffic 
patterns right before the experimental period to decide on the locations of the platforms in order to 
maximize the possible approach rate. However, there was no evidence that the imaginary 30 m circles 
around platforms were avoided (Figure 3). We fitted regression lines to the average rate of passes per 
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follow as a function of distance from the platform locations to assess whether movement was basically 
random. If there was avoidance of the closest circles to the platform, the fitted lines would intersect 
the abscissa at values well below 0. The regression lines approximately pass through the origin and 
their confidence limits all include zero, as expected when movement was random relative to platform 
location. Similarly, the observed 30 m points during the experimental period do not lie clearly below 
the line connecting the origin and the rates observed at 60 and 90 m distance. Because the ranging 
patterns of the orangutans were random relative to the 30 m circle surrounding the platform, we 
conclude the orangutans showed neither active avoidance of, nor active attraction to the general area 
around the platforms during the experimental time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Average passes per full-day follow by wild orangutans at 30, 60 and 90 meters distance from the 
platform locations during the experimental year 2010- 2011 (test) and during the control periods, when no 
platforms were present. The straight lines are fitted linear regressions. Note that they all approximately intersect 
the origin, suggesting no avoidance of the imaginary 30 m circle around the platform. 
 
In the focal follows during the observation period, 59 cases were recorded at Suaq where an orangutan 
passed the platforms within possible viewing distance (30 m).  The number of recorded approaches 
across the 28 focal followed individuals ranged from 0 to 10. In addition, the motion-triggered video 
camera traps captured 12 additional independent passes when no human was present (none of which 
involved physical contact). In total at Suaq 49 approaches to 10 m or closer were noted. At Tuanan, 20 
approaches within 30 m were recorded during focal observations, plus none captured on camera 
(Table I). Because the focal data per individual were too sparse, we used the average pass rate 
(entering the imaginary 30 m circle) during all focal follows in the experimental period to characterize 
the average rate for the local population of coming close enough to the novel objects to view them. This 
rate, as extracted from GPS data in the platform area, was 0.78 per follow for Suaq and 0.37 for Tuanan 
(Table I). No individuals, apart from two adolescents Shera and Jerry (see below), were recorded to 
proceed until physical contact with the objects on the platforms during the experimental periods of 
145 and 251 days for Suaq and Tuanan.  
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Table I: Approaches to the platform by wild orangutans at Suaq Balimbing (Sumatra) and Tuanan (Borneo). 
Data recorded in the wild populations Suaq Balimbing Tuanan 
Number of approaches recorded during focal observations 
59 20 
Number of approaches recorded by video camera trap  
12 0 
Average passes (<30 m) per follow day 
0.78 0.37 
Average passes (<60 m) per follow day 
1.60 0.76 
Average passes (<90 m) per follow day 
2.48 1.09 
Number of experimental days 
145 251 
Number of days until first  physical interaction with platform 
110 (Shera) 74 (Jerry) 
Number of focal follows (> 6 hours) in the area during experimental time period 
139 311 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Median distance to platform, 
provided the focal animal had approached to 
within 30 meters to the platform, when it did 
not direct its gaze toward the platform with 
novel objects (n= 26) versus when it clearly 
did (n=33). 
 
 
At Suaq, data was taken on close proximity and gaze direction toward the platforms. At this study site, 
from 59 recorded approaches to within at least 30 m, 49 were to within 10 m or less. Wild orangutans 
would direct gaze significantly more toward the platform while they had approached to within 10 m 
radius than when farther away (binary logistic regression: N=59, Exp (B) =0.861, P=0.006, Figure 4). 
This implies that at a 10 m distance, the orangutans had usually noted the platform. For all focal follows 
at Suaq Balimbing we calculated the approach rates (corrected for focal time of each individual) and 
found that as time went by and the novel objects thus became gradually more familiar, individuals 
were more likely to approach to within 30 m (Spearman’s rho: r=0.260, N=48, P=0.081, Figure 5A). 
Furthermore, we found that the minimum approach distances, provided there was a close approach to 
10 m or less, decreased over time (Spearman’s rho: r= -0.439, N=49, P=0.002, Figure 5B). Thus, as time 
of exposure increased the orangutans gradually approached the objects more closely. 
 
The first and only time a wild orangutan at Suaq made contact with a platform and physically explored 
its contents was after 110 days. Similarly, at the study site of Tuanan the first and only physical 
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approach was recorded after the novelty had been presented for 74 days (Table I). The adolescent 
female that explored the novel objects at Suaq Balimbing (Shera) only approached after her attention 
had inadvertently been drawn to the platform because she noted a human restoring the platform. After 
observing the person handling the objects on the platform from a distance, the female approached 
immediately after the human had climbed down. She moved onto the platform and picked up a plastic 
red apple and tried to bite in it. After several biting attempts she made a tool out of a small twig and 
poked at the plastic apple with her twig tool. After unsuccessful attempts with the twig tool she picked 
up a second red plastic apple and tried a third processing technique by striking it back and forth onto 
a branch. Shera’s manipulation involved a feeding technique frequently used in her population, twig 
tool use (van Schaik et al., 1996). Further, her exploration span resembles the one measured in captive 
orangutans handling the same objects for the first time (Figure 6). Besides this one approach of 
physical exploration of the novelty, throughout the same time period at Suaq, 28 cases were recorded 
during focal follows, where an orangutan would explore a normal old nest, but no cases were seen 
where an orangutan handled the novel objects. The only individual in Tuanan who approached and 
physically explored the plastic flowers was a male adolescent (Jerry).  
 
Figure 5. A: Approach rates (number of approaches ≤ 30m per hour focal time) for all individuals with at least 
five approaches recorded during focal follows as a function of the time elapsed since the novel objects were first 
presented (exposure time); B: Relationship between all close approaches (≤10 m) and exposure time. The data 
refer to the wild population of orangutans, Pongo abelii at Suaq Balimbing. 
 
Both exploring individuals were adolescents. After their exploration of the novel objects no further 
physical investigation by the same individuals were recorded within the experimental time period. 
However, Shera passed a second platform with exactly the same objects on the same day only a few 
hours after she examined the plastic fruits for the first time. The second time around she approached 
to zero meters of the platform but only visually examined them and did not touch the plastic fruits 
presented there. 
 
A B 
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Figure 6: Comparison of exploration spans (in min) between wild (black bars) and captive (gray bars) subjects 
handling a novel object: a plastic fruit. 
 
Before these first contacts by the adolescents, it is highly unlikely that an orangutan at either site had 
approached to such close proximity that examination or manipulation of the novel objects would have 
taken place. First, in five of the 15 platforms at Suaq and four of 10 at Tuanan, such an event would 
have been recorded by the video camera, because the cameras did capture a diverse range of other 
animal species visiting the platforms. Second, not a single object was removed or dropped from the 
platforms, nor did the objects show any bite marks or other signs of physical exploration or 
disturbance. By using a crude estimate of approaches (mean number of 30 m passes per follow day 
times experimental days), by the end of the experiment the average orangutan at Suaq Balimbing had 
passed the platform location approximately 113 times, or 93 times at Tuanan, without ever handling 
the objects. However, it has to be noted that this estimate is based on the assumption of equal travel 
patterns for all individuals. 
 
Neither Shera nor Jerry was unusually keen to approach the platforms: 0.44 per follow day (N=16) and 
0.25 per follow day (N=8), respectively, close to the average values for their population. Shera’s 
response was similar to that of the population in general, as she too approached the platform to within 
30 m more as time went by (approach rate: Spearman’s rho r= 0.636, N= 13, P= 0.019) and gradually 
decreased her approach distance when getting to at least 10 m (Spearman’s rho: r= -0.824, N=6, 
P=0.044). By day 110, when Shera made contact with a platform, we estimate that she had passed by 
(< 30 m) roughly 48 times. The respective estimate for Jerry at day 74 at Tuanan would be 19 passes. 
Moreover, another adolescent at Suaq (Ellie) was observed within 10 m to a platform 10 times during 
the study period, but never physically explored the novel objects. 
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2.4.2 Response to novelty in captive orangutans 
 
In Zurich zoo the general approach latency towards novel objects was quite different: the Sumatran 
orangutans approached all novel objects tested within a few minutes (Figure 7A). They had similar 
approach latencies for the novel objects as for the familiar objects in the control condition (Friedman’s 
test: χ2 (3)=5.229, N=7, P=0.156). Similarly, the Sumatran orangutans housed in Frankfurt zoo 
approached the presented novel objects equally fast as the control condition when the platform was 
empty (Friedman’s test: χ2 (2)=0.519, N7, P= 0.772) (Figure 7A). In both zoo groups approach 
latencies varied individually, but were similar between the zoos despite the fact that experiments were 
performed in the group in Zurich and individually in Frankfurt. In the Zurich group the wider 
distribution of approach latencies toward the novel objects versus the control condition, especially the 
orangutan doll, was probably caused by the fact that only a single doll was presented in their enclosure. 
Therefore not all individuals had access to it simultaneously, whereas the familiar objects and the 
bundles of flowers and fruits could be torn apart for investigation by multiple individuals. In Zurich, 
because of the dominance hierarchy (S. Lehner, unpublished data), the two older females could not 
approach while the doll was being monopolized by the adult male.  
 
Figure 7. A: Approach to contact latencies (in min) to novel objects by the orangutans in Zurich zoo (the same 
ones as used for wild orangutans) and in Frankfurt zoo (a blue rubber ball with holes, normally used as a dog toy 
and a flashlight), compared with those to familiar objects or an empty platform, respectively, serving as a control 
condition; B: Total exploration time in minutes for the orangutans at Zurich zoo handling a familiar object and 
three novel objects. 
 
 
In Zurich zoo, where familiar objects served as a control condition, exploration spans were 
significantly different between conditions (Friedman’s test: χ2(3)=8.657, N=7, P=0.034), but using 
post hoc analyses and applying a Bonferroni correction, pairwise comparisons revealed that none of 
the durations between the control condition and the novel objects were significantly different 
A B 
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(between all conditions the critical difference at P=0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons, was 
12.74, Figure 7B) (Siegel & Castellan, 1988).  
 
Social proximity during novelty response in Zurich increased during the physical exploration of novel 
objects. A social partner was significantly more likely to be within two meters when a subject handled 
one of the novel items than when it was engaging with the familiar paper bags or cardboard boxes 
(Friedman’s test: χ2 (3)=9.927, N=7, P=0.019, critical difference = 12.74, Figure 8). During this closer 
proximity individuals often tried to grab the novel item from the individual handling it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of close social proximity 
(< 2 m) when handling a familiar object versus 
novel objects presented to the orangutans at 
Zurich zoo. 
 
 
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
2.5.1 Wild versus zoo orangutans 
 
Wild orangutans were extremely unresponsive toward the novel artifacts. In fact, the novel objects did 
not elicit any particular reactions for several months, and therefore we could only report approach 
data, except for the two cases in which individuals actually handled the novel objects. Although not all 
platforms were supplemented with cameras, the absence of any physical contact by the orangutans is 
highly plausible. First, whenever we checked the platforms, the objects showed no signs of having been 
handled or bitten, and were never found to have been removed. Second, we recorded no contacts 
during focal follows, except for the two cases of physical interaction (which also left obvious signs of 
handling on the platforms). Closer approaches were more frequent as time went by (Figure 5A and 
5B), and these closer passes were accompanied by visual inspection at a distance, suggesting gradual 
habituation to the novelty but no approach proceeding to physical exploration of the artificial objects. 
The two adolescents who eventually responded (one in each population) did so after several months 
of potential exposure. Indeed, contact latencies amounted to dozens of passes in the wild, even for the 
two adolescents who made contact after an estimated 48 and 19 passes (the latter necessarily are 
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estimates, extrapolated from their mean number of passes per follow day). Although the others 
orangutans had passed the platforms with novel objects at < 30 m about 100 times, they did not make 
contact with them. 
 
In contrast to their wild counterparts, zoo orangutans approached almost immediately after noticing 
the novel objects for the first time, regardless of whether they were the same items as used in the wild 
(Zurich zoo) or other perhaps somewhat more novel objects (Frankfurt zoo), and irrespective of 
whether they were tested as a group (Zurich) or alone (Frankfurt). Thus, their contact latencies 
correspond to a single pass in the wild, and contact ensued within a few minutes at most. Zoo 
orangutans approached all the novel objects as fast as the control conditions of familiar paper sacks 
and cardboard boxes or an empty platform (Figure 7A and 7B).  
 
In the zoo setting the subjects also spent equal time exploring the novel objects as they did the familiar 
ones (Figure 7B), suggesting interest in the unfamiliar even though no success in food search followed. 
Even if the zoo subjects regarded the novel objects as less novel than their wild counterparts, given 
their previous enrichment experience, they were clearly equally willing to approach and explore the 
novel objects as the familiar ones. This indicates that these groups of zoo-housed orangutans do not 
distinguish novel items as irrelevant nor potentially harmful compared to familiar ones.  
 
The comparison, though producing a striking contrast, was not entirely unbiased. First, the animals 
tested in Zurich zoo were always in association, and it has been shown that association reduces 
neophobia so that novelty is approached faster in a group context than alone (Marzlufi & Heinrich, 
1991; Stöwe et al., 2006). However, in the study performed at Frankfurt zoo each subject was tested 
individually and showed similar short approach latencies. Moreover, the orangutans at Suaq are also 
frequently in association (van Schaik et al., 1999), so differential sociality can only explain a small part 
of the difference. Second, novelty may cause stronger reactions in a familiar environment (Harris & 
Knowlton, 2001), and the zoo animals live in far smaller enclosures than their wild counterparts. 
However, the latter are obviously also very familiar with their habitat, (e.g. Janmaat et al., 2012), and 
continued to show no response toward the novel objects after dozens of passes. Thus, while the 
comparison cannot be made totally unbiased, the dramatic difference we observed is real and requires 
explanation. 
 
2.5.2 Explaining the captivity effect 
 
This documented marked difference between wild and zoo orangutans in their response to artificial 
novel objects suggests that something about these two conditions fundamentally changes the response 
to novelty. So far, the main explanation has referred to time constraints. Due to the lack of predation 
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pressure and foraging challenges, captivity has been argued to provide animals with a more relaxed 
time budget (Kummer & Goodall, 1985) or an excess of energy (Benson-Amram et al., 2013), allowing 
for more exploration. However, Benson-Amram et al. (2013) demonstrated that the higher problem-
solving ability in captive versus wild spotted hyenas could be attributed to reduced neophobia rather 
than differences in time and energy. Thus, while the reduced attentional and perceptual load in 
captivity (due to lack of predation or the need to search for food and plan the daily routes) may free 
up animals to become more exploratory, having more free time per se does not explain reduced 
neophobia.  
 
One key factor may well be risk (Haslam, 2013; Kummer & Goodall, 1985). Wild orangutans cannot 
know whether novel objects are dangerous, and given their long life expectancy (Wich et al., 2004) 
may benefit from being conservative. Because exploration times themselves were similar for zoo and 
wild orangutans, once the latter approached the items (Figure 7A and 7B), the difference between the 
wild and captivity is truly in the lack of avoidance of novelty. Risk assessment surely differed between 
the two conditions. Zoo-living animals only have positive experiences with novel items, which are 
usually food or playthings, and thus may have overcome any initial neophobia as a consequence of 
positive reinforcement with man-made objects. In fact given the less diverse environment of a zoo, the 
zoo subjects may have seen the artifacts as worth approaching and exploring. Their wild counterparts 
clearly did not. This may appear surprising, given that in the wild especially immature orangutans can 
spend up to 45 % of their daily activity budget engaged in play, including play with familiar objects in 
their habitat (van Noordwijk et al., 2009). On the other hand, exploration spans were similar between 
wild and captive subjects once an approach was made. If limited time and energy determined the 
response, this would not be expected.  
 
While lack of risk and increased value of the objects may cause part of the documented difference 
between wild and captive orangutans in our study, we also propose social information as a 
complementary explanation. One obvious way to avoid risk when dealing with novelty is to use social 
information. Naïve wild orangutans can attend to role models and heavily rely on social learning in the 
acquisition of their diet. Maturing individuals with abundant opportunities for social learning have 
come to rely preferentially on socially learned skills to construct their cognitive abilities (the cultural 
intelligence hypothesis: van Schaik & Burkart 2011; see also Herrmann et al., 2007; Whiten & van Schaik 
2007). They thus follow experienced role models around and minimize independent exploration (e.g. 
orangutans: Jaeggi et al., 2008; Jaeggi et al., 2010; van Schaik et al., 2003). As a result, naïve orangutans 
tend not to interact with novel features in their environment until they have seen experienced role 
models interact with them. Rare food items are more likely to be unfamiliar to these naïve immatures, 
and indeed in their natural environment, orangutan infants focus much more visual attention toward 
their mothers when the latter are feeding on food items that are very rare in the feeding repertoire 
(Jaeggi et al., 2010; C.S., unpublished). Interestingly, unfamiliar objects in captivity also elicited social 
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attention (Figure 8). Thus, the availability of social information is consistent with the novelty 
avoidance in wild orangutans. 
 
This account suggests that novelty avoidance is the natural response of wild orangutans. The 
availability of social information can help us understand the loss of novelty avoidance in captivity 
because in a zoo environment, human keepers serve as additional role models. Once these conditions 
are in place, the greater opportunity for social learning due to intense contact with conspecifics 
maintains and even boosts this captivity effect. Thus, we suggest that in species that have the ability to 
attend to humans as an additional source of information the neophilia seen in captivity arises in part 
because the novel items (objects, stimuli, and even spaces to some extent) are associated with humans 
and thus are implicitly approved for exploration. Indeed, semi-free ranging rhesus macaques have 
been reported to accept novel food faster when handed to them by humans than when they 
independently discovered it in their habitat (Johnson, 2000). Likewise, orangutan orphans reared in 
rehabilitation centers and sanctuaries, experience human role models as replacement for their own 
mothers, and when in semi-natural conditions become very exploratory (Russon et al., 2009; Russon 
et al., 2010).  
 
The two cases of contact in the wild are also consistent with a role for social information. When Shera, 
at Suaq Balimbing, approached and explored the novel objects, her attention had been drawn to them 
by a familiar human engaging with the objects (note that no physical approach was recorded in the 
absence of humans by the video camera traps). Furthermore, experiments have shown that infant 
orangutans refuse novel foods offered by unfamiliar humans unless they witness them being accepted 
by conspecific adults (Rijksen, 1978). In general the presence of conspecifics influence the acceptance 
of novel food in orangutans (Gustafsson et al., 2014; Hardus, 2012) a pattern also found in some other 
primate species, e.g. aye-ayes, Daubentonia (Krakauer, 2004) and capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella 
(Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000).  
 
Future work should examine the range of species in which the captivity effect can be documented, and 
moreover what aspects of a captive environment causes novelty response and other behaviors to differ 
from that in natural habitats. The social information hypothesis predicts that in species with strong 
orientation toward tolerant role models in regular skill acquisition during development, but also 
gregarious, tolerant foraging per se, social attendance boosts interest in novelty. However, we stress 
that this idea is not meant as an alternative to the effects of ecological factors such as limited 
environmental stimulation, abundant free time and good physical condition. Regardless of the factors 
causing the captivity effect, an important unresolved question remains to what extent the documented 
cognitive differences between wild and captive populations (e.g. Laidre 2007; Benson-Amram et al., 
2013) can be attributed to different attitudes towards novelty. 
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2.5.3 Neophilia and cognition 
 
Innovations have been shown to correlate with neophilia (Day et al., 2003; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001). 
Wild orangutans avoid novelty. Yet, they have large innovation repertoires (van Schaik et al., 2006), 
and the Sumatran population at Suaq is the technologically most advanced orangutan population, 
showing a variety of tool uses, which are known to be based on innovations (van Schaik et al., 1996; 
van Schaik, 2004; van Schaik & Knott, 2001). Admittedly, the one individual (Shera) at Suaq exploring 
a plastic apple used a stick tool to do so, but most others at Suaq ignored these novel objects, also after 
long exposure time. Moreover, we found no major differences between the Bornean and Sumatran 
sites with regard to reactions after passing within 30 m of a platform.  
 
This comparison thus supports the idea that novelty response and high innovative ability do not 
necessarily go together (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014; Griffin & Guez, 2014). First, as noted above, the 
attitude toward novelty and the tendency to explore are probably independently regulated at the 
proximate level. There were no differences between the wild and zoo individuals in exploration time, 
once the latter had proceeded to physical contact with the novel objects. Second, as suggested by the 
orangutan comparison, highly technologically innovative species, such as great apes, may well owe 
their large innovation repertoires to their efficient social learning, which strongly increases the 
chances of persistence of any innovations that happen to have been made (van Schaik et al., 2003; see 
also Koops et al., 2014). 
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3.1 Abstract 
 
It is often thought that innovative species are those that are attracted to novelty. These species would 
thus benefit from a combination of low neophobia and a high exploration drive, which are known to 
be independently regulated motivations. Here we draw attention to the innovation paradox: the most 
innovative vertebrate animals tend to show neophobic reactions when confronted with novel objects 
or food. Whereas previous work has often stressed the role of ecological factors (dietary flexibility and 
predation risk), here we also consider the role of social information, especially in species with slow life 
history. We find that empirical studies support the role of both ecological factors and social 
information. Specifically, we see that neophobia is generally reduced by social facilitation and the 
presence of experts. Age effects vary depending on access to social information: where it is present, 
young individuals can afford to be neophobic, where it is absent or the novelty is classified as non-
dangerous, immatures are less neophobic than adults. We draw attention to a strong neophobia-
reducing effect of being in captivity, an important cause of which is that humans act as social 
information sources. We propose that the species showing the paradoxical combination of strong 
neophobia and strong exploration tendency can rely on social information to select aspects of the 
environment worth exploring, and also tend to have a slow-paced life history, and thus long potential 
life expectancy. The social information hypothesis can thus explain the innovation paradox. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
Novelty response refers to the way an individual responds to novel stimuli (object, food, context, or 
environment). It is often categorized as neophobia (avoidance of novelty) or neophilia (attraction to 
novelty). Here we regard neophobia as a behavioral phenomenon, i.e. the avoidance, indifference or 
lack of interest in novelty. This focus allows us to remain uncommitted about the underlying 
motivation; this can be either aversion or fear, but these two can normally not be disentangled without 
additional experiments (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006). Such analyses are rarely undertaken and would 
be especially difficult in the wild. As a result, a focus on the regulatory mechanisms would preclude 
broad comparative analysis. A neophilic response, in contrast, is defined as attraction towards 
unfamiliar things or places, accompanied by a strong tendency to explore them.  
 
Neophobia and neophilia are often treated as lying on a single linear scale, for instance as the endpoints 
of the boldness-shyness continuum in personality studies (e.g., Brown et al., 2005; Burns, 2008; Frost 
et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 1994; Wilson & Stevens, 2005). However, whenever this has been 
investigated, neophobia and neophilia were found to be independently regulated motivations (Biondi 
et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2012; Greenberg, 2003; Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 2001; Hughes, 2007; 
Mettke-Hofmann, 2014; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002; Miranda et al., 2013; Pisula et al., 2012; Russell, 
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1973; Sabbatini et al., 2007). Accordingly, they are also presumably controlled by different genes 
(Weisstaub et al., 2006). Thus, the absence of neophobia does not automatically imply neophilia; 
likewise, the absence of neophilia does not necessarily indicate neophobia. In the following, we will 
therefore consider neophobia and neophilia as distinct, independent traits, and to underscore this, we 
will from here on refer to neophilia as exploration tendency.  
 
One consequence of considering neophobia and exploration tendency as independent variables is that 
we can examine how they can be combined. This is shown in Figure 1 (after Greenberg & Mettke-
Hofmann, 2001; Mettke-Hofmann, 2014), where for ease of reference each variable is dichotomized 
into low and high. We can therefore ask which kinds of species or individuals are expected to occupy 
the space defined by these four combinations. In this review we are especially interested in the 
paradoxical combination of high neophobia and high exploration tendency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Possible combinations of neophobia and exploration tendency with predicted category of species 
representing each cell. 
 
Two of the other combinations are straightforward.  Dietary generalists, consuming an array of diverse 
food types, characterized by species with low neophobia and high exploration tendency, have received 
most attention. They can be contrasted with the opposite combination, characteristic for habitat and 
diet specialists. The combination of low neophobia and low exploration tendency is unexpected for 
species that can recognize novelty, because one would expect species with a strong response to novelty 
to subsequently explore the novel items. This combination is therefore perhaps most likely in species 
lacking the cognitive abilities to recognize novelty or to gain from exploration, and thus presumably 
most common among invertebrates. Unfortunately, most research on invertebrate novelty responses 
concerns spatial neophobia rather than responses to novel objects (Kralj-Fišer & Schuett, 2014), so the 
generality of novelty recognition in invertebrates remains unexplored. Therefore, in this review we 
mainly deal with vertebrates, especially birds and mammals.  
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Our aim is to develop an understanding of the functional basis for the extensive variation in novelty 
response, especially between species but to some extent also within species. We will do this by 
developing predictions and then examine the existing studies in light of them. Although the ecological 
aspects have been much studied and recently been reviewed by Mettke-Hofmann (2014), the non-
ecological aspects have so far received less attention, so we will pay particular attention to those.  
 
Because our main focus is on neophobia, we will start by considering its possible functions and by 
developing predictions. We will next discuss methodological issues potentially influencing the 
possibility to compare findings on novelty responses. These include the confounding effects of several 
simultaneous factors that are not always controlled for, individual variation in the perception of 
novelty and variation in experimental paradigms (Greggor et al., 2015). Finally, we assess the 
predictions with a review of the literature. 
 
3.3 The possible functions of neophobia 
 
Most animals live in habitats where they experience risks such as predation pressure, pathogens, 
poisonous prey or plant toxins. Thus in many species and conditions there is a benefit to avoiding 
potentially hazardous novel stimuli, i.e. neophobia (Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 2001). This implies 
a selective advantage to having such a protection mechanism (Barnett, 1958; Greenberg, 2003; Rozin, 
1977).  Accordingly, a study of captive-bred swift foxes, Vulpes velox, showed how novelty response 
can affect survival. Individuals with reduced neophobia, as assessed during rearing in captivity, 
experienced higher mortality than wild-born foxes after release into the wild, suggesting that there are 
fitness benefits to neophobia (Bremner-Harrison et al., 2004). 
 
This functional perspective leads to a basic prediction: animals should avoid novelty if they can (Corey, 
1979), but do so less or not at all if they cannot afford to because they lack vital skills or access to 
resources, or if the risk is so low that it is outweighed by the benefits of exploration (examined below). 
This basic prediction can be differentiated into many subsidiary predictions, which are all of the ceteris 
paribus variety, i.e. keeping the effect of other relevant variables constant. 
 
First, animals should be more neophobic if they have access to social information, so they acquire the 
relevant information without exposing themselves to risk (Galef, 1993). This prediction can be tested 
both within species (when sociality varies) and between species that vary in sociality. Moreover, 
individuals that are naïve, either because they are young or recently immigrated, should be especially 
keen on social information. However, if naïve individuals do not have access to social information or 
when they are in risk-free contexts, we expect the opposite: they should be less neophobic than adults 
or residents. 
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A second subsidiary prediction concerns habitat effects. Where the habitat has intrinsically low risk 
for the individuals concerned, they are expected to be less neophobic (Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 
2001; Brown et al., 2013; Mettke-Hofmann, 2014). Such variation may exist within species, e.g. when 
populations live in different habitats that vary in risk (e.g. urban versus rural), or when captive 
populations are compared with wild ones. It may also exist between species, e.g. in species living on 
islands or in highlands without predators versus their close relatives in different habitats. Finally, 
immigrants entering a new habitat encounter much more novelty and may be forced to be less 
neophobic than residents, who live in familiar habitats (Martin & Fitzgerald, 2005; Mettke-Hofmann 
et al., 2009; Nilsson et al., 2010; Candler & Bernal, 2014). This prediction can apply to individuals or 
populations of the same species or to different species (for testing purposes ideally congeners). 
 
A third subsidiary prediction concerns the effects of life expectancy on neophobia. Acceptable level of 
risk should depend on life expectancy (van Schaik et al., 2006): where this is low, acceptable risk level 
goes up and, consequently, neophobia decreases. Thus, old individuals and those that are starving or 
low-ranking (and thus have lower life expectancy, unless they can improve access to limiting 
resources) should be less neophobic. Similarly, species with short life expectancies (fast life-history 
pace) should be less concerned with novelty avoidance than those with long life expectancy. Note that 
for infants, the life expectancy argument claims that the risk of responding to novelty is highest, 
whereas their naïve status may imply they have the highest need to do so, unless they have access to 
social information. 
 
A final prediction concerns the ecological niche. Some species are dietary generalists, and provided 
they cannot rely on social information, are forced to be less neophobic (Greenberg, 1983; Greenberg, 
1984, Greenberg, 1990a; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001). Within species, individuals may vary in 
personality or genetic endowment. Natural selection may not lead to a single optimum within a 
population, and individuals may thus differ in the neophobia. 
 
3.3.1 Exploration tendency 
 
Exploration also involves costs, first and foremost because exploring potentially toxic or noxious plant 
parts and venomous or poisonous prey represent a direct risk. There is also a tradeoff between time 
dedicated to exploration and other crucial activities, such as attention to predators or hostile 
conspecifics (Dukas et al., 2009). Especially when an explorative act is unsuccessful, e.g. due to limited 
cognitive abilities, exploration also entails an opportunity cost. Thus, we can make the same basic 
prediction for exploration as for neophobia. An animal should explore if the risks are minimal and 
therefore outweighed by alternative strategies such as social learning (O'Hara et al., 2012), or if it is 
dependent on individual exploration in order to gain fundamental skills or access to resources. This 
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basic prediction can again be differentiated into subsidiary predictions. However, there is far less work 
that will allow us to test them, in part because in experiments exploration tendency cannot be cleanly 
separated from novelty response. As a result, we will not examine it in detail here (but see van Schaik 
et al., 2016), but instead mainly emphasize the dependencies between exploration and novelty 
responses. First, when a species has low neophobia one should also expect a high tendency to explore, 
since otherwise the response to novelty is not functional. Similarly, a species that lacks a tendency to 
explore does not need to reduce its neophobia. On the other hand, as we argued above, there may be 
species that have high neophobia, but nonetheless also have a high tendency to explore. 
 
3.4 Factors affecting comparisons 
 
Reviewing the evidence regarding these numerous predictions concerning novelty response assumes 
that we can compare existing studies. Apart from lack of control for alternative factors, variation in 
experimental procedures may hamper comparisons. We therefore must briefly consider 
methodological issues. When we compare within individuals or between individuals from the same 
population with the same basic paradigm, novelty responses such as approach latencies and 
exploratory behaviors should not be affected by the factors we consider below. However, when we 
compare studies using different paradigms or different species even if using the same paradigm, 
problems may arise. Although in most published studies such confounding effects are minimized 
because they assess closely related species, it is important to pay attention to them. 
 
3.4.1 Variation in the recognition of novelty 
 
An obvious precondition for responding to novelty is the ability to recognize novelty per se, in other 
words, to realize that an object or stimulus, or its context, is different from the familiar one and thus 
novel (Kaufman et al., 2011). Age classes almost certainly vary in their ability to identify novelty, with 
adults being better than naïve immatures. This variation may be one (usually unacknowledged) source 
of intraspecific variation. Species may also vary in the ability to recognize novelty, because it requires 
some minimal cognitive capacity. Studies of hippocampal lesions in rats have shown that novelty 
response is linked to the size of the hippocampus (Broadbent et al., 2004). Similar results are reported 
for non-human primates in that lesions in the hippocampus impair recognition (Zola & Squire, 2001; 
Nemanic et al., 2004). Thus at least in mammals the hippocampus is involved in novelty recognition 
(Sokolov, 1963). Although it’s relative size varies among animals (Kaufman et al., 2011), we are not 
aware of evidence for variation in the ability to recognize novelty among vertebrates. Major variation 
is unlikely, however, because insects such as bumblebees, Bombus terrestris, can distinguish stimuli of 
“sameness’” from “difference” (Giurfa et al., 2001) and accordingly respond to novelty with avoidance 
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of the unfamiliar items, followed by exploration before accepting a novel food source (Forrest & 
Thomson, 2009; Muller et al., 2010). 
 
3.4.2 Heterogeneity due to the degree and type of novelty 
 
One source of heterogeneity in responses that is generally not considered is the degree of novelty 
(Hughes, 1997). Since animals must always compare a new stimulus or context to some standard, the 
size of the perceived difference from the standard may lead to variation in the strength of the response. 
Most tests will make the novel stimuli as different as possible to avoid this problem, but if not all 
studies succeed to an equal extent, this may cause artificial variation in response. This problem may 
especially affect interspecific comparisons and interpretations on what neophobia tests measure (see 
extensive discussion by Greggor et al., 2015). Furthermore, many studies use human-made objects, 
which does not necessarily correspond to any novelty an animal may encounter in its natural habitat 
(see discussion on ecological relevance of novel objects by Koski, 2011). 
 
Once novelty is recognized and assessed, the animal must decide upon a response based on its 
classification of the novel stimulus as a potential predator or otherwise dangerous object, a potential 
food item, or a neutral object (Greggor et al., 2015) (Figure 2). Moreover, a novel object classified as 
neutral can be further classified as interesting or not depending on the species’ predisposition toward 
object manipulation or play behavior, which may also depend on age (Koops et al., 2015). As a result, 
novelty responses to different items may vary, and may also be regulated differently (Mettke-Hofmann 
et al., 2006).  
 
These expectations are supported by empirical studies. For example, studies on object exploration in 
mice, Mus musculus, and garden warblers, Sylvia borin, have shown that individuals habituate to and 
approach smaller objects faster than larger objects (Heyser & Chemero, 2011; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 
2006). Ravens, Corvus corax, approached round shaped objects faster than long and thin objects, and 
novel animal carcasses elicited the longest approach latencies, indicating that the experience of 
potential predators in the habitat influence the judgment of when to explore (Heinrich et al., 1995). 
Similarly, exploring an unfamiliar space may imply a greater risk than exploring a novel object. In birds 
(starlings, Sturnus vulgaris; mountain chickadees, Poeclile gambeli) and fish (guppies, Poecilia 
reticulate), responses to novel surroundings and to novel objects were not correlated, suggesting 
independent regulation (Boogert et al., 2006; Burns, 2008; Fox et al., 2009, Carazo et al., 2014). 
Individuals also respond differently to novel stimuli under threatening circumstances (Carter et al., 
2012). Response to threatening contexts is correlated with neither novel food response (Coleman & 
Wilson, 1998) nor exploration tendency (Koski & Burkart, 2015; Massen et al., 2013, see also Réale et 
al., 2007; Carter et al., 2013). 
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Figure 2: Pathway of possible outcomes of novelty recognition. 
 
In conclusion, different mechanisms may regulate reactions toward novel environments versus novel 
objects in the environment, or regulate responses to potential food items versus potential predators 
or poisons. Because of this heterogeneity, we will from here on focus exclusively on novelty reactions 
toward potentially novel food and novel (non-predatory) objects in general. This choice affects the 
taxa that we can compare, because most work on invertebrates concerns spatial neophobia (see 
review: Kralj-Fišer et al., 2014). 
 
3.4.3 Heterogeneity due to experimental paradigms 
 
Comparisons between studies may also be hampered by differences in experimental paradigm among 
studies. Figure 2 shows four major kinds of design: (a) novel objects presented next to familiar food; 
(b) novel objects per se; (c) novel foods per se; and (d) familiar foods embedded in or associated with 
novel problem-solving apparatus.  
 
The typical “neophobia test” measures approach latencies to a novel object presented next to familiar 
food or feeding area (Figure 3A) relative to the latency in the absence of the novel object. In the 
literature this paradigm commonly reports species differences in willingness to feed close to novelty, 
which might reflect an aspect of risk taking (Greenberg, 1984; Greenberg, 1990; Webster & Lefebvre, 
2001; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002). Variability in the direct approach toward a novel object, also 
referred to as the “neophilia test” (Figure 3B), often captures age or personality differences, so that 
immature or bold/exploratory individuals tend to show more novel object exploration than adults 
(Joubert & Vauclair, 1986; Heinrich, 1995b; Mayeaux & Mason, 1998; Bergman & Kitchen, 2009; 
review of personality literature on boldness: Carter et al., 2013). The novel food test (Figure 3C) often 
reports social influences on approach and acceptance (Addessi et al., 2007; Chiarati et al., 2012; 
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Gustafsson et al., 2014; Heinrich, 1988; Ueno & Matsuzawa, 2004). A final commonly used design is 
presentation of a novel problem-solving task or puzzle box containing familiar food (Figure 3D).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Experimental paradigms commonly used in studies 
assessing responses toward novelty; A. “Neophobia test”: a novel 
object is placed in close proximity to familiar food or foraging site, 
where approach latency to feed is measured, B. Approach latency 
towards a novel object per se, C. Approach and consumption of a 
novel food item and D. A novel foraging task or puzzle-box novel to 
the animal but presenting a familiar food item as reward. 
 
These studies are mostly designed to measure problem-solving ability or innovativeness. However, 
from the animal perspective they may be confounded by variation in novelty response elicited by the 
unfamiliar apparatus. Indeed, some of these studies simultaneously demonstrate a positive 
relationship between latency to approach the apparatus and success (Auersperg et al., 2011; Benson-
Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013; Sol et al., 2012), whereas others find no link between 
approach latencies and successful performance (Cole et al., 2011; Kendal et al., 2005; Shaw et al., 2015; 
Thornton & Samson, 2012). Moreover, in some settings a neophobia test is performed separately from 
a problem-solving task, but findings regarding the link between the two are diverse: while some 
studies report a negative relationship between high neophobia scores and problem-solving ability 
(Biondi et al., 2010; Bouchard et al., 2007; Koski & Burkart, 2015; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001), others 
find no influence of neophobia on innovativeness (Boogert et al., 2006; Griffin et al., 2013; Liker & 
Bókony, 2009). In conclusion, the kind of study paradigm used may induce variable responses in 
otherwise identical species or individuals. For example the age effect may be more visible in a novel 
object test than in a novel food test, simply because youngsters classify neutral objects differently from 
adults (see age and learning effect below). Thus comparisons, especially between species that are not 
closely related, should ideally be based on the same paradigm. 
 
In the next sections, we will evaluate the evidence in favor of the various variables affecting neophobia 
and exploration tendency, in the order indicated in the introduction. 
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3.5 Social influences on novelty response 
 
A social lifestyle may affect the novelty response of independent individuals in two different ways. 
First, simply being together with other, equally naïve individuals may reduce the risk of approaching 
novel objects, because the divided attention needed to attend to the novelty and especially subsequent 
exploration is less risky when others nearby are vigilant for predators (Dukas et al., 2009). Second, 
naïve individuals, for whom the objects are novel, may rely on experienced individuals, for whom the 
objects are not novel or are better at classifying it. Accordingly social impacts will be intertwined with 
age or experience effects. All other things being equal, long association with parents or other 
caretakers (often linked to slow life-history pace) would favor greater neophobia, because developing 
individuals can acquire experience through social learning, directly or indirectly. There is indeed 
evidence for this preferential reliance on social information (Gunst et al., 2008; Jaeggi et al., 2010; 
Slagsvold & Wiebe, 2007; van Schaik et al., 2016). In contrast, species with non-overlapping 
generations or a solitary lifestyle will have to be less neophobic than otherwise comparable species 
that live in association with the parental generation. One such example concerns Octopus spp, a 
taxonomic group reported to respond to novelty in a rather explorative manner (Mather & Anderson, 
1999; Oinuma, 2008). 
 
An effect of sociality on neophobia has been reported for a wide range of species (Tables 1-4, Appendix 
I). Different aspects of social effects are sometimes hard to disentangle. We organized studies 
according to variability in experimental design, in an attempt to identify the independent effects of 
sociality per se and of association with experienced individuals. Because age effects and sociality are 
often intertwined, we also examine intrinsic variation among age-sex classes in novelty response here. 
 
3.5.1 Social facilitation effects 
 
It has often been suggested that a social environment reduces stress when approaching novelty in a 
group context than exploring alone (Greenberg, 1990a; Moretti et al., 2015; Stöwe et al., 2006a; 
Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000). Some studies have focused specifically on testing a possible social 
facilitation effect by comparing novelty response of the same subjects when they were alone versus 
when they were in a social context (Table 1, Appendix I). Compared to the solitary condition, a social 
setting was found to reduce neophobia in tests in various mammals (Forkman, 1991; Moretti et al., 
2015; Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1995; Voelkl et al., 2006; Yamamoto & 
Lopes, 2003) and birds (Coleman & Mellgren, 1994; Soma & Hasegawa, 2004). These studies were all 
conducted in captive settings where individuals are easily separated for individual testing.  
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However, when tested in a natural group condition, wild spotted hyenas, Crocuta crocuta, also showed 
significantly shorter approach latencies to a novel problem solving apparatus if a conspecific was 
already present at the apparatus than when approaching alone (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012).  
 
Some studies did not find social facilitation of the novelty response. In some bird species the social 
setting did not reduce approach latencies to novelty (Apfelbeck & Raess, 2008; Griffin et al., 2013; 
Overington et al., 2009). The negative result in one study could be attributed to details of the 
experimental design (Apfelbeck & Raess, 2008), but this did not explain the results in other studies. In 
some cases, birds that are permanently gregarious can afford to have a tendency to simply wait for 
other, potentially more experienced, individuals to take the lead. This could explain the absence of 
social facilitation per se in mynahs (Griffin et al., 2013; Sol et al., 2012), as well as the reports that 
individuals from larger groups of birds show higher neophobia and higher social tolerance than birds 
from smaller flocks (Dardenne et al., 2013). Alternatively, a negative effect may arise because animals 
in the social condition are more likely to be scrounged (Bugnyar & Kotrschal, 2002; Coolen & Giraldeau, 
2003; Griffin et al., 2013; Mathot & Giraldeau, 2010; Stöwe et al., 2006a). In conclusion, therefore, a 
positive effect of sociality on novelty response is commonly, but not universally, found. 
 
3.5.2 Age and learning effects 
 
For a young individual most of the world is novel. We can call this subjective novelty, to stress the fact 
that the items themselves may have been in the environment for a long time, but are new to the naïve 
individual. To an experienced adult, in contrast, most of the environment is familiar, and perceived 
novelty will thus generally be true novelty.  
 
The basic prediction would therefore be that a youngster’s neophobia is expected to be lower than that 
of adults, and its tendency to explore commensurately higher (Figure 4). This prediction holds for 
solitary species or when risk is regarded very low. However, there may be two conditions in which this 
prediction may not hold. First, in species in which immatures are reliably accompanied by 
knowledgeable adults (including parents), the presence of role models during infancy will permit 
neophobia. However, when immatures and adults are simultaneously exposed to novelty, the 
immatures may respond more strongly due to social facilitation (discussed above). In either case, we 
expect immatures to show higher explorative behavior toward items that have been classified as non-
dangerous or toward familiar objects than adults.  
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Figure 4: Predicted variation in novelty response during three different life phases (infancy, juvenility + 
adolescence, and adulthood) of species exhibiting high neophobia and high exploration tendency. During infancy, 
novelty response must be high when no social information is available, but neophobia is expected where it is. 
Adolescents often have become independent from parents and other role models, but still benefit from 
exploration for niche expansion. Under these conditions, neophobia should be reduced and a period of higher 
independent exploration will ensue. This period comes to an end, once the individual is fully adult and has gained 
experience to allow it a reduced novelty response. 
 
 
The second reason for immatures to be more neophobic than adults is linked to life-history pace.  For 
young individuals in species with a slow life history and thus high potential immature survival and 
long life expectancy, it is unprofitable to jeopardize survival before reproductive age is reached. 
Therefore they should rely on social information as long as possible. A delay in natal dispersal until 
well after weaning is believed to be linked to the need to learn vital skills in primates (Deaner et al., 
2003; Isler & van Schaik, 2009; Schuppli et al., 2012), and there is increasing evidence that many birds 
stay with their parents after fledging (Chiarati et al., 2012; Drobniak et al., 2015). These conditions 
should favor higher neophobia in youngsters than adults, especially older adults. This has been argued 
for humans, where the impact of own mother is strongest in children faced with unfamiliar food 
(Harper & Sanders, 1975). In many cases, we expect immatures of species with slow life history to rely 
on social information, and thus be more neophobic than adults, but also nonetheless to be more 
exploration prone. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of experimental studies of this double prediction. They were based on 
the experimental paradigm of exposing an entire social group to some novel item and compare the 
age-sex classes in their latency to contact it. The majority of studies listed in Table 2 use the paradigm 
of Figure 2B: reactions toward a neutral, inedible novel object or a novel problem-solving apparatus. 
Where a difference is found, immatures, especially the older ones, are more inclined to approach and 
contact novelty than adults. This may simply due to more experienced adults classifying an object as 
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irrelevant faster and thus remaining uninterested or losing interest sooner (Figure 4). Indeed the lack 
of response in adults of both titi monkeys, Callicebus moloch, and macaques, Macaca fuscata, were 
reported to reflect indifference rather than caution (Mayeaux & Mason, 1998; Menzel, 1966).  
 
Exceptions may reflect methodological artifacts. While no age effect was reported in wild capuchin 
monkeys, Cebus apella, in response to novel objects, immatures were more responsive towards novel 
food (Visalberghi et al., 2003), which goes against the normal pattern of primates relying on social cues 
in novel food acceptance (Ueno & Matsuzawa, 2004; Voelkl et al., 2006; Yamamoto & Lopes, 2003). The 
lack of the predicted age pattern here may reflect the fact that the capuchins were habituated to find 
edible items on platforms (see effect of risk-free habitat below).  
 
It is important to differentiate between infants and juveniles or adolescents. In meerkats, Suricata 
suricatta, juveniles were more likely to approach novelty than adults, whereas pups did not generally 
interact with the novelty (Thornton & Samson, 2012). This difference between younger infants and 
other immatures has also been found in other species (Table 2, Appendix I), where the very young ones 
are more inclined to rely on role models (Biro et al., 2003; Fairbanks & McGuire, 1993; Fu et al., 2013). 
The exploration peak during adolescence may be important because it is likely to generate new 
innovations and thus prevents the erosion of the innovation repertoires of local populations. Overall, 
then, juveniles and adolescents appear to have the highest tendency to approach novelty. 
 
These conclusions remain tentative, because age-sex classes may differ in their susceptibility to social 
facilitation. The ideal way to eliminate this possibility is to compare responses between individuals 
tested alone. Very few studies have done so; they are listed in Table 3. While four studies are consistent 
with the findings compiled in Table 2, three found that adults had the same motivation to approach 
novelty as youngsters. It may not be a coincidence that those species are cooperative breeders (Table 
3, Appendix I). In species where adults act as caretakers, they may exhibit an intrinsic protective 
mechanism regarding response to novelty. Obviously, at this stage this remains an open question. 
 
3.5.3 Dependence on experts 
 
In some species individuals might respond differently to knowledgeable experts compared to merely 
other individuals in their group, or an individual may be especially likely to use social information 
when there is an asymmetry in knowledge, e.g. in the presence of a trained demonstrator. Table 4 lists 
the studies on novelty response where some individuals are regarded “experts” and thus the item in 
the test is not novel to them.  All studies found that naive subjects rely on social information when 
given the opportunity. In birds and rats, naïve individuals learn to avoid unpalatable prey/ food 
through social learning from more experienced conspecifics (Galef et al., 1984; Galef & Wigmore, 1983; 
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Mason, 1988; Thorogood & Davies, 2012), in part through observation of a conspecific’s disgust 
response (Sherwin et al., 2002; Skelhorn, 2011). Even in species not habitually associating with the 
parental generation, as in many fish, there is evidence that young fish exposed to a demonstrator use 
social cues in acceptance of novel food (Brown & Laland, 2002). Importantly, these subjects were 
exposed to a trained or non-trained demonstrator adult fish rather than a group condition, which 
excludes the social facilitation effect. Thus, we see a widespread effect of asymmetries in social 
information on novelty response. 
 
The studies compiled in Table 4 also support the idea that the nature of the social cue matters: mothers 
are preferred over fathers (striped mice, Rhabdomys pumilio) (Rymer et al., 2008), familiar over 
unfamiliar (pigs, Sus domesticus) (Figueroa et al., 2013) and dominant over subordinate (lemurs, 
Eulemur macaco macaco) (Gosset & Roeader, 2001). Reducing risk by trust in a specific social source 
is implicated by the observation that immature ravens followed a sibling significantly faster towards 
a novel object than non-siblings even if a social setting per se didn’t reduce neophobia (Stöwe et al., 
2006b). Kin spent more time in close proximity and thus provided more opportunities for both 
learning and social facilitation (Stöwe et al., 2006b). Thus kin may be seen as a more reliable source of 
social information than non-kin. The same pattern of faster approach in kin-condition was also evident 
in canids (Table 1, Appendix I) (Moretti et al., 2015).  A similar pattern holds for primates. Aye-aye 
infants, Daubentonia madagascariensis, accept novel food items only once they had observed their 
mother consuming them (Krakauer, 2005). Similarly juvenile marmosets, Callithrix jacchus, did not 
consume novel food when tested alone, but did so in the presence of their related adult group members 
(Yamamoto & Lopes, 2003), although the study did not test whether the same effect was found when 
tested with non-group member adults.  
 
In addition to the experiments examining social effects on novelty response listed in Table 4, natural 
observations support the prediction as well. Learning one’s feeding niche is closely associated with 
novelty response, yielding insight into the underlying mechanisms. In various primate species, naïve 
individuals rely on experienced experts to guide their approach to foods that to them are novel: lemurs, 
Eulemur fulvus, (Tarnaud, 2004), howler monkeys, Alouatta palliata, (Whitehead, 1986), mountain 
gorillas, Gorilla gorilla beringei, (Watts, 1985), orangutans, Pongo spp, (Jaeggi et al., 2008; Schuppli et 
al., 2012), and chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes (Lonsdorf, 2006; Matsuzawa et al., 2001).  
 
Recent food experiments on great apes showed that social attention to known group members was the 
main factor influencing ingestion of novel food types also among adults in both chimpanzees and 
orangutans (Gustafsson et al., 2014). Without others present, these species are extremely neophobic 
in the wild, despite a very opportunistic feeding niche (Forss et al., 2015; Takahata et al., 1986) (see 
effect of captivity below). Another study on orangutans exposed to novel food found that repeated 
exposure to a novel food item did not increase acceptance, but observing a conspecific consuming it 
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did so (Hardus, 2012). In humans, children are evidently explorative to collect information of their 
environment, but are nevertheless mostly unenthusiastic when new food is first presented to them. 
However, this initial food neophobia can be weakened by social influence and multiple experience with 
unfamiliar food (Addessi et al., 2005). Human children in the age of 2-5-years were also able to 
selectively pay attention whether the demonstrator ate food with same color code as themselves and 
accepted their novel food accordingly (Addessi et al., 2005). Thus the trust in the mother or other 
tolerant experts is crucial. Overall, therefore, the effect of the presence of trusted experts on 
immatures’ approaching novelty or ingesting novel foods is found in many species. 
 
3.6 The effect of risk variation in different habitats 
 
Some individuals may move between various habitats and thus experience many potential foraging 
possibilities that are novel to them. Thus, wide-ranging and especially migratory species should show 
reduced neophobia. Some studies indeed report migrant individuals to be less neophobic than 
residents in approaching a novel object (Nilsson et al., 2010) or in entering a novel room (Mettke-
Hofmann et al., 2009). Similarly, house sparrows from an expanding population were less neophobic 
toward novel food when compared with individuals from a long established resident population 
(Martin & Fitzgerald, 2005). In a migrating warbler species, Dendroica castanea, Greenberg (1984) 
tested reactions to novel and familiar microhabitats and found that the birds preferred foraging in 
microhabitats resembling those they experienced as juveniles. Thus even if migration and habitat 
change may reduce neophobia, individuals become more hesitant towards novel habitats as adults by 
showing a preference for familiarity, consistent with the age effects noted above.  
 
Intriguingly, in between-species context the opposite pattern was found, so that resident bird species 
are less neophobic and more explorative than migrants. This has been shown in two closely related 
warbler species, Sylvia spp, concerning reactions in a novel space (Mettke-Hofmann, 2007), and in 
different species of New World blackbirds (Icterids), by using the classical neophobia test (Figure 2A) 
(Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2013). These results suggest that at least in these bird genera, migrants are 
cautious towards potential new risks in an unfamiliar habitat (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2013). However, 
among the blackbirds the resident species also approached in greater number in the neophobia test, 
suggesting that social facilitation from conspecifics may have confounded this result.  
 
Nonetheless, these diverse results suggest that additional factors besides habitat may play a role. One 
possibility is to examine whether young individuals of these particular species acquire their feeding 
skills through independent exploration or with use of social cues (Lefebvre & Bouchard, 2003; 
Slagsvold & Wiebe, 2007). Learning a species-specific niche may in fact reveal underlying mechanisms 
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involved in novelty response. It has also been demonstrated in birds that social learning increases with 
increasing gregariousness and environmental opportunism (Lefebvre & Giraldeau, 1996). 
 
Another prediction is that where predation risk is generally reduced, species should show reduced 
neophobia relative to closely related species (Mettke-Hofmann, 2014). In a broad comparison, island 
species showed shorter latencies to explore novel objects (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002). This 
difference may explain why bird species on islands have generally expanded their niches relative to 
their mainland relatives, and thus the presumed ancestral state (Ebenman & Nilsson, 1982; Yeaton & 
Cody, 1974).  Similarly, living in a safe habitat may explain the increased exploration tendency found 
in kea parrots, Nestor notabilis, living in open, high-altitude habitat (Gajdon et al., 2011), and in the 
robin, Petroica longipes, hailing from Kapiti island off New Zeeland (Maloney & McLean, 1995; Shaw et 
al., 2015). 
 
3.6.1 The risk-free existence in captive environments 
 
Individuals may change their novelty response depending on previous experiences or current 
conditions. For example, individuals living in captive conditions face drastically reduced 
environmental risks, which modifies the process of an individual’s learning about its environment and 
responses to novelty.  
 
The effect of captivity may have two non-exclusive dimensions. First, reduced neophobia may reflect 
a repeated lack of negative reinforcement (Haslam, 2013; Kummer & Goodall, 1985). Animals should 
therefore generally differ between wild and captive conditions. Second, in species attending to role 
models in their learning processes, human caretakers may become regarded as role models and thus 
their actions attended to in a similar way. Thus, the captivity effect should be stronger in species that 
rely on social information, because these species showing the strongest neophobia in the wild.  
 
So far quantitative, systematic comparisons regarding the captivity effect only exist for a few species: 
wild rats, Rattus norvegicus (Barnett, 1958; Tanas & Pisula, 2011), mice, Mus musculus domesticus 
(Kronenberger & Médioni, 1985), hyenas (Benson-Amram, Weldele & Holekamp, 2013), and 
orangutans (Forss et al., 2015). Moreover, strong conservatism toward novelty in the wild, compared 
to captive conditions have been recorded for primates, which generally rely on social information 
(Forss et al., 2015; Fu et al., 2013; Johnson, 2000a; Laidre, 2007; Menzel, 1966; Visalberghi et al., 2003). 
Especially “enculturated” apes can associate human actions with novel objects and attend to them 
accordingly (Tomasello & Call, 2004; Tomasello et al., 1993).  
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Within-species differences due to rearing and captivity are also reported in birds (see Table 5, 
Appendix I): ravens, Corvus corax, that were reared in captivity approached novel animal carcasses (as 
well as edible and inedible inanimate novel objects) faster than wild ravens (Heinrich, 1988). 
Moreover, the captive subjects would approach and interact with any object familiar or non-familiar 
after the known human experimenter had handled it, supporting the hypothesis that some captive 
animals beyond primates use their caretakers as sources of social information. Similarly, in orange-
winged Amazon parrots, Amazona amazonica, hand-reared juveniles were less neophobic than the two 
other captive treatment groups (parent reared/ human handled and parent reared/ no handling) up 
until the age of six months. After one year of age all three groups showed same levels of neophobia, 
which the authors ascribed to the effect of experience the birds had gathered by then (Fox & Millam, 
2004). It may not be a coincidence that both reports are for species with slow-paced life history. In 
other species of birds, captured individuals kept in aviaries may readily respond to both novel objects 
and foods to participate in learning experiments. This would not be possible with most primates. 
 
We can look more closely at the possible mechanisms underlying the strong reduction of neophobia in 
captivity in the species that are highly neophobic in the wild. For generalist feeders, it has been argued 
that food neophobia is acquired after repeated experience of conditioned taste aversion with novel 
foods (Johnson, 2000b; Rozin, 1976). However, this assumes low or even absent neophobia as the state 
of departure, which holds neither for these primates nor presumably for many rodents (Barnett, 1958; 
Galef, 1970; Galef & Clark, 1971). Thus, we should instead look for processes that wear down 
neophobia. The most obvious candidate is social information: if captive primates consider human 
caretakers as reliable sources of information, seeing the caretakers handle food and handing it to them 
should reduce the neophobia toward that food. This habituation and erosion of neophobia towards 
food offered by humans has been shown in semi-free ranging conditions: macaques accepted novel 
food faster when it was handed to them from humans than when they encountered the same items in 
their habitat (Johnson, 2000a). Similarly, baboons, Papio papio, responded weakly when tested on 
novel food-access puzzles in the wild, hardly manipulating the objects used in the experimental set up 
in order to get to the preferred foods, whereas captive baboons are known to eagerly manipulate 
objects (Joubert & Vauclair, 1986; Laidre, 2007).  
 
Alternatively, the captive-wild differences have been attributed to time constraints linked to a life in 
the wild (Kummer & Goodall, 1985), which offers fewer opportunities for developing an understanding 
about objects and their physical affordances compared to captive life (Laidre, 2007). Nevertheless, 
wild primates regularly engage in object manipulation within their foraging niche and although time 
constraints can influence the explorative time devoted to human-introduced objects, they cannot 
provide the whole explanation for the observed shift in interest towards novelty between captive and 
wild. Captive individuals may have learned to associate novelty with caregivers and thus allowed this 
social information to reduce their initial neophobia and induce curiosity. In conclusion, the erosion of 
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neophobia in captivity can be due to the combination of reduced negative reinforcement and humans 
acting as social information sources. 
Socially encouraged curiosity is well documented in domestic dogs. In a setting associated with 
humans, dogs, Canis familiaris, exhibited prevalence for novel objects when choosing between one 
novel and two familiar toys (Kaulfuss & Mills, 2008). The process of domestication generally involves 
selection on reduced neophobia and thus the same two general factors identified above are therefore 
at work in domestication of dogs as well. First, dogs generally lack negative experiences when 
approaching and handling novel objects in the presence of humans. Second, dogs are strongly human-
oriented and see their owners as trusted experts. Dogs are less neophobic than closely related wolves, 
even when both are housed in similar captive settings (Moretti et al., 2015).  Dogs are better at 
following human actions than wolves, which primarily attend to conspecifics (Range & Virányi, 2014). 
Thus the domestication of dogs can be seen as an extreme example of the captivity effect.  
 
Reduced neophobia may improve problem-solving ability. In a comparison of captive and wild spotted 
hyenas, the higher problem-solving ability of captive subjects was attributed to both a reduced 
neophobia and an increased exploration tendency (Benson-Amram et al., 2013). Thus, neophobia, 
while generally adaptive in the wild, may come at a price, in that the species is less likely to produce 
sophisticated innovations, and accumulate them through social transmission into cultural repertoires. 
 
3.7 Life expectancy and novelty response 
 
Variation in life-history traits should play a role, in that a long life expectancy will enhance selection 
on conservatism and risk avoidance, which in turn should also affect the response to novelty. One could 
expect life expectancy to create interspecific differences in novelty response, but none such broad 
species comparison exist due to the challenge of controlling for all factors systematically across 
multiple species. However, within-species differences in novelty response in regard to life history 
traits are addressed and incorporated in personality studies. 
 
3.7.1 The influence of personality 
 
Studies of animal personalities typically include novelty response as representations of boldness 
and/or exploration tendency traits (Carter et al., 2013; Koski, 2014; Patrick & Weimerskirch, 2014; 
Wilson et al., 1994). Inter-individual variation in novelty responses can arise because optimum 
behavior depends on physical condition and life history. Individuals with low future prospects of 
reproduction or survival should increase their fitness potential by taking more risks to maximize 
energy acquisition and reproduction opportunities. Also, individuals with faster growth rate require 
more energy and, consequently, take more risks to meet the energy requirements. Conversely, those 
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with higher likelihood of survival or reproduction, or slower growth, should be more cautious (Biro & 
Stamps, 2008; Dall et al., 2012; Kight et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2007).  This prediction is supported in the 
grey mouse lemur, Microcebus murinus, where degree of boldness, measured as response to a novel 
environment as well as a novel object test, is related to life-history trade-offs: younger males with a 
longer life expectancy and potentially high future reproductive success express lower boldness than 
older males of the same population (Dammhahn, 2012). Similarly, in domestic dogs, Canis familiaris, 
breeds with more docile or shy behavioral characteristics have lower mortality and lower energy 
needs than breeds with more aggressive and bold characteristics (Careau et al., 2010). 
 
3.7.2 Rank effects 
 
Social status has been suggested to influence novelty responses, but the results are unequivocal. In 
meerkats, Suricata suricatta, subordinate males were less neophobic than dominants towards a new 
foraging apparatus (Thornton & Samson, 2012), whereas in crows, Corvus corone, subordinate birds 
would overcome neophobia and exploit new food sources only after the dominant male initiated the 
exploration (Chiarati et al., 2012). In coyotes, Canis latrans, dominant individuals were also less 
neophobic than subordinates (Mettler & Shivik, 2007), whereas no clear rank effect was found in wild 
spotted hyenas, Crocuta crocuta (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012) nor capuchin monkey, Cebus 
apella, (Visalberghi et al., 2003). These variable findings regarding rank effects indicate that cost and 
benefits of novelty response may vary in different ways in different social systems, in particular in 
relation to the skew in access to resources. However, at present, we cannot exclude confounding effects 
of variable test paradigms. 
 
3.8 Variation due to feeding niche 
 
Dietary effects on neophobia should be widespread. Ceteris paribus, one would expect species with a 
diverse and complex diet to have reduced neophobia in order to maximize use of the feeding niche. 
Comparing two closely related warbler and sparrow species, Greenberg (1990) experimentally tested 
for the effect of dietary plasticity and found more specialized species to react with stronger neophobia 
than their dietary-generalist congeners. Webster and Lefebvre (2001) measured willingness to feed 
close to a novel object (Figure 3A) to compare Passeriformes and Columbiformes in their feeding 
flexibility, but also estimated their responses when faced with novel feeding opportunities in a 
problem-solving task (Figure 3D). Passeriformes, which feed on a broader diet, had shorter approach 
latencies in the neophobia test and also outperformed the Columbiformes in the problem-solving task. 
However, when comparing two Darwin’s finches, Tebbich et al., (2012) found that small tree finches, 
Camarhynchus parvulus, show higher neophobia than woodpecker finches, Cactospiza pallida, despite 
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the fact that tree finches forage on a more diverse diet. Thus, diet effects are not clear, perhaps due to 
uncontrolled confounding variables. 
 
So far the generalist hypothesis has been both developed and largely been tested in birds (Greenberg, 
1984; Greenberg, 1990b; Sol et al., 2011; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001). Among mammals, however, two 
related fox species, the culpeo fox, Pseudalopex culpaeus, and gray fox, Pseudalopex griseus, show the 
same pattern (Travaini et al., 2013). Also, a primate study comparing the sister taxa of wild chacma 
baboons, Papio ursinus, and geladas, Theropithecus gelada, showed similar results. Baboons exhibit a 
more diverse diet and inhibit a broader spectrum of habitat types, and consequently were less 
neophobic than geladas, which are specialized grazers (Bergman & Kitchen, 2009). 
 
Diversity of habitats may also cause within-species differences. The success of individuals inhabiting 
urbanized and highly variable habitats are often explained by greater behavioral flexibility, which 
would predict lowered neophobia compared to conspecifics from stable environments (Sol et al., 
2011). However, in both woodpecker-, Cactospiza pallida, and bullfinches, Loxigilla barbadensis, birds 
experiencing unpredictable habitats showed higher neophobia suggesting that neophobia may not be 
the underlying mechanism for their  expansion success (Audet et al., 2015; Tebbich & Teschke, 2014).    
 
Other aspects of feeding ecology have also been suggested to influence neophobia: in a comparison on 
over sixty parrot species, Psittacidae, insectivores showed higher neophobia than folivorous species. 
To explain this, the authors suggested that ingesting unfamiliar insects can be more dangerous than 
ingesting unfamiliar leaves (Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002). The same study found that among parrot 
species, some ecological factors seemed to promote exploration tendencies. Latencies to touch and 
exploration duration of a novel object did not depend on dietary generalism, but correlated with 
habitat type (forest edge) and diet composition (buds and fruits). However, because this broad 
comparative study did not control for other variables, such as life expectancy or sociability, its 
conclusions should ideally be confirmed.  
 
Extractive foraging is another dietary aspect expected to create variation in exploration tendency (and 
thus, all other things equal, innovativeness in experimental conditions), especially in primates. Day et 
al., (2003) compared seven callitrichid species and found that the more manipulative foraging niche of 
Leontopithecus was correlated with higher exploration tendencies than Callithrix and Saguinus species. 
Moreover, being specialized gummivores, Callithrix species are extractive foragers and were more 
explorative than the non-extractive Saguinus species.  
 
All these comparisons are affected by the difficulties of disentangling neophobia and exploration 
tendency in these studies. The ecological hypothesis argues that a species lacking the physiological or 
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morphological capacity to broaden its diet would not benefit from responding to novel items, and 
would therefore remain neophobic. Alternatively, however, a species remains neophobic because it 
would not benefit from exploitation because it lacks the cognitive abilities. So far, this non-exclusive 
alternative has not been explicitly addressed. 
 
In conclusion, ecological factors such as diet breadth tend to shape novelty response and contribute to 
species differences. Thus when neophobia is low, foraging plasticity, and so dietary generalism, is 
achieved through exploration tendency, whereas species inhabiting more restricted niches can afford 
to be more neophobic (Figure 1). However, given some ambiguities in the various studies, it would be 
interesting to explore the interaction with social information. In particular, we expect this ecological 
effect to be most pronounced in species that cannot rely on social information in skill acquisition, or in 
species experiencing such fast life history or rapid habitat change that social information is unreliable 
(Giraldeau et al., 2002).   
 
3.9 Conclusions 
 
The review suggests that high exploration can be found in conditions characterized by both high and 
low neophobia (Figure 1). Low neophobia accompanied by high exploration is found where non-risky 
habitats allow opportunistic, generalist feeders to respond to novelty. Thus the degree of neophobia 
depends on the costs and benefits of the environment and a species’ life-style (generalist vs. specialist, 
resident vs. migrant and caching vs. non-caching: Mettke-Hofmann, 2014). This combination has long 
been known for birds and is captured by the generalist hypothesis (Greenberg, 1984; Greenberg, 
1990a; Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 2001). It is more likely in species with fast life histories and/or 
limited access to social information. Similarly, where ecological factors permit suppressed neophobia, 
especially due to low predation risk, intrinsic exploration tendency rises in species that benefit from 
opportunistic resource use.  
 
As stressed in this review, however, high exploration can also be accompanied by high neophobia, 
which is paradoxical and so far somewhat ignored. In these cases, the cause of reduced neophobia is 
the opportunity to rely on social information rather than ecology. It has often been noted that learning 
from others is an adaptive strategy in order to avoid potentially dangerous novelty responses 
(Giraldeau, 1997), especially when it comes to skills rather than perishable information (Rendell et al., 
2010; van Schaik, 2010). One important finding in the current review was that social information 
allows a species or individuals to be highly exploratory without simultaneously having to reduce 
neophobia.  
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We saw that social information comes in two forms, (i) a more diffuse shared risk form (social 
facilitation), and (ii) an asymmetric reliance on more knowledgeable, and therefore usually older, 
experts. The strongest prediction is that species with customary access to social information should 
show pronounced neophobia, but should subsequently engage in extensive exploration once a social 
source (expert, role model) has indicated that a particular context is not risky. Moreover, just like risk-
free captive habitats, social facilitation and trust in experts allow individuals to explore due to reduced 
cognitive load as a consequence of reduced vigilance toward predators and other environmental risks. 
The evidence reviewed here is mostly consistent with these predictions. 
 
The high neophobia-high exploration combination should not just be associated with tolerant sociality 
but also with slow-paced life history, because both will lead to higher costs of reducing neophobia due 
to greater opportunities to benefit from social information and their long life expectancy, respectively. 
This is indeed found in some long-lived species with long parent-offspring associations, often including 
social access to other tolerant group members: great apes, capuchin monkeys, rhesus macaques, aye-
ayes, spotted hyenas and ravens (Addessi et al., 2005; Benson-Amram et al., 2014; Benson-Amram & 
Holekamp, 2012; Chiarati et al., 2012; Johnson, 2000a). In all these species the default condition of 
neophobia was reduced in presence of a familiar companion. Similarly, while this conclusion seems 
warranted, critical tests of the life-history effect, while holding all other effects constant, remain 
necessary. 
 
A further conclusion worth emphasizing is that novelty response may have coevolved with how young 
naïve individuals learn their feeding niche. The same underlying psychological mechanisms together 
with classification ability and relative experience are involved in when and how to avoid potential risk 
of exploring something new (Figure 4). 
 
It is often predicted that innovative species are species with low neophobia (Auersperg et al., 2011; 
Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Greenberg, 2003; Sol et al., 2002; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001). 
Given that great apes combine high innovativeness and high neophobia (Biro et al., 2003; Boesch, 
1995; Manrique et al., 2013; van Schaik et al., 2006), this link is clearly not universal. There may not 
have been enough attention to the effects of the novelty-response bias in innovation repertoires in 
species comparisons. Perhaps the main reason for this lack of concern is that the expected correlations 
between brain size and innovativeness across species, in both birds and mammals, were found despite 
these biases (Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 2001; Lefebvre et al., 2004; Reader & Laland, 2002). This 
in turn may have two reasons. First, neophobic species lose their neophobia in captivity, and these 
species may on average be more innovative. Second, in the wild, the highly neophobic species that rely 
strongly on social information are exactly those species that acquire most innovations through social 
learning or by modifying pre-existing behaviors rather than inventing them by responding directly to 
novelty themselves (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014; Russon et al., 2009), which in turn leads to large 
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standing innovation repertoires in a population. An additional reason is that in species showing highly 
neophobic behavior, not only social learning but also other cognitive processes are further developed, 
leading to more effective exploration once neophobia is overcome. Although exploration tendency has 
been shown to correlate with innovation (Day et al., 2003; Greenberg, 2003; Webster & Lefebvre, 
2001), one study has reported this relationship to be negative (Kendal et al., 2005) and several found 
no correlation at all (Biondi et al., 2010; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2002; Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006). 
This variability should no longer surprise us. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Overview of different innovation pathways. 
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4.1 Abstract 
 
Cultural species are able to - or even prefer to - learn their skills from conspecifics. According to the 
cultural intelligence hypothesis, selection on the underlying mechanisms not only improves this social 
learning ability but inevitably also the asocial (individual) learning ability. Thus, species with 
systematically richer opportunities to socially acquire knowledge and skills may over time evolve to 
become more intelligent, eventually reflected in larger brain size.  We experimentally measured 
problem-solving ability in zoo groups of two closely related great ape species: Sumatran (Pongo abelii) 
and Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). In the wild, the former is far more sociable than the latter. 
The homogeneous environmental conditions provided by the nine European zoos allowed us to detect 
intrinsic differences between the two species. The results on a set of tasks assessing physical cognition 
revealed an intrinsic species difference in performance, with Sumatrans showing superior problem-
solving skills to Borneans, as predicted. The Sumatrans also showed greater inhibitory control and a 
more cautious and gentle exploration style. The more sociable Sumatran species has therefore 
experienced stronger selection on the cognitive mechanisms underlying learning. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
The cultural intelligence hypothesis (Tomasello, 1995, 1999, 2000) proposes that the capacity of 
human infants to attend to skills actively demonstrated by experts, was selected for because it is an 
essential ingredient of our complex ecological niche. Indeed, young children outperform our closest 
living relatives, the great apes, in socio-cognitive tasks but not in physical cognition tasks (Herrmann 
et al., 2007), indicating that the early-developing socio-cognitive skills serve to scaffold the subsequent 
construction of physical and spatial cognition. In essence, human intelligence is therefore largely 
constructed ontogenetically. The core of cultural intelligence is socially mediated learning, defined as 
the use of social information in the process of acquiring new skills (Heyes, 1994; Heyes & Galef, 1996; 
Heyes, 2012). Although humans have evolved unique predispositions in both infants and caretakers 
toward active skill transmission (pedagogy: see Csibra & Gergely, 2011), social learning does occur in 
other species (Galef & Laland, 2005; Galef, 2006; Laland, 2004) and is instrumental in acquiring both 
critical ecological (Allen et al., 2013; Coelho et al., 2015; Esteban et al., 2016; Humle et al., 2009; Jaeggi 
et al., 2010; Lonsdorf, 2006; Mann & Sargeant, 2003; Perry, 2009; Schuppli et al., in prep.) and social 
skills (Arling & Harlow, 1967; Bloomsmith et al., 2006).  Moreover, accumulating evidence of 
geographically distinct traditions has confirmed culture-like phenomena in many non-human animals 
(Boesch, 1996; Krützen et al., 2005; Laland, 2008; McGrew, 1992; van Schaik et al., 2003; Whitehead 
et al., 2004, Whiten et al., 1999). A broader version of the cultural intelligence hypothesis (Whiten & 
van Schaik, 2007; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011; cf. Reader & Laland, 2002) therefore focuses on the 
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quality and quantity of opportunities for social learning as a crucial determinant of culturally 
constructed intelligence. This version of the cultural intelligence hypothesis has a developmental and 
an evolutionary dimension (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011).  The developmental dimension predicts that 
the greater the quantity and quality of social inputs experienced by an individual during ontogeny, the 
more learned skills it can acquire, but also the more experience it can accumulate and thus the better 
it will be at asocial learning or problem-solving. This process also generates a larger skill pool in a 
population, which in turn enlarges the individual’s set of learned skills (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). 
 
The evolutionary dimension posits that species with a social system that predictably exposes maturing 
individuals to numerous opportunities for social learning will be subject to selection on cognitive 
abilities, whenever fitness is improved by having a larger set of skills, more complex skills, or 
mastering them earlier in life. Because maturing individuals in such species will routinely accumulate 
greater experience, they should be more likely to transfer knowledge to other tasks, and thus further 
improve their ability to solve problems. This process may select for enhanced exploration strategies. 
Moreover, on longer time scales, such species should also experience selection to enhance the 
underlying social learning mechanisms. However, due to the cognitive overlap with asocial learning 
mechanisms (Galef, 1995; Heyes, 1994; Reader, 2003), this selection will indirectly also produce 
improved asocial learning ability, which over time, will lead to an increase in the innate general 
cognitive performance in conditions identical to the ancestral state, as well as increased brain size. 
This broader version should apply to any species that learns socially and maintains this knowledge for 
generations, although the strength of the effect is likely to depend on the social learning mechanisms 
and the role played by experts. 
 
To date, although some comparative tests involving brain size were favorable (van Schaik et al., 2012), 
no direct tests of the cognitive predictions of the evolutionary hypothesis have been undertaken. Here 
we tested the prediction that greater opportunities for social learning are associated with a different 
exploration style and thus greater asocial learning ability (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011). A systematic 
comparison of the cognitive abilities of the two orangutan species (Pongo abelii on Sumatra, and Pongo 
pygmaeus on Borneo, with an evolutionary divergence estimated from autosomal gene pools of around 
~0.9-1.1 Ma) (Greminger, 2015) provides an excellent test of the hypothesis. Orang-utans show 
extensive social learning during skill development (Jaeggi et al., 2010), with more frequent peering 
and feeding practice as the complexity of foraging skills increases (Schuppli et al., 2016). They also 
show extensive evidence for geographic variation in a variety of skills (Bastian et al., 2010; Krützen et 
al., 2011; van Schaik et al., 2003; Wich et al., 2012). Crucially, Sumatran and Bornean orangutans differ 
systematically in the frequency of the opportunities for social learning. In similar habitats, Sumatran 
populations show higher densities (Husson et al., 2009; van Schaik et al., 1999; Wich et al., 2006) and 
are consistently more gregarious and socially tolerant (Mitra Setia et al., 2009; van Schaik et al., 1999). 
They also show much greater repertoires of learned skills and exploratory behavior (Schuppli et al. 
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2016), along with greater cultural repertoires in general (van Schaik et al., 2003). This difference in 
socio-ecology has likely persisted over evolutionary time (Greminger, 2015; van Schaik et al., 2009).   
Note that our choice of species provides a particularly stringent test of the hypothesis because their 
broadly similar brain size (Taylor & van Schaik, 2007) means that we test the genetic impact of cultural 
intelligence before pronounced brain size differences have evolved. 
 
Because housing and rearing conditions, ranging from deprivation to enculturation, have a major 
impact on the cognitive development of apes (Bard & Leavens, 2014; Call & Tomasello, 1996; Russell 
et al., 2011; Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello & Call, 2004), a proper test of the possibly subtle 
differences in cognitive performance crucially requires that the conditions be as identical as possible. 
Since this cannot possibly be achieved in the natural environment, we therefore turned to zoo-housed 
orangutans. All subjects in this study were mother-reared and zoo-born, and experienced highly 
similar feeding routines, sleeping quarters, encounters with human keepers and visitors, out-door 
enclosures and enrichment regimes. In all, 33 subjects in 9 different European zoos were tested on 
their physical cognitive skills on 4-7 different tasks inspired by the test battery employed by Herrmann 
et al., (2007).  
 
When groups of animals differ in cognitive performance, it is informative to look for underlying 
differences in their problem-solving strategies, because selection on cognitive performance may 
actually have targeted these mechanisms. We therefore also tested for the possible role of novelty 
response, exploration style and inhibitory control, since recent literature has identified these as 
potentially important mechanisms in conspecific comparisons. First, since cognitive tests inevitably 
involve some element of novelty, how animals respond to novelty may affect their cognitive 
performance, as found in several studies (Bouchard et al., 2007; Day et al., 2003; Seferta et al., 2001; 
Webster & Lefebvre, 2001). Second, exploration styles have been reported to influence cognitive 
performance. Sometimes, the best problem solvers are the boldest individuals (Dugatkin & Alfieri, 
2003; Guillette et al., 2009; Trompf & Brown, 2014), at other times, they are the individuals showing 
frequent and persistent exploration (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Huebner & Fichtel, 2015; 
Kendal et al., 2005; Massen et al., 2013; Overington et al., 2011), whereas in yet other cases, they are 
those with the most diverse exploratory actions (Griffin et al., 2014; Griffin & Guez, 2014). Finally, 
various studies suggest a relationship between inhibitory control and higher cognitive abilities (Bray 
et al., 2014; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hauser, 1999; Kralik et al., 2002; Manrique et al., 2013).  
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4. 3 Methods 
 
4.3.1 Subjects 
 
We undertook the study in nine European zoos (Table 2, Appendix II), where both species of 
orangutans are housed under constant and similar conditions, and tested only mother-reared 
individuals. The European breeding program, EEP, holds all detailed information on birth dates, 
kinship, transfers and island of origin of all orangutans in European zoos. Table 3 (Appendix II) 
describes the housing conditions and the time at which the experiments were run at each zoo. All data 
collected in the United Kingdom were approved by the British and Irish association for zoos and 
aquariums, BIAZA; all other data were collected in compliance with the Swiss and German animal 
regulations concerning non-invasive testing on animals.  
 
We presented orangutans of the two species with a set of physical cognition tasks and additionally two 
tests of novelty response (a novel food and a novel toy) (Figure 1). All subjects participated on their 
own initiative and individually, which controlled for variation in motivational state between subjects, 
albeit at the expense of a reduced sample size in some tasks. All tests were conducted either in the 
morning hours or around mid-day and all subjects were fed normally before and after participating in 
the tasks. The tasks were presented to the orangutans in their smaller sleeping enclosures or directly 
in the large home enclosure, whenever a subject could be separated from the rest of the group there. 
If mothers could not be separated from their dependent offspring, they were tested together with their 
infants (the latter did not participate in the tasks). Participating subjects ranged in age from five to 
fifty-two years (Table 4, Appendix II). The average age was 17 years for Sumatran subjects, 21 years 
for Borneans. All tasks were video recorded with two SONY HDR-CX200 Handy cameras, because to 
minimize human impacts, no humans were nearby or interacting with the subject during testing. 
 
4.3.2 Description of physical cognition tasks 
 
Inspired by the primate cognition test battery (PCTB) of Herrmann et al., (2007) we developed a 
modified set of physical cognition tasks to assess different aspects of cognition. These tasks were 
modified because we wanted to make it possible to collect meaningful information without pre-
training and frequent interactions with humans, and therefore had to make them as naturalistic and 
simple as possible, as well as adjust them to different locations of testing. 
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Detour reaching task 
 
A large transparent plexiglas box (100 cm x 30 cm x 30 cm) was presented in the sleeping enclosure 
of the subjects. Because the box was placed inside the enclosure it was entirely accessible to the 
subjects to explore the whole box, providing suitable measurements of explorative actions. 
Exploratory actions of the plexiglas box were divided into two categories: rough (push, pull, hit) and 
gentle (touch, poke). The front side of the box had two openings, one small round hole (diameter 2 cm) 
and one large rectangular opening (30 cm x 20 cm) situated 50 cm from the small opening (Figure 1A). 
Before the subject entered the test enclosure a food reward (piece of fruit) was placed inside the 
plexiglas box right behind the small opening, through which the food reward did not fit. The subject 
would have to prevent its focus on the visible fruit in order to find the large opening and thereby the 
solution. Each subject was given five minutes to solve this task and the task started as soon as the 
subject approached to within one meter from the box. The moment the subject touched the fruit piece 
inside the box was counted as a successful solution and ended the task.  
 
The honey tool-task 
 
This problem-solving task constituted of a wooden box (50 cm x 80 cm x 5 cm) with two traps, which 
were covered with a plexiglas on the front side for visibility (Figure 1B). The upper trap was a straight, 
downward-sloping channel (30 cm x 5 cm) filled partly with honey, in which a 40-cm long stick was 
already inserted (and thus immersed into the honey). The second, lower trap was an L-shaped curve 
(15 cm x 10 cm), whose interior part, also filled with honey, could not be reached with a finger or a 
stick. We additionally provided two sticks (40 cm) and three bendable plastic ropes (20 cm) on the 
floor in front of the apparatus. In order to find the solution for the L-shaped trap, the subject needed 
to use one of the provided ropes as a tool and dip it into the L-shaped trap. The rope could also be 
explored as a tool in the straight trap but did not yield any honey reward due to its insufficient length. 
Likewise, the stick could not reach the honey in the L-shaped trap. The total time a subject was given 
for this task was ten minutes. 
 
First, we assessed how attentive subjects were toward the test apparatus by calculating the time they 
spent within one meter of the apparatus as well as the duration of exploration of the apparatus. 
Exploration was defined as any event were the subject would touch and manipulate any part of the 
apparatus or the different tools provided right beside the apparatus, minus the time that was spent at 
performing the solution, e.g. dipping the stick into the straight trap. We also recorded relevant 
exploration events, which included all exploration events directed toward the two traps and not the 
apparatus itself (and thus relevant to the actual problem-solving). From this, we calculated the 
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proportion of total exploration duration during which the subjects focused on relevant exploration. 
Second, for the cognitive performance we used four measurements from this task:  
a) Use of the information provided beforehand: re-use of the stick that was already provided as 
solution in the straight trap. The stick was counted as re-used if the subject did not let go of it, walked 
out of sight with it or put it on the floor before re-inserting it into the straight trap. A stick was defined 
as inserted if at least one third of the stick was inside the straight trap.  
b) Correct solution to the straight trap: if the orangutan did at any point during the ten minutes insert 
the stick to the straight trap, it was defined as a successful solution to the straight trap.  
c) Considering the rope as a tool: if the subject did at any point during the ten minutes tried the rope 
as a tool for either of the traps.  
d) Correct solution to the L-shaped trap: if the subject inserted the rope tool into the L-shaped trap 
during the ten minutes. 
 
The tube-trap task 
 
The tube-trap task was also presented to each subject outside of the enclosure mesh, along with sticks 
to reach six horizontal metal tubes (Figure 1D). Each tube was 30 cm long and 5 cm wide, with an 
opening on either end, where the stick could be inserted to slide a visible reward (a piece of fruit or a 
nut) in two different directions. However, the tube had a trap, visible from the outside. Thus, if the 
reward was moved in the wrong direction it would fall down a 10 cm deep metal cylinder and get 
trapped. However, if the reward was moved in the correct direction it reached the end of the tube and 
fell out, to be picked up. The board contained six tubes. Each subject encountered the task in three 
consecutive trials, resulting in 18 possible attempts. Three tubes had the correct opening on the left 
side, three on the right side. Thus, if a subject would have a strong side preference and always slide the 
reward toward one side, it would reach nine correct out of 18 (50%). We therefore calculated the 
percentage of tubes an individual solved correctly and used a criteria of more than 60% of the tubes 
correct as a successfully solved task.  
 
Reversal learning task 
 
In this task the orangutans were presented a wooden board, at a distance of ca. 20 cm outside of the 
enclosure mesh (Figure 1C). The board had 12 holes with 12 lids: six black and six white ones. The 
subjects were provided sticks to reach the lids of the board. In the first part of the task a food reward 
(fruit piece or nuts, depending on recommendations or preference of the keepers) was hidden behind 
either all the black or all the white lids (color was randomly determined for each subject). We 
determined that the subject had successfully learned the association between right color lid and food 
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reward once at least five out of the six first lids it touched were of the correct (rewarded) color. In 
addition, the subject had to pass an extra control trial to ensure it had learned the right association. 
After the control trial was also successful, we switched the position of the food reward to the opposite 
color, and counted if and how many trials it took the subject to learn the reverse pattern. The task 
continued for four days and each subject was given three to four trials per day (depending on when a 
control trial was needed or not). 
 
A                                                              B                                     C                                                                     D 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Set of tasks for testing physical cognition and 
novelty response. A) Detour reaching task B) The honey 
tool-task C) Reversal learning board D) Tube trap board E) 
Novel Food F) Novel toy. 
E                                                     F 
 
4.3. 3 Novelty response tests 
  
Novel food 
 
As a novel food item we used potato mash that was colored turquoise using regular food coloring and 
topped with a few black olives (Figure 1E). Each subject was then served a handful of the turquoise 
potato mash as a little pile on a board right outside the mesh of the test location. The novel food test 
lasted for a maximum of two minutes, but ended earlier in case all food had already been consumed. 
We measured the latency to taste the novel food as a proxy for cautiousness. We used the latency of 
tasting from the point when the subject first touched the item to control for potential differences due 
to the size of the enclosure mesh through which the subjects had to reach for the food items. As a 
control condition we also recorded reactions toward a familiar food item, which was either a fruit or 
vegetable that was part of the subjects’ daily diet.  
 
Novel toy 
 
As a novel toy we presented the orangutans with a wooden board containing three slits, in each of 
which sat two differently colored tennis balls that could be rotated and moved in different directions 
(Figure 1F). Subjects were given two minutes to interact with the novel toy. Since many zoo-housed 
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orangutans are familiar with tennis balls (albeit not with these colors or in this context), our intention 
for this task was to capture how they explore a new task that neither presents any particular problem 
to be solved nor produces a food reward. Explorative behavior of the toy was divided into the same 
categories as for the detour reaching task: rough- (bite, hit, pull, push) and gentle exploration (touch, 
poke, rotate, slide). We calculated exploration rates, counted as number of total exploration events of 
each category divided by the total time spent with the toy.  
 
4.3.4 Analyses 
 
The same observer (SF) coded all behavior details from the videos of each task using Mangold Interact 
9.7. The sample size for each task varied somewhat, because zoos differed slightly in opportunities for 
separate testing and not all individuals could always be separated.  To test for a potential species 
difference in overall performance (task solved: yes/no), we fitted a Generalized Linear Mixed-effects 
Model (GLMM) with a binomial error distribution to the data. We incorporated species as the main 
fixed effect, while task identity, age, sex, group size, and the number of zoos the subject had lived in 
over the course of its life-time, were included as additional (confounding) fixed effects. Planned 
contrasts for task (the only categorical predictor with more than two levels) were set to compare a 
subject’s performance on each task to its performance on the detour reaching task (i.e. the task with 
the highest overall performance, solved by all but 2 subjects). We controlled for repeated observations 
on each task across the same subjects from different zoos by specifying task identity and individual 
identity nested within zoo as two crossed random effects. For the exploration data of each task (time 
to solution) we used standard linear models, with species as independent variable while controlling 
for age and sex. All statistical analyses were conducted in R version 3.2.3 (Team R Core: 2015), using 
the “lme4” package (Bates et al., 2014). 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Cognitive performance 
 
Overall performance across all 7 tasks was assessed for a total of 33 subjects (14 Bornean, 19 
Sumatran) from 9 different zoos. A highly significant binomial GLMM (χ2ML= 33.24, Nobs= 196, P< 
0.0005; Figure 2, Table 1) revealed that, while controlling for the potentially confounding effects of 
age, sex, group size, the number of zoos a subject had lived in, and task identity, Sumatran subjects 
were significantly more likely to solve a task than their Bornean congeners (B= 1.934, SE= 0.74, z= 
2.63, P< 0.01). In fact, the odds ratio indicated that the overall odds of a Sumatran subject solving a 
task were higher as those of a Bornean subject. Our model also reflected that, compared to the detour-
reaching task, performance was significantly worse on most other tasks (Table 1). Follow-up models 
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constructed to investigate the interaction between species and task, failed to converge due to 
singularities in the Hessian matrix. However, visual inspection of a plot depicting the proportion of 
subjects within each species that solved each task (Figure 2), suggests that the difference between 
Sumatran and Bornean individuals was both consistent and of a similar magnitude across all tasks 
(although possibly more pronounced for the tube trap experiment). 
Table 1: Output from the generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) showing  
species differences in task performance 
 
 B SE z value P 
Intercept 1.998 1.44   
Species     
   Pongo pygmaeus - - - - 
   Pongo abelii 1.934 0.74 2.63 0.0085 
Confounding variables:     
   Task     
      Detour reaching - - - - 
      HT: Straight trap -1.446 0.97 -1.49 0.1355 
      HT: Re-use -4.147 1.06 -3.92 0.0001 
      HT: Rope tool -5.258 1.15 -4.58 0.0000 
      HT: Curved trap -6.268 1.27 -4.93 0.0000 
      Reversal learning -3.441 1.06 -3.26 0.0011 
      Tube trap: >60% -4.260 1.12 -3.81 0.0001 
   Sex     
      Female - - - - 
      Male 0.448 0.72 0.63 0.5321 
   Age 0.006 0.03 0.21 0.8306 
   Number of Zoos -0.543 0.31 -1.77 0.0774 
   Group size 0.122 0.12 0.99 0.3235 
196 observations on 33 individuals from 9 different zoos, χ2ML= 86.45, P< 0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overall task performance over the different tasks and subtasks  
between Pongo   pygmaeus and Pongo abelii. 
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The differences between Sumatran and Bornean subjects actually held across individual tasks and 
subtasks, even though they were not always significant and we could not control for all the 
confounding variables in these comparisons. The detour-reaching task lasted for a maximum of five 
minutes and ended once a subject found the solution. Data on latency to solution and exploration 
behavior was log transformed in order to fit normally distributed residuals. Our results showed that 
among successful solvers, Sumatran subjects were significantly faster in solving this problem (LM: 
NSumatra=10, NBorneo=10, Pspecies=0.049, βspecies=-94.53±44.28, Page=0.155, Psex=0.760; Figure 3).  
 
In the honey tool-task, Sumatrans were somewhat more likely to solve the stick solution, but the 
difference in latencies was not significant (LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=13, Pspecies=0.159, Page=0.143, 
Psex=0.826). The three individuals who managed to solve the more difficult task of using the rope for 
the curved trap were all Sumatran.  
 
Because the tube trap task was designed with equally many tubes providing the correct solution 
toward left respective right side, a subject with a strong side preference for one side would reach 50 
percentage correct solved tubes due to its side preference. Thus in order to solve tubes correctly in 
this task an individual had to suppress any existing side preference and instead decide in each instant 
toward which side to move the food item. We therefore first looked for the existence of a side 
preference and found that Sumatrans and Borneans did not differ significantly in the tendency to have 
a side preference: 70% for Borneans and 85.7% for Sumatrans (Chi-square test: NSumatra=14, NBorneo=10, 
χ2=2.33, P=0.311). When comparing the number of tubes solved correctly, relative to how many tubes 
a subject attempted to solve, we found that Sumatran individuals achieved significantly more correct 
tubes than Borneans (LM: NSumatra=14, NBorneo=8, Pspecies=0.011, βspecies=0.127±0.045, Page=0.123, 
Psex=0.737; Figure 4). 
 
In the reversal learning task all individuals in our sample, both Bornean and Sumatran learned the first 
association between lid color and food reward. Further, 37.5 percentage of the Bornean subjects and 
56.3 percentage of Sumatran learned the reverse color association (Chi-square test: NSumatra=16, 
NBorneo=8, χ2=0.230, P=0.891), which did not amount to a significant difference.  
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Figure 3: Latency until solution in detour reaching task for both species. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Proportion correctly solved tubes in tube trap task, corrected  
for total amount of tubes attempted. 
 
4.4.2 Task exploration 
 
We also examined possible mechanisms that could underlie the species difference in cognitive 
performance, focusing on the latency to ingest novel food, the exploration during tasks as well as of a 
novel toy, and an assessment of inhibitory control.  
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Novel food reactions 
 
We compared the two species in their response towards novel food, using their reactions to a familiar 
food item as the control condition. Data of the response variable (latency to taste novel food) was log 
transferred in order to reach evenly distributed residuals. We found that the Sumatran species took 
significantly longer before ingesting the new food than Bornean, but that this was driven by an 
interaction effect between age and species in the Sumatran sample: (LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=12, 
Pspecies<0.001, βspecies=2.179±0.433, Psex=0.726, Page=0.686, Pinteraction: age/species=0.001, βinteraction: age/species 
=-0.071±0.018; Figure 5A and 5B). Relative to the Bornean sample, our Sumatran sample contained 
more young individuals who responded with longer delays to try the novel food. To exclude the fact 
that those young individuals drove the results of novel food reaction, we also ran the same model 
excluding all individuals younger than six years. We still obtained the same species difference (LM: 
NSumatra=14, NBorneo=12, Pspecies<0.001, βspecies=2.123±0.496, Psex=0.990, Page=0.781, Pinteraction: 
age/species=0.001, βinteraction: age/species =-0.069±0.020). In the familiar food condition, we found 
neither a species nor an age effect (LM: NSumatra=15, NBorneo=9, Pspecies=0.340, Psex=0.500, Page=0.257; 
Figure 5C and 5D).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 Figure 5: Latencies to taste novel (A and B) and familiar food (C and D). 
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Exploration styles 
 
We also found species differences in the exploration of a novel toy. Compared with Sumatran-, Bornean 
orangutans showed both higher gentle exploration rates toward novelty (LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=9, 
Pspecies=0.031, βspecies=-0.163±0.071, Page=0.069, Psex=0.169; Figure 6A) and (especially) higher rough 
exploration rates (LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=9, Pspecies<0.001, βspecies=-0.167±0.036, Page=0.636, 
Psex=0.155; Figure 6B).  
 
The same species difference in explorative behavior found in the novel toy test also appeared in the 
detour-reaching task. Bornean subjects showed significantly more rough exploration (controlled for 
time at apparatus) than Sumatran (LM: NSumatra=10, NBorneo=10, Pspecies=0.042, βspecies=-0.050±0.023, 
Page=0.301, Psex=0.134; Figure 6D). We did not find the same effect when comparing gentle exploration 
(LM: NSumatra=10, NBorneo=10, Pspecies=0.648, Page=0.794, Psex=0.478; Figure 6C). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Exploration rates (corrected for total time at apparatus): gentle exploration and  
rough exploration for both novel toy manipulation (A and B) and detour reaching task (C and D). 
 
 
 
In the honey tool-task, each subject was given ten minutes time to engage with the apparatus in order 
to extract honey by choice of right tool for two different traps; straight and curved trap. There was no 
species difference in either the attentive time (LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=13, Pspecies=0.903, Page=0.064, 
Psex=0.811, Figure 7A), or the duration of exploration in this task (LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=13, 
Pspecies=0.398, Page=0.094, Psex=0.449, Figure 7B), indicating that individuals of both species were 
equally motivated to engage with the task. They also did not differ in the variety of exploration acts 
(LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=13, Pspecies=0.930, Page=0.465, Psex=0.523, Figure 7C). However, we found a 
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clear trend that Sumatrans showed higher relevant exploration time compared to Borneans, and that 
males spent less time on relevant exploration than females (LM: NSumatra=19, NBorneo=13, Pspecies=0.064, 
βspecies=0.139±0.072, Page=0.210, Psex=0.029, βsex =-0.183±0.080; Figure 8). 
 
Figure 7: Time spent at the honey tool-task (A) and exploration duration during task participation (B) as well 
as the variety of exploration acts used (C). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Proportion of relevant exploration time devoted to the honey  
extraction, corrected for total exploration duration of apparatus. 
 
Inhibition  
 
The reversal learning task provides the opportunity to examine inhibition. When an individual opens 
the correct lids it acquires information about the specific color and presence of a food reward; equally, 
opening the wrong lids produces information about the absence of a food reward associated with that 
color. Once the individual has learned where the food is hidden it should therefore inhibit the tendency 
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to open the wrong lids.  We calculated the total number of lids each subject touched and the proportion 
of which were of the wrong color and log transferred our data to produce evenly distributed residuals. 
We found a significant difference between the species: Bornean orangutans opened more of the wrong 
colored lids than did Sumatran, (LM: NSumatra=16, NBorneo=8, Pspecies=0.011, βspecies=-0.092±0.033, 
Page=0.899, Psex=0.475; Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Proportion of lids opened of wrong color corrected for total amount  
of lids touched in the reversal learning task.   
 
 
4.5 Discussion  
 
The results showed a clear and consistent pattern: Sumatran orang-utans, Pongo abelii, performed 
better in a variety of tests of physical cognition compared to the Bornean species, Pongo pygmaeus 
(Figure 2 & Table 1). In fact, there was not a single task in which Bornean subjects were more likely to 
solve the problem than the Sumatrans. The results of the GLMM reveal that variation in cognitive 
performance was strongly determined by species and revealed no significant effect of group size, age, 
sex, or the identity of the zoo in which they were kept. Moreover, in the detour-reaching task Sumatran 
orang-utans were faster at achieving the solution, which required inhibition of fixation on the visible 
food reward (Figure 3). In the tube-trap task no subject manage to solve more than 12 tubes out of 18, 
perhaps because most individuals had a side preference, which would have to be suppressed in order 
to reach a high task performance. Nonetheless, Sumatran orang-utans managed to solve more tubes 
correctly than the Borneans (Figure 4). These results therefore support the existence of an intrinsic 
species difference in the ability to solve physical cognition tasks, in agreement with the prediction of 
the evolutionary version of the cultural intelligence hypothesis. 
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Given this clear difference in performance on tasks of physical cognition between these two closely 
related species, it is of great interest to identify possible underlying variables. We measured novelty 
response, inhibition and aspects of exploratory behaviour. Because Sumatrans were more cautious in 
tasting novel food (Figure 5), better performance was not due to reduced neophobia, as was found in 
some previous studies (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013; Sol et al., 2012). The 
species difference was also not confounded by age effects. Although younger Sumatrans delayed their 
intake of novel food, when tested individually (Figure 5B), the species difference remained even when 
we excluded the younger subjects from the Sumatran sample. Species with greater dependence on 
social learning have been suggested to also exhibit higher neophobia and conservative novelty 
response, because they strongly rely on social cues to engage in independent exploration (Forss et al., 
in prep).  However, captivity has been shown to suppress neophobia in orang-utans (Forss et al., 2015). 
Therefore, it is remarkable that we still detect this species difference in a zoo comparison, suggesting 
a stronger predisposition for cautiousness in Sumatran orang-utans than Borneans.  
 
 
In the honey tool-task, which consisted of multiple problem-solving steps, both species were equally 
keen on participating and spent equal time exploring the task (Figure 7A), but Sumatran females, 
though not males, spent more time exploring the relevant parts of the apparatus (the holes containing 
honey; Figure 8). Further, Bornean orang-utans were more likely to apply a rougher exploration style 
than their Sumatran relatives, both in the detour-reaching box and toward the novel toy (Figure 6B 
and 6D). Such rough actions suggest that the subjects had given up on trying to find a solution and 
were either frustrated or attempting to reach the food reward through force, or both. 
 
 
Reversal-learning tasks entail an element of inhibition (Bond et al., 2007; Griffin et al., 2015). A higher 
percentage of Sumatran individuals learned the colour reversal. Although this was not significant, we 
found that Sumatrans were also better at inhibiting their behaviour in that they opened significantly 
fewer lids of the wrong colour than Borneans (Figure 9). Orang-utans have previously been reported 
to exhibit higher inhibitory control than other great apes (Manrique et al., 2013), but our results 
suggest that Sumatrans show this even more than the Borneans, which complements their greater 
cautiousness and gentler explorative behaviour.  
 
 
In sum, the superior cognitive performance by the Sumatran orang-utans may well reflect their greater 
inhibitory control and more cautious exploration style, which made them less likely to turn to 
destructive exploration and more likely to focus on relevant aspects of the problem at hand.  
 
 
Because group size in the zoos examined did not affect the results and the zoos did not differ greatly 
in their enrichment regimes, this species difference cannot reflect any differences in opportunities for 
social or asocial learning during development other than those caused by innate differences in 
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attention patterns or social tolerance by role models. Moreover, it is unlikely to be due to innate 
differences in the ability to effectively manipulate tools, because on Sumatra the tendency to use tools 
is limited to particular regions (van Schaik et al., 2009). Zoo orang-utans of both species use tools 
regularly and all nine zoos where the data was collected provided the apes with enrichment devices 
requiring stick tool-use, with which all subjects in our study were familiar.   
 
 
If the species had been very different in overall or relative brain size, the same result would 
presumably have been obtained, given the effect of brain size on cognitive abilities in primates (Deaner 
et al., 2007; Reader & Laland, 2002) and carnivores (Benson-Amram et al., 2016). The study was 
designed to capture the effects of cultural intelligence at similar brain size. Nonetheless, there are 
minor brain size differences between the two orang-utan species. Although females are all 
approximately the same body size, those of the two western Bornean subspecies have a cranial 
capacity that is slightly (average 2-3%) smaller than that of the Sumatrans. However, those of the 
eastern subspecies Pongo pygmaeus morio have a cranial capacity that is on average 11-12% smaller 
than that of the other Bornean subspecies and 14% smaller than that of the Sumatrans (Taylor & van 
Schaik, 2007). However, because the breeding program in European Zoos that manages the population 
of Pongo pygmaeus, does not distinguish between subspecies, we do not know which individuals, if 
any, are of this subspecies, assuming there are any pure or hybrid P. p. morio at all in European zoos. 
Moreover, the brain size distributions between the species and subspecies show high overlap, and any 
difference in relative brain size is still less than that between the sexes of modern humans (Ankney, 
1992; Lüders et al., 2002; Lüders et al., 2009). Furthermore, in many tests of cognitive abilities, the 
various great apes do not differ consistently in their cognitive performance (Amici et al., 2012; Call, 
2006; Hanus & Call, 2007; Vlamings et al., 2006; Vlamings et al., 2010), despite greater interspecific 
differences in absolute and relative brain size than found between Bornean and Sumatran orangutans. 
Most importantly, however, regardless of any residual effects of brain size, we identified plausible 
underlying causal differences in exploration style, which help us understand the species differences 
found here and may also be involved in species differences across a broader range of brain sizes (e.g. 
inhibitory control, see MacLean et al., 2014). 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This species comparison of physical cognitive tasks provides the first empirical confirmation of the 
cultural intelligence hypothesis in a non-human species, suggesting that the combination of more 
frequent opportunities for social learning and advanced skill repertoires have over evolutionary time 
produced cognitive differences between the two Pongo species. We saw that they differ in physical 
problem-solving performance but also in some of the likely underlying mechanisms, including 
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inhibitory control and caution, traits that may very well be the ones targeted by selection on learning 
abilities, and thus crucial for effective cultural learning. 
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5.1 Abstract 
 
Non-human animals may show great intraspecific variation in their cognitive abilities. Especially in 
large-brained species external inputs and experiences during the prolonged developmental time is 
expected to modify cognitive mechanisms. We examined the variation in exploration and cognitive 
performance on a problem-solving task in a large sample of captive housed orangutans (Pongo abelii 
& Pongo pygmaeus, N=103) in relation to variation in conditions during ontogeny, including in 
duration of exposure to humans. In addition to measuring cognitive performance we also conducted a 
set of experiments to assess the subjects’ psychological attitude, including reactions toward a novel 
human and novel food or objects. Based upon the response to an unfamiliar human we created a 
human orientation index (HOI) in order to quantify variation in attentiveness of individuals with 
different rearing histories. Using general linear mixed models we found human orientation, but not 
neophobia, to predict both exploration variety and problem-solving skill. We conclude that different 
experiences with humans made individuals vary in curiosity and understanding of physical problem-
solving tasks. We discuss the implications of these findings for comparative studies of cognitive ability. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
 
As in humans, individual performance on a variety of tests of cognitive ability, including problem-
solving tasks, is correlated in various non-human primate species, leading to suggestions that they too 
show evidence of general intelligence (Herndon et al., 1997; Reader & Laland, 2002; Banerjee et al., 
2009; Reader et al., 2011; van Schaik & Burkart, 2011; Woodley de Menie et al., 2015). Human 
intelligence is partly genetically determined and thus inherited (Burt, 1972; Plomin & Petrill, 1997 ; 
Davies et al., 2011 ; Nisbett et al., 2012 ; Bates et al., 2013 ; Turkheimer et al., 2013; Joshi et al., 2015). 
This finding was recently confirmed for our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees (Hopkins et al., 
2014). As expected based on the great developmental plasticity of especially cortical brain functions 
(Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997), human intelligence is also strongly affected by the conditions experienced 
by the developing individuals, from early nursing experience (Anderson et al., 1999; Mortensen et al., 
2002; Der et al., 2006; Kramer et al., 2008) to cultural impacts later in life (Bouchard et al., 1990; 
Markus et al., 1991; Neisser et al., 1996). Much less is known about this phenomenon in nonhuman 
primates, where variability is often regarded as “noise” in species comparisons.  
 
Our knowledge of intraspecific variation in cognitive abilities among primates so far has mainly come 
from two extreme cases of experience effects: deprivation and enculturation. Harlow’s pioneering 
experiments on rhesus macaques demonstrated strong negative outcomes of physical- and social-
deprivation on cognitive development (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1959; Gluck & Harlow, 1971; Gluck et 
al., 1973). Since then other primate studies have pointed out maternal separation to have both short- 
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and long term socio-cognitive consequences (Gilmer & McKinney, 2003; Freeman & Ross, 2014; 
Kalcher-Sommersguter et al., 2015). Skills linked to physical cognition also tend to be influenced by 
early rearing conditions. Chimpanzees that were removed from their mothers as young infants showed 
reduced competence in both nest-building (Videan, 2006) and problem-solving skills involving tool 
use (Menzel et al., 1970; Morimura & Mori, 2010). Although deprivation affects the expression of 
primate intelligence, it could be argued that these extreme conditions remove inputs for experience-
expectant processes (Greenough et al., 1987), and thus reflect different processes from the ones 
affecting cognitive variation in humans. 
 
The opposite extreme condition is enculturation. Especially among great apes (but see Fredman & 
Whiten, 2008), enriched socio-cultural inputs, in the form of extensive training by humans, result in 
enhanced cognitive skills, particularly in socio-cognitive and communicative abilities (Tomasello et al., 
1993; Call & Tomasello, 1996; Tomasello & Call, 2004; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003; Bering, 2004; 
Björklund, 2006). Enculturated apes also show faster development of motor skills, sophisticated object 
manipulation and more skillful tool use (Bard & Gardner, 1996; Gardner & Gardner, 1989; Furlong et 
al., 2008). It remains possible, however, that social inputs far beyond the range found under natural 
conditions may reflect the operation of processes not normally present during development.  
 
Even in the absence of deprivation and enculturation, captive primates may show high intraspecific 
variability in cognitive abilities (Herrmann et al., 2010; Herrmann & Call, 2012). Similarly, recent work 
has found high variability in problem-solving abilities of wild mammals (e.g. Liker & Bókony, 2009; 
Cole et al., 2011; Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Thornthon & Samson, 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013; 
Griffin & Guez, 2014). However, the strongest intraspecific variation in cognitive traits is found 
between wild and captive individuals of the same species (e.g. Visalberghi et al., 2003; Laidre, 2008; 
Benson-Amram et al., 2013; Forss et al., 2015).  
 
The sources of this variability remain largely unstudied. There is therefore a need for comprehensive 
studies of individual variation in cognitive performance that can be related to the individuals’ rearing 
histories and the underlying psychological motivational and emotional variables, such as motivation 
to solve problems, responses to novelty and exploration style. Such studies are best conducted in 
captivity, where experiments can be made more uniform, individual histories usually are better 
documented, and the underlying psychological variables can be estimated independently. 
  
These differences in cognitive performance may have various causes. Captivity changes how animals 
respond to novelty, expressed by strongly reduced neophobia compared to wild conspecifics 
(Visalberghi et al., 2003; Benson-Amram et al., 2013; Forss et al., 2015; Forss et al., in prep). The 
contrast in novelty reactions can to a certain extent explain variation in cognitive performance when 
assessed experimentally: due to reduced neophobia captive hyenas outperformed their wild 
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conspecifics when tested on their problem-solving abilities (Benson-Amram et al., 2013). However, 
the effect of captivity is not restricted to novelty response, because the absence of neophobia may 
trigger further cognitive changes. Extractive foragers, such as primates increase explorative behaviors, 
tool use and innovation rates in captivity (Russon, 2003; Lehner et al., 2010; Shumaker et al., 2011; 
Haslam, 2013; van Schaik et al., 2016). This increase in creative behavior especially among captive 
primates has so far been attributed to reduced costs associated with ecological causes such as time 
constraints, predation risk and terrestriality (Kummer & Goodall, 1985; Meulman et al., 2012; Benson-
Amram et al., 2013; Haslam, 2013; van Schaik et al., 2016), whereas social influences have received 
less attention. This is remarkable given that captive environments expose primates with a strong social 
component of human exposure. In their natural niche primates are prone to attend to conspecifics and 
learn necessary skills socially (Lonsdorf et al., 2006; Humle et al., 2009; Jaeggi et al., 2010; van de Waal 
et al., 2010; van de Waal et al., 2013; Schuppli et al., in prep). Consequently having evolved to be 
attentive to others’ activities, captive primates experience increased social opportunities that besides 
conspecifics include human role models. Accordingly from birth on the attention structure of captive 
primates may be tuned toward human cues, upon which further cognitive differences may follow. 
 
In the present study, we ask how a range of different captive management regimes affects both 
independent psychological attitudes, such as human orientation, motivation and exploration style, and 
cognitive performance in more than 100 captive orangutans, Pongo abelii and P. pygmaeus. In both 
wild and captivity, orangutans are known to be flexible problem solvers, as suggested by their large 
innovation repertoires (van Schaik et al., 2006) and their strong scores on comparative cognitive tests 
(Deaner et al., 2006; Reader & Laland, 2002). It is widely assumed that this ability is adaptive in their 
challenging foraging niche, for which developing individuals must learn the requisite skills over 
several years (Jaeggi et al., 2010; Schuppli et al., 2016).  
 
Our sample contains both zoo groups of orangutans, consisting of both mother- and hand-reared 
individuals, and individuals housed in rehabilitation stations from a diverse range of backgrounds: 
station-born animals and orphans who are wild-born and experienced variable duration in the wild 
and subsequent captivity, as well as former pets. The availability of individuals kept under highly 
similar conditions but with a wide range of rearing histories provides us with an excellent opportunity 
to test their effect on cognitive performance and exploration styles. Because the individuals’ 
experience with humans was so variable, we conducted the study without the presence of an 
experimenter to avoid possible effects on the subject’s participation and attention during cognitive 
testing (cf. Schubiger et al., 2015). 
 
First, we examined the subjects’ performance on a novel, multi-step problem-solving task with high 
ecological validity: the honey-tool task. Second, we assayed the individuals’ psychological attitudes 
underlying their exploration style. Because the captivity effect on cognitive performance seems to 
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reflect the most dramatic change in psychological attitude, we developed the human orientation index 
(henceforth: HOI) as a predictor of cognitive performance and exploration style (see Methods for 
details). Moreover, as orangutans show increased interest in novelty in captivity (Forss et al., 2015), 
we also assessed the response to novelty across individuals of different captive conditions. Third, we 
broke down our sample according to housing conditions. Zoos and rehabilitation stations differ in their 
purpose of holding captive apes. Zoo apes have lived all their lives in a similar and stable environment, 
mostly together with their mothers and in intense contact with both knowledgeable conspecifics and 
human caretakers, with additional exposure to human strangers on a daily basis. Virtually all zoos also 
offer enrichment in the form of various foraging activities. In rehabilitation stations the purpose is very 
different. Many individuals have experienced traumatic events in their past (capture and loss of 
mother, sometimes accompanied by injury) and thus need to recover physically and mentally. The 
stations’ ultimate aim is to bring individuals back into the wild, and consequently they avoid bringing 
about too close an attachment to humans or exposing them to artificial enrichment devices. Moreover, 
many rehabilitating apes lack the close bond to their mother or other knowledgeable adults and are 
instead housed in peer groups.  
 
Our overall aim, then, is to relate the variation in rearing histories to psychological attitudes and 
exploration styles, and thus to problem-solving abilities. The results of this study should also help to 
improve comparability when the cognitive performance of different species is compared. 
 
5.3 Methods 
 
5.3.1 Subjects and study locations 
 
Our total sample size involved 103 orangutans: 68 Pongo pygmaeus spp and 35 Pongo abelii. Data 
collection on the zoo-housed sample took place at nine different European zoos between November 
2012 and January 2015 and all data was collected by SF (Table 1). In total the zoo sample consisted of 
41 individuals, of which 31 were standard mother-reared and ten individuals whose own mother had 
either died or rejected the infant were hand-reared: cared for by human caretakers, within the zoo or 
partly within a human household, and subsequently returned to a group of zoo-living conspecifics 
(Table 2).  
 
Data on 62 rehabilitation orangutans was collected between June 2012 and June 2014 by LD and ZK, 
supported by a trained assistant Andreas Wendl. In Borneo data was conducted at the Orangutan Care 
Center and Quarantine (OCCQ) and Nyaru Menteng Rescue Center managed by Bornean Orangutan 
Foundation International (BOSF), both located in Central Kalimantan (Table 1). In Sumatra data 
collection took place at two sites managed by the Sumatran Orangutan Conservation Program (SOCP): 
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the quarantine station in Batu M'Belin (QBM) and at the release site Danau Alo, Bukit Tigapuluh in 
Jambi (Table 1). 
 
Depending on available background information the sample collected at the rehabilitation stations was 
further divided into following defined groups: Wild, Station, Ex-Human and Unknown. Individuals 
were assigned to these four groups depending on at what age they had arrived at a rehabilitation 
station and their previous history with humans (Table 2).   
Table 1: Overview of subjects and study facilitations. 
Study Facility N Species Age Range Social Housing Test Location Time Period 
Münster zoo 6 P. pygmaeus 6-43 Mixed-age group Sleeping box Apr-May 2013 
Apenheul primate park 8 P. pygmaeus 13-52 Mixed-age group Sleeping box Jan-Feb 2014 
Basel zoo 4 P. abelii 5-13 Mixed-age group Smaller enclosure Nov 2013 
Blackpool zoo 4 P. pygmaeus 13-31 Mixed-age group Sleeping box Jan 2015 
Dortmund zoo 4 P. abelii 8-23 Mixed-age group Sleeping box Nov-Dec 2012 
Durrell wildlife trust 5 P. abelii 9-49 Mixed-age group Sleeping box Mar 2013 
Leipzig zoo 6 P. abelii 5-25 Mixed-age group Test enclosure Mar 2014 
Paignton zoo 2 P. pygmaeus 18-20 Mixed-age group Sleeping box Feb 2015 
Twycross zoo 2 P. pygmaeus 14-36 Mixed-age group Sleeping box Jan-Feb 2013 
Danau alo/ SOCP 5 P. abelii 3-6 Solitary Home enclosure Apr-Jun 2013 
Nyaru menteng 18 P. pygmaeus 6-17 Solitary Home enclosure May-Jun 2014 
OCCQ 28 P. pygmaeus 8-14.5 Peer group Test enclosure June-Sep 2012 
Batu mbelin/ SOCP 11 P. abelii 5-25 Solitary Home enclosure Oct 2012-Mar 2013 
 
 
5.3.2 Housing conditions 
 
In the zoos, individuals were housed in mixed-aged groups of conspecifics ranging from four to 12 
individuals in standard indoor enclosures during the day, and mostly separated individually or in pairs 
into sleeping boxes for the night. Most zoos also provide the orangutans with a larger outdoor 
enclosure.  At each zoo, animal keepers are in daily close contact with the orangutans, providing them 
with food but also with diverse enrichment activities.  
 
In the rehabilitation stations the housing situations were more heterogeneous (see Table 1). They 
differed according to the standards and capabilities of each facility and the age, sex and background of 
the individuals. All orangutans in this study were at the time of the study held in solitary cages, except 
for one station were 28 individuals were socially housed in groups of 2-6 individuals. Contact with 
humans was limited: caretakers were cleaning and feeding several times a day, and if necessary 
veterinarians took care of their physical health. Each cage had simple enrichment devices, such as 
ropes, and once a day subjects received extra food-related enrichment. If the infants were very small 
human caretakers served as a mother replacement. These individuals were attended to in a nursery 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
107 
 
home with other infants. They had daily contact and supervision by humans for their needs. Most 
individuals had access to the forest at some stage during their time at the station. 
 
Table 2: Groups of subjects and their background information. 
Group N 
Age 
Range 
Current Housing 
Years in 
Captivity 
Human 
Exposure 
Remark 
Wild 5 10-25 
Rehabilitation 
station 
0-7 Minimal 
Majority of life in natural habitat. 
Arrived at a rehabilitation center as 
sub-adults or adults, eventually to be 
translocated to a new natural habitat. 
Station 8 5-11 
Rehabilitation 
station 
4-10 
Mainly 
human 
raised. 
Minimum 80% of life in rehabilitation 
station. Arrived at station as 
dependent offspring at the age of 1.5 
year or younger. 
Ex-Human 16 3.5-14 
Rehabilitation 
station 
0-9 
Minimum 6 
months with 
humans 
Arrived at rehabilitation station after 
the age of 1.5 years. Background 
history with human contact i.e. pet 
(minimum 6 months) 
Unknown 33 3-17 
Rehabilitation 
station 
0.5-14 
Unknown 
before arrival 
at station 
No background information. Arrived 
at station between 2 and 7 years of 
age and therefore large part of the 
developmental phase spent in 
captivity. 
Mother-
reared Zoo 
31 5-52 Zoo 
Whole 
life 
All life within 
human care 
Nursed by own mother within a zoo. 
All life in captivity with exposure to 
human caretakers and visitors. 
Hand-reared 
Zoo 
10 13-43 Zoo 
Whole 
life 
Human hand 
nursing and 
all life within 
human care 
Nursed by human caretakers either at 
the zoo or in human households. All 
life in captivity with exposure to 
human caretakers and visitors. 
 
 
5.3.3 Human Orientation Index 
 
To capture any psychological variation caused by time in captivity and human-related experiences, we 
assessed the degree to which each individual reacted toward a novel human. The Human Orientation 
Index (HOI) contained the following components: reactions and proximity to a human stranger during 
two conditions. Each subject was tested individually, except for a few cases where the mother was 
tested with its dependent offspring to avoid inducing stress for both. In the zoos the test took place 
either in the home enclosure or in the sleeping quarters if individuals were more easily separated 
there. In the rehabilitation stations, individuals were either transported to single compartments for 
testing or were directly tested in their home enclosure. The test was performed by a local man, 
unknown to the orangutans and dressed in black.  
 
 
Human Induced Curiosity Predicts Cognitive Performance in Orangutans 
 
 
 
108 
 
The total test lasted for one minute and was composed of two consecutive conditions, each lasting 30 
seconds. In the first condition the man approached and positioned himself approximately one meter 
in front of the enclosure where the subject was located and remained standing with his body oriented 
laterally (perpendicularly) to the subject. In the second condition the man turned around to face the 
orangutan and tried to establish eye contact. The whole test was video recorded and during the entire 
test no other human was present.  
Reactions and proximity to the man for the first two seconds of first sight were coded from the videos. 
For each condition we scored the proximity to the man in the following way: 0= the orangutan 
positioned itself as far away as possible; 1= the orangutan was more than one meter away from the 
human; 2= the orangutan was within one meter from the human; and 3= the orangutan placed itself as 
close to the human as possible. 
We also scored the very first behavioral reaction of the orangutan for each condition as follows: 0= a 
negative reaction, defined as: retreat, stress vocalization, pilo-erection, nervous swinging or turning 
away from the human; 1= a neutral reaction, defined as resting, moving calmly or play behavior; 2= a 
positive reaction, if the orangutan approached the human; and 3= an actively positive reaction, if the 
orangutan begged (either by using lips or hands), tried in any other active way to contact the human 
or attempted to trade objects from the enclosure for food. 
Furthermore, since the measurements listed above were based upon the first reaction of each 
condition only, we also scored whether any active contact behavior occurred during the 30 seconds of 
each condition. This was to ensure catching the possible substantial interest in humans, when the 
surprise had waned.  
Thus, in total HOI consisted of all the summed behavioral reactions combined with the proximity to a 
human stranger, with the eventual score ranging from zero to 14. In our sample, scores ranged from 2 
to 14. Furthermore, we also measured the time in seconds a subject spent within one meter of the 
human stranger throughout the whole test and found that this independent time measurement of 
proximity was strongly correlated with the HOI-index (Spearman’s correlation, two-tailed: rs=0.600, 
N=96, P<0.001).  Given that an individual can be in close proximity and not move throughout the time 
of the test, but nevertheless not show any active response behavior, we used the summarized index of 
both behavioral reactions and proximity scores, which also generated more resolution to the various 
responses within our sample, than simply proximity latency data would.  
The logistics in one of the rehabilitation stations allowed us to use a sub-sample of 28 individuals to 
test for social interest in unfamiliar conspecifics. In this sub-sample we measured the time of close 
proximity to two other unknown orangutans of equal sex, when these were present in a neighboring 
enclosure to the subject, which allowed us to disentangle social orientation per se to that from interest 
in humans. 
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5.3.4 Response to novelty  
 
We performed two separate tests to assess individual variation in novelty response. First, we 
examined how each subject reacted to novel food. In the zoo sample the novel food was blue potato 
mash served with black olives on top. Zoo orangutans receive a broad diet with many types of human 
food, but blue items are not common and olives were new to all individuals. In the rehabilitation 
stations we used purple rice or purple potato mash. Second, we introduced a novel toy in form of a 
wooden board equipped with six different colored rotatable tennis balls. For both tasks, we recorded 
the latency to first touch or first taste, respectively, as well as exploration duration of the novel toy. 
Maximum test duration was two minutes for both tasks, and each subject was tested individually. 
 
5.3.5 Experimental cognitive task – The honey tool-task 
 
In order to evaluate cognitive performance we used a naturalistic task, which required no pre-training 
trials and could therefore easily be applied to all individuals. The honey tool-task allowed us to assess 
physical cognition at multiple levels from very basic understanding of the apparatus to high 
innovativeness. The task was made up of a wooden box measured 50 cm x 80 cm x 5 cm, whose front 
was covered by a transparent plexiglas plate (Figure 1). The upper part of the box contained a straight 
channel (30 cm x 5 cm) in which sat a pre-inserted wooden stick (40 cm) with its tip dipped in honey. 
Below the straight channel, the box also had another channel, which was L-shaped. This channel was 
15 cm x 10 cm and the bottom of the curve was filled with honey. The honey was visible to the subjects 
through the plexiglas but the length of the channel was too long for any finger to reach the honey. 
Moreover, the wooden stick would not work in the L-shaped channel. In addition, below the test 
apparatus we provided each subject with two more wooden sticks and three pieces of rope. The ropes 
were too short to reach the end of the straight channel but long enough to bend the L-shaped curve 
and retrieve honey from its bottom.  
 
We measured multiple aspects of the subjects’ responses to the apparatus, which was presented to 
them in the absence of any humans. To estimate cognitive ability, we measured the following actions: 
1) removing the provided stick from the straight channel; 2) inserting any of the three provided sticks 
into the straight channel during total test time; 3) tool manufacturing, defined as an attempt to modify 
the provided tools and/ or the use of any other tool that the subject found or made; 4) inserting the 
rope tool into the L-shaped channel. We recorded each task measurement individually with yes or no, 
depending on whether or not a subject completed the action (Table 3).  
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We also recorded detailed data on any exploration actions during the problem-solving task. These 
were divided into two main categories: relevant and irrelevant exploration. Relevant exploration 
involved any exploration of the channels, and thus the actual problem to be solved. Any other 
explorative acts directed toward the test apparatus itself, the board or table on which it was presented 
was counted as irrelevant exploration. For our statistical analyses, we measured the frequency and 
variety as well as duration of both categories of exploration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
   A                                                         B                                         C 
Figure 1: A zoo housed subject exploring the honey tool-task (A). The honey tool-task in the zoos (B) and rescue 
centers (C). 
 
Table 3: Measurements of cognitive performance 
Task measurement Definition Remarks 
Remove stick 
Stick provided in the straight 
trap is taken out of the trap 
Recognition of the stick in the 
trap and removal of it 
Insert stick straight trap 
Any of the three sticks are 
inserted into the straight trap 
during the 10 minutes test time 
Understanding of stick fitting the 
straight trap 
Tool manufacture/ other tool 
use 
Any tool (stick or rope) is 
modified or any other material 
is used as a tool in any of the 
two traps 
Innovative attempt to retrieve 
honey by modifying existing tool 
or trying out any other solution 
Insert rope to L-shaped trap 
Any of the three ropes are 
inserted into the L-shaped trap 
Understanding of the properties 
of rope fitting the L-shape trap 
 
 
5.3.6 Experimental procedure 
 
A In all tasks; novelty response tests, the HOI test and the honey tool-task only those individuals who 
were easily and voluntarily separated for the experiment participated, therefore sample size between 
the different tests varied between 94-103. In the honey tool-task each orangutan was tested 
individually, except for mothers who could not be separated from their dependent offspring, in which 
case the offspring was not participating in the task. All subjects were naïve to this test apparatus and 
we performed no training trials. Thus each subject was tested only once. Zoo individuals were tested 
in their smaller sleeping enclosures where they could be separated from the group. In the 
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rehabilitation stations testing took place in their home cage, since most individuals were housed alone. 
For the 28 socially housed individuals, additional testing cages were available. The individuals were 
brought to the testing cages separately and only stayed there for the time of testing. The problem-
solving task lasted for a maximum of 10 minutes and no humans were near the subjects during this 
time. The task was video recorded with one to two SONY HDR-CX200 handy cameras, depending on 
angle of the cameras. All subjects were normally fed both before and after testing and thus were not 
food-deprived for the task. In the rehabilitation stations, the honey tool-task was presented to the 
subjects on a large board right outside of their enclosure, and subjects could easily reach out toward 
the problem-solving task. In one zoo, we were able to present the honey box within the test enclosure 
and thus subjects here had full access to the apparatus. In all other zoos the logistics were slightly 
different and due to narrower mesh size the apparatus was therefore presented closer to the mesh 
outside the enclosure, with a slight angle but less accessible to the subjects. We therefore scored 
accessibility of the test apparatus and controlled for this variation in the statistical model.   
 
5.3.7 Data extraction and statistical analyses 
 
All videos were imported into Mangold interact 9.7, where all detailed behaviors of both cognitive 
performance measurements as well as exploration acts were coded by SF and LD. We used IBM SPSS 
statistics 20 to perform inter-observer reliability tests on every detailed behavioral act. For the zoo 
sample, 20% of the videos were coded by both observers and yielded a Cohen’s Kappa value of 0.842 
(Nevents=1020, P=0.000), which is considered very good. From the rehabilitation sample, 16% of the 
videos were coded by both observers and delivered a good inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s Kappa: 
0.721, Nevents=1020, P=0.000). All statistical analyses were performed in R version 3.2.3 (Team R Core: 
2015) using a binomial General Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) to examine each individuals performance 
as well as Linear-Mixed-Effect-Models (LMM) for assessments of the relationship between the HOI-
index, novelty response, exploration variables and performance. 
 
5.3.8 Ethical note 
 
All experiments fully complied with the ethical guidelines of each study facility and were respectively 
approved by the research manager and/or head of each facility. We confirm that according to the Swiss 
Animal Welfare legislation our animal experiments are considered with the severity grade 0 (no harm). 
The experimental protocols for the rehabilitation stations were approved by the Animal Welfare office 
of the University of Zurich, the Scientific Advisory Board of the BOS Foundation (Bornean Orangutan 
Survival), the research managers and head of the stations of Sumatran Orangutan Conservation 
Programme (SOCP) and Orangutan Foundation International (OFI), and the Indonesian Ministry of 
Research and Technology (RISTEK). Moreover, all zoo experiments were supported by research 
committee of the British and Irish association for zoos and aquariums, BIAZA. 
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5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 Cognitive performance  
 
For the honey tool-task, we found large variation in cognitive performance among the 103 orangutans 
(Figure 2). Eleven individuals did not solve a single sub-task. The modal and median score on total 
performance was 1 out of a maximum of 4. The four different cognitive measurements of the honey 
tool-task varied significantly in difficulty. In order to examine whether the ability to solve the different 
sub-tasks was cumulative, we applied a Guttman scale, which showed a reproducibility coefficient of 
close to one (0.97). This strongly suggests that the ability to solve the more difficult sub-tasks was 
nested within the performance of the other sub-tasks: 90% of the 103 individuals performing the 
honey tool-task fitted the applied Guttman scale of the four different sub-tasks. As expected, ‘remove 
stick’ was the easiest, ‘insert the stick in the straight channel’ was next, followed by ‘making a tool’, 
whereas ‘inserting the rope in the curved channel’ was most difficult (Table 3, Sub-task) for the 
orangutans in this study. Due to this variation in difficulty, we treated the four levels of cognitive 
performance as an ordinal variable in further analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Honey tool-task performance. Frequency of subjects 
that solved zero to all subtasks. 
 
 
We next tested whether background and housing conditions, species, sex, and age could explain the 
variation in cognitive performance on the honey tool-task. Table 1 shows the results of a binomial 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) of the honey tool-task performance, with the response 
variable being whether or not a subject solved each sub-task. The GLMM allowed us to control for 
repeated observations in each facility and on each individual. The results revealed that the human 
orientation index (HOI) was a good predictor of the ability to solve the task (B±SD= 0.227±0.08, 
Z=2.699, P=0.007; Table 4), as was the latency to touch unfamiliar food (B±SD= -0.034±0.01, Z=-2.263, 
P=0.024; Table 4) and a novel object (B±SD= -0.025±0.01, Z=-2.123, P=0.034; Table 4). The less 
neophobic the individuals, the more likely they were to solve the task. When we removed the novelty 
responses from the analysis, the HOI remained the main predictor of performance (Table 5, Appendix 
III). Because an individual’s age and the time it had spent in captivity were strongly correlated, only 
the factor age was considered for the analysis, but it did not influence task performance. Subtle 
differences between enclosures, which might affect the ease of access to the apparatus, were controlled 
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for in the analysis, but again did not contribute to explaining the variation in cognitive performance. 
Perhaps surprisingly, none of the other possible variables (sex, species [Sumatran or Bornean], and 
the various background and current housing conditions of the orangutans) predicted performance; 
they also had no influence on task performance when HOI was excluded from the analyses (Table 6, 
Appendix III). 
 
 
 
Table 4: Generalized Linear Mixed Model of overall performance in the honey tool-task. 
Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the task. 
   B  SE Z p value 
(Intercept) -2.588 1.33 -1.943 0.052  
Human Orientation Index 0.227 0.08 2.699 0.007 ** 
Novel food: time until touch -0.034 0.01 -2.263 0.024 * 
Novel object: time until touch -0.025 0.01 -2.123 0.034* 
Novel object: exploration duration 0.003 0.01 0.433 0.665 
Age -0.006 0.03 -0.232 0.817 
SEX (male) 0.124 0.51 0.243 0.808 
Species (Sumatra) -0.094 0.59 -0.16 0.873 
Background     
   Wild vs. Rest -0.173 0.27 -0.639 0.523 
   Rehab vs. Zoo -0.402 0.29 -1.395 0.163 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest 0.073 0.20 0.367 0.714 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation station) -0.479 0.48 -1.008 0.314 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo) 0.365 0.51 0.722 0.470 
Accessibility (trend analysis)     
   Linear 0.786 0.76 1.04 0.298 
   Quadratic 0.228 0.89 0.257 0.797 
   Cubic -0.189 0.89 -0.213 0.831 
Sub-task (trend analysis)     
   Linear -4.969 0.74 -6.737 <0.001 *** 
   Quadratic 1.554 0.44 3.559 <0.001 *** 
   Cubic -0.205 0.33 -0.626 0.531 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each facility and individual. The performance in the 
honey tool-task was binary measured. The Analysis included 88 individuals in 9 different zoos/rehab stations, 
totalling 352 observations,  χ2= 226.27, P< 0.001, P-values below 0.05 appear in bold. 
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5.4.2 Exploration behavior 
 
The orang-utans’ performance on the tool-use task was best accounted for by exploration variety, 
which explained 27% of the variation (Figure 3 and Figure 4b), whereas exploration duration 
predicted 9% of the variation (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =08.57, R2LMM(m)=.092, P =0.005, Figure 3 and 
Fig. 4a). However, the HOI only explained 5% of cognitive performance (χ2ML =6.21, P<0.05). 
 
The effect of human orientation on exploration 
 
A Linear Mixed-Effects Model (LMM) analysis of the subjects’ exploration of the apparatus, which 
controlled for repeated measurements in each facility, showed that HOI accounted for 11% of the 
variation of the total exploration variety (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =12.02, R2LMM(m)=0.1113,  P <0.001, 
Figure 3 and Figure 5b). In addition, there was a trend showing that individuals with a higher HOI 
explored the apparatus longer than those with a lower HOI (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =3.53, 
R2LMM(m)=0.025, P =0.06, Figure 5a), although the HOI explained a mere 2% of the variation in 
exploration duration (Figure 3). This low proportion is not surprising, because the most successful 
orang-utans, and thus the ones with high HOI values, stopped exploring once they found the solution 
to the problem and spent their remaining time extracting honey. 
 
 
Figure 3. Graphical illustration of the relationship between the human orientation Index (HOI), the cognitive 
performance and exploration duration and variety, in context to each other. The total variety can be divided into 
relevant and irrelevant variety. The figure also indicates the percentage of variation estimated by the pseudo R2 
for linear mixed effects margins that is explained by each factor. The thickness of the arrows accentuates the 
strength of the influence. 
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Random exploration of the apparatus per se does not necessarily raise the chances of finding the 
solution. Individuals who can distinguish between relevant and irrelevant parts of the apparatus 
should be more successful (Table 7, Appendix III). We therefore also investigated the separate effects 
of exploration variety directed at the relevant or irrelevant areas of the apparatus. We calculated 
marginal pseudo-R2 values to estimate the proportion of variation explained by the fixed effects in our 
model. The HOI explained 13% of the variation of relevant exploration (χ2ML =13.67, P<0.001, Figure 3 
and Table 8, Appendix III), which subsequently accounted for 36% of the variation in cognitive 
performance. In contrast, HOI explained only 3% of the irrelevant exploration (χ2ML =2.93, P=0.087, 
Figure 3), which accounted for only 3% of performance in the task. The effect of a higher HOI was thus 
primarily on the amount of exploration and especially on the diversity of exploration on relevant parts 
of the task, with the latter explaining 36% of cognitive performance. Furthermore, neither housing- 
nor background/ rearing history had any effect on the exploration of the apparatus (Table 8, Appendix 
III). 
 
Figure 4. The relationships between exploration behaviour and the overall cognitive performance. (a) Overall 
performance in relation to the exploration duration. Individuals that explored longer were significantly better 
problem solvers (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =08.57, P =0.005). (b) The overall task performance in relation to the 
total variety of exploration actions (Nobs=103, Nlocation=12, χ2ML =36.10, P <0.001). 
 
Additionally, using a Linear Mixed-Effect Model (LMM), controlling for each subject’s housing location, 
we compared the exploration style of the most successful individuals, the 10 subjects who solved the 
most difficult problem of ‘inserting the rope in the curved channel’ (‘ropers’), to the other non-
successful individuals (‘non-ropers’) (Figure 6). There was no difference in exploration duration 
between ropers and non-ropers. However, the ropers differed significantly from non-ropers in their 
exploration variety (P= 0.012).  Ropers not only showed a greater diversity of explorative actions, but 
also a far greater diversity of exploration on relevant parts of the apparatus (p< 0.001; note that solving 
the rope solution is itself not counted as relevant exploration). Moreover, the ropers’ HOI was 29.7% 
(and significantly) higher than that of non-ropers (χ2ML =4.06, P<0.05). 
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Figure 5. The relationships between the human orientation index (HOI) and exploration behaviour showed 
significant dependencies in Linear-Mixed-Effect-Models (LMM) that controlled for repeated observations in each 
facility. (a) Exploration duration in relation to HOI-index (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =3.53, R2LMM(m)=0.025, 
P=0.06). (b) Total variety of exploration actions in relation to the HOI (Nobs=94, Nlocation=10, χ2ML =12.02, 
R2LMM(m)=0.1113,  P <0.001). 
 
Figure 6: Individuals who solved the more challenging problem of inserting the rope into the L-shaped curved, 
had significantly higher HOI-index, relevant exploration variety and overall performance, than individuals who 
failed to find the rope-solution. 
 
5.4.3 Evaluating the human orientation index 
 
Given the large effect of the HOI on exploration style, we examined whether the different background 
categories determined an individual’s human orientation index. ‘Wild’ individuals strongly diverged 
from any other category in that they took longer or did not respond at all to the novel food and novel 
object (Figure 6, Appendix III) and by showing significantly lower HOI values (Kruskal-Wallis test: 
N=95, P=0.002, Figure 7). However, pairwise comparisons of each background category (controlling 
for age, sex and species as well as repeated observations from each study location and correction of P-
values for multiple comparisons using Tukey) revealed no significant differences in HOI between the 
background categories (Table 9, Appendix III).   
The reaction toward novel humans might also be the result of several other factors, such as a response 
to any novelty or to social beings (human or orang-utan). Therefore, we also examined the links 
between HOI and the three novelty response experiments (concerning novel food, novel objects and 
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novel conspecifics). Results of a Linear Mixed-Effects Model (LMM) evaluated the relation between the 
HOI and two other novelty response tasks, the novel-object and the novel-food task. The HOI was not 
explained by the latency to touch either the novel food (B±SD= -0.057±1.12, df= 78.83, t= 6.401, 
P=0.332; Table 5) or the novel toy (B±SD= 0.008±0.02, df= 81.9, t= 0.457, P=0.649; Table 5), whereas 
the latter two were correlated (Spearman’s rho: r =0.314, N=98, P=0.002, 2-tailed). Neither did the 
exploration duration of the novel toy explain the variation in HOI (B±SD= 0.006±0.01, df= 81.99, t= 
0.584, P=0.561; Table 5). Thus, the HOI did not simply reflect a positive response to novelty per se. To 
test whether the HOI represents a general interest in social beings, and thereby a higher social 
motivation in general or whether it describes the interest in humans specifically, we performed an 
additional social-interest-task with a subset of individuals of one rehabilitation station (N=28, see 
Method section). The HOI did not seem to measure a general social interest, since the duration spent 
in close proximity to a novel human did not correlate with the time spent in close proximity to novel 
conspecifics (Spearman’s rho: r =.198, N=28, P=.312, two-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The measured human 
orientation index for sub-categories 
of diverse background histories 
presented with the raw data. 
 
 
Table 5: Linear Mixed-Effects model of the human orientation index controlling for repeated observations on 
each facility. 
  Estimate Std. Error df t value P value 
(Intercept) 15.59252 1.63461 50.76 9.539 <0.001*** 
Novel food 
      Latency touch -0.13721 0.11044 79.98 -1.242 0.218 
      Latency taste 0.0161 0.04416 77.49 0.365 0.716 
Novel Toy  
      Latency touch 0.01408 0.03946 79.74 0.357 0.722 
      Exploration duration 0.0215 0.01677 79.99 1.282 0.204 
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5.5 Discussion 
 
This study represents one of the largest systematic individual-level comparisons of cognitive tool-
using abilities in apes, involving 13 different captive groups in both zoos and rehabilitation stations in 
which none of the individuals were deprived or enculturated. As expected, the latency to touch novel 
food or objects, and thus reduced neophobia, was an important independent predictor of task 
performance (Table 4), as has been found in other studies (Auersperg et al., 2011; Benson-Amram & 
Holekamp, 2012; Cauchard et al., 2013; Sol et al., 2012). However, we also found that variation in 
problem-solving skills in the honey tool-task was equally predicted by persistent and varied 
explorative behaviour, which in turn was highly influenced by the orangutans’ psychological 
orientation as assessed with the human orientation index, HOI (Table 4). We suggest the following 
biologically most plausible causal cascade, backed up by a series of analyses: Human orientation 
mainly influenced both the orang-utans’ motivation to explore and the nature of their exploration, and 
consequently affected their understanding of the problem-solving task, and thus their success in 
solving it. 
 
The reaction towards humans could have several dimensions, other than the mere interest in humans, 
and our results allowed us to characterize the nature of the Human orientation Index (HOI) in more 
detail. A high HOI does not simply reflect the expectation of food that is provided regularly by humans, 
because HOI varied extensively and all these orang-utans depended on humans for their food. The 
different background categories also showed higher variability in their HOI than in their novelty 
response (Figure 7 and Figure 8, Appendix III). Moreover, if it were mere food expectation, variation 
in HOI should be associated with caretakers that provide the daily food supply rather than random 
strangers. Finally, the HOI does not reflect general novelty response or general social interest, as it was 
not correlated with the approach latency to novel food nor objects (Table 5), nor with interest in novel 
conspecifics. Therefore the effect was human-specific and increased the motivation to explore, 
expressed as increased duration and variety of exploration (Figure 5a and 5b).  
 
The HOI thus captures a fundamental psychological change that is induced by human contact. The 
different background categories overlapped largely in their HOI (Table 9, Appendix III), implying that 
each individual’s specific nature and experience of human contact is more influential than the human 
exposure time per se. However, our sample included a few wild individuals who had spent their whole 
immature period in natural habitat and showed very low human orientation compared to most other 
conspecifics housed in zoos and rehabilitation stations, independent of the time they had spent at the 
station (Figure 7). This indicates that the change caused by humans can only happen at an early age, 
suggesting a sensitive period for social inputs. Since this kind of psychological orientation is absent in 
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nature (Forss et al., 2015), we can ask which natural process is being mimicked or modified by human 
contact. The answer is remarkably simple: humans replace the role of the mother and other conspecific 
experts, and the rich variety of artefacts provided by humans enriches their physical environment. In 
their natural niche, orangutans as well as other primates are prone to attend to their mother and other 
expert conspecifics and learn necessary skills socially (Lonsdorf, 2006; Humle et al., 2009; Jaeggi et al., 
2010; van de Waal et al., 2013; Schuppli et al., 2016). Exploration plays a crucial role in skill acquisition 
in the wild, but virtually all exploration is socially facilitated, allowing orangutans to overcome 
intrinsic neophobia (Forss et al., 2015). 
 
Given the identification of human orientation, rather than rearing conditions, as the key determinant 
of cognitive ability in captive apes, it makes sense to revisit the role of deprivation and enculturation.  
Because deprivation involves the complete loss of any role models, whereas enculturation involves the 
presence of far richer social inputs by more actively engaged role models than under normal 
conditions, one could argue that the degree of human orientation may largely explain the whole 
spectrum of cognitive performance among great apes. This perspective also explains why enculturated 
apes outperform others not just in socio-cognitive skills, but also in physical cognitive skills 
(Rumbaugh & Washburn, 2003; Bard et al., 2014).  
 
The social triggering of the engagement with artefacts is highly influential in human child development 
(Tomasello, 1999; Bard & Leavens, 2009). Studies within the field of comparative psychology have 
documented non-human primates’ tendency to attend to humans (Call & Tomasello, 1996; Hirata et 
al., 2009) and acknowledged the improvement in learning cognitive tasks due to human contact in 
captive settings (Harlow, 1949; Rumbaugh & Pate, 2014). Systematic species comparisons of primates’ 
attention structure toward humans are rare. Nonetheless, in 1916, Yerkes already suggested that the 
qualitatively better cognitive performance of an orang-utan compared to monkeys was due to the ape’s 
social attention to human actions. Our results thus support previous suggestions (Shumaker et al., 
2011; Russon & Galdikas, 1993; Byrne & Russon, 1998) that early exposure to humans and human 
artefacts presents a broader range of opportunities for exploration resulting in increased 
innovativeness in captive apes. Over time, the accumulating experience resulting from attention to 
humans leads to improved problem-solving ability, provided the exposure to humans is early in life. In 
conclusion, human orientation at least partly explains the phenomenon that captive primates that are 
exposed to both conspecific and human role models experience increased opportunities for socially 
induced exploration and learning (cf. Bering, 2004).  
 
Our detailed analyses revealed that the HOI influenced an individual’s duration and especially its 
variety of exploration (Figure 5a and 5b), which subsequently explained cognitive performance 
(Figure 3 and Figure 4a and 4b).  Previous studies on hyenas (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012) and 
birds (Griffin & Guez, 2014) have also reported that the diversity of exploration actions influences 
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innovativeness and problem-solving skills. However, in our study, individuals with a strong human 
orientation were more successful in the task, not only through their exploration diversity, but also by 
focusing on the relevant parts of the apparatus (Figure 3), implying that they were better at 
recognizing the actual challenge presented in the honey tool-task. Importantly, these parts were 
relevant not because they directly led to the solution, but rather because exploration of these parts 
improved the animals’ understanding of the physical properties of the problem. For example, 
individuals that traced the honey channel from the outside of the glass obviously understood that there 
is honey inside, but were at that time not searching at the correct part of the apparatus, the channel 
entrance. Similarly, individuals poking with their finger into the curved channel may have gathered 
information on its length. Exploration can therefore be viewed as latent learning: it allows an animal 
to gather knowledge of the texture, the material, and the problem itself. Over time, then, individuals 
with a high HOI will gain more experience, which contributes to their focus on relevant aspects of the 
problem and hence problem-solving success. 
 
The effects of the HOI on problem-solving success may have been so strong that they masked the 
effects of other factors. Thus, we found no differences between the two orangutan species (P. abelii 
and P. pygmaeus), even though these were found when orang-utans with very similar backgrounds (all 
mother-reared zoo individuals) were compared on a range of cognitive tasks (Forss et al., 2016).  
 
This study documented strong effects of human orientation on problem-solving abilities, through its 
effects on response to novelty, motivation to explore, exploration persistence and ultimately 
experience. This finding suggests that it is just as impossible to design culture-free cognitive tests for 
primates as it is for humans. In this sense, tests of primate cognition are inevitably deeply 
anthropomorphic. However, once we have controlled for the subjects’ human-related histories and 
given that problem-solving ability is about dealing with unknown, novel problems the variation 
captured in these tests nonetheless reflects variation in intrinsic cognitive abilities and should be 
comparable within and across species. Therefore, we suggest the HOI may be a useful tool in 
standardizing comparisons across primates, especially studies concerning ape subjects with various 
background and human-related experiences. In future work, we will further disentangle the exact 
nature and causes of the HOI and address additional problem-solving domains.  
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Conclusion & Outlook 
 
Although humans have evolved specialized adaptations making us a culture-dependent species, this 
thesis examined the idea that processes underlying cultural learning are more widely distributed and 
impact cognitive abilities in nonhuman primates. I therefore conducted four projects to test the 
presence of culturally constructed intelligence in orangutans.  
 
First, we saw that despite being a species acknowledged for its explorative and innovative tendencies, 
orangutans are ironically not naturally curious toward novelty and in fact strongly avoid it. Thus, even 
though innovations are the building blocks of what we define as orangutan culture, individuals do not 
boldly explore novel things and rarely invent under natural conditions. Consequently, the individual 
pathway, assuming innovations to appear from intrinsic curiosity expressed through novelty response, 
can be rejected in this particular case. Instead, I suggest that innovations may arise because the 
acquisition of skills through social learning can occasionally result in modifications of existing 
innovations. These results are inconsistent with the widespread assumption that novelty response is 
a common and straightforward pathway to animal innovation. The finding prompted me to do a 
literature review (Chapter 3), which suggests that social (cultural) species prefer attending to social 
information if available, when confronted with novelty. In slow paced life-history species - depending 
on learning - this effect may even depend on specific experts or role models. This can explain why in 
natural conditions innovations are relatively rarely made. Furthermore, it implies that innovations are 
retained as a consequence of effective social learning ability. In long-lived species characterized by an 
extended developmental phase - like the orangutans - socially protected learning represents an 
adaptation through which risks can be avoided. In consequence investment in novelty exploration 
does not provide additional fitness advantages, whereas selection on learning efficiency is highly 
beneficial.  
 
On the contrary, the very same species, which have evolved to effectively learn skills from conspecifics 
rather than engage in risky independent exploration, can be made to express the opposite behavior – 
novelty-based curiosity – once the constraints of risk are removed and environmental conditions allow 
for it. One such case is when animals are kept in artificial and risk-free habitats, like the enriched 
conditions of captivity provided by modern zoos. Captive animals experience different environments 
from those of conspecifics in natural habitats, which can affect their cognition – a process that can give 
rise to the captivity effect, the phenomenon that captive animals show greatly different psychological 
attitudes and cognitive abilities compared with their wild counterparts. 
 
Secondly, by investigating the effect of captive habitats, I found that in some species captivity can 
reduce the default state of evolved neophobia (Chapter 2 & 3). Due to a risk-free and safe habitat 
captive animals experience a reduced cognitive load, allowing for exploration to thrive once neophobia 
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is suppressed. This is especially pronounced in species where exploration tendency is intrinsically high 
and somewhat socially induced – like the orangutans. Because most cognitive studies assessing 
innovativeness have so far been conducted solely in captive settings, it is easily assumed that large-
brained species like great apes are highly curious and innovative, although this paradoxically 
represents the exceptional state where animals can afford to invest in curiosity. Consequently, looking 
at a species’ innovativeness only in captivity can lead to misleading conclusions. Unfortunately, the 
opposite of only considering cognitive abilities as revealed by field measurements of innovativeness 
in natural habitat runs the risk of measuring neophobia only.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustrative framework of innovativeness. In natural habitats investment in exploration, (especially of 
novelty) is constrained by trade-offs linked to costs of potential predation risk, poisonous food intake as well as 
opportunity costs linked to time and energy. As a result innovation rates in natural habitats remain relatively 
low. In contrast, captive habitats lack the cost of investment in exploration allowing for higher innovation 
tendencies. These are additionally boosted by the effect of intense social cues. This effect of reduced risk linked 
to a captive existence illustrate the conditions of the creative nice of humans.  
 
 
The findings from this thesis also show that the effects of a life in captivity is more than loss of 
neophobia - especially in great apes - who are adapted to learn from others and therefore also can 
attend to humans as additional role models. Accordingly their intensified social environment alters 
attentiveness, causing further cognitive changes. Thus as a third factor I showed that among 
orangutans, the specific social stimulus provided by humans permanently changes their attitudes 
toward novel problem-solving task, resulting in better physical cognitive skills. Chapter 5 reports huge 
variation in problem-solving ability, which in our model was best predicted by human orientation, 
which in turn was measured with an independent test assessing attentiveness to an unfamiliar human. 
Beyond improved actual performance, individuals with higher human orientation were also more 
curious and creative: they explored the task longer and used more variable exploratory actions while 
doing so. Thus, the documented captivity effect and individual variation in cognitive performance in 
orangutans represent a change in attention structure caused by the social component of human 
exposure and the experiences associated with this. As great apes exhibit high a potential for curiosity 
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and creativity, only certain conditions facilitate such behavior, implying that creative behavior is an 
evolutionary byproduct expressed when risk constraints are absent. This may help us understand 
some fundamental perspectives on why humans have become creative and the results are 
incorporated in a recent review on the phylogeny of creativity by van Schaik et al. (2016). One could 
therefore argue that the results of the captivity effect on ape cognition documented here reflect 
historical changes that led to the niche of modern human foragers. As our species overcame predation 
pressures, a combination of reduced cognitive load and pronounced cultural learning may have 
promoted conditions ideal for creative exploration (van Schaik et al., 2016). It would be valuable to 
investigate multiple large-brained and cultural species to test the generality of this conclusion. 
 
Because cognitive abilities in apes are highly plastic and influenced by experiences, potential intra-
individual variation (the reaction norm) is broad and context dependent. This range of plasticity – in 
typical data sets usually regarded as some sort of “noise”– challenges comparisons between species. 
Based upon the findings of my dissertation, I would like to emphasize the importance of considering 
experience effects, as we did by measuring a subject’s human orientation in chapter 5. This may be 
especially important when performing comparative studies not only on great apes, but in any species 
where skills are acquired through inputs during development. Thus when considering primate 
cognition, the introduced HOI-measurement describes a continuous process, of which the end point is 
enculturation. Hence, among captive apes cognitive skills may never be culture-free due to the effects 
of individuals´ specific experiences. It remains to be discovered whether this impact of human 
attentiveness is strong enough to outweigh species differences when evolutionary distances become 
greater than the two closely related species of orangutans measured so far. When the evolutionary gap 
between species are larger, like chimpanzees and bonobos, species-specific cognitive predispositions 
are more distinct, which provides interesting conditions to test for the strength of developmentally 
constructed experience effects. 
 
Figure 2: Orangutan cognitive abilities are strongly related to the quantity and quality of social inputs and 
learning experiences an individual is exposed to. Consequently, intrinsic differences between the two Pongo 
species, resulting from different evolutionary histories in learning opportunities, emerge when the experience 
effect is controlled for. 
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Since experience effects - caused by human exposure - were highly influential on orangutan problem-
solving skills, an honest comparison of cognitive abilities between the two Pongo species required a 
sample of individuals who have experienced identical social and environmental inputs. As a final goal, 
I delivered the first empirical test of the Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis in a non-human taxon by 
comparing a sample containing only standard mother-reared individuals, with similar human 
orientation values, living in highly similar zoo environments. Here intrinsic differences in cognitive 
performance appeared: Sumatran orangutans outperformed the Borneans. Thus the combination of 
more advanced skill repertoires and frequencies for social learning opportunities have over an 
evolutionary time scale produced cognitive differences between the two Pongo species. We saw that 
not only do they differ in physical problem-solving performance, but also in underlying mechanisms 
such as inhibitory control and caution, traits that may very well be under selection when selection is 
on the efficiency of social skill transmission, and thus crucial for cultural learning to take place. More 
generally, the traditional benefit hypotheses for the evolution of intelligence, such as the social brain 
hypothesis (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007) or the technical intelligence hypothesis 
(Byrne, 1997), both face the problem of grade shifts, i.e. that different lineages show major differences 
in intelligence in spite of similar social or technical challenges (Holekamp 2007; van Schaik et al., 
2012). The cultural intelligence hypothesis, which basically argues that where learning is more 
efficient intelligence can be enhanced, may therefore be essential to complement the explanatory 
power of these benefit hypotheses. 
 
All in all, in orangutans – as in humans – behaviors that require intelligence are constructed during 
development mainly depending on the social input an individual is exposed to and thus highly sensitive 
to various experiences.  When experience effects are kept as constant as possible, we can make species 
differences in cognitive capacity visible. The results from my dissertation therefore illustrate the two 
levels of cultural intelligence: the magnitude of individual experiences extracted from the social 
environment and the evolutionary outcomes of socially constructed intelligence. 
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Appendix I: Tables to chapter 3 
 
Table 1: Social facilitation effect; individuals tested alone versus social condition 
Species 
Test 
paradigm 
Test 
setting 
Social 
condition 
reduce 
neophobia 
Kin 
effect 
Remark Study 
Sturnus vulgaris 
starling 
Novel 
object/ A 
Captive No  
Individuals tested 
alone were not more 
neophobic than 
those tested with 
their group 
Apfelbeck & Raess 2008 
Acridotheres tristis  
mynah 
Novel 
object/ A 
Captive No  
When tested with 
conspecifics birds 
delayed approach to 
a novel object 
relative to when 
alone 
Griffin et al. 2013 
Quiscalus lugubris 
carib grackle 
Novel P-
S/ D 
Captive No  
Birds took longer to 
approach problem-
solving apparatus in 
social condition 
Overington et al. 2009 
Corvus corax 
raven 
Novel 
object/ B 
Captive No Yes 
Birds approached 
novel objects faster 
when alone than in 
social condition and 
approached faster 
when tested with 
siblings compared to 
non-kin 
Stöwe et al. 2006a 
Stöwe et al. 2006b 
Perca fluviatilis 
perch 
Novel 
food/ C 
Captive Yes 
 Presence of trained 
demonstrator 
influenced 
consumption of 
novel food 
Magnhagen & staffan 
2003 
Taeniopygia guttata 
Zebra finch 
Novel 
object/ A 
Captive Yes  
Birds in flocks were 
less neophobic than 
solitary birds 
Coleman & Mellgren 1994 
Melopsittacus 
undulatus 
parakeet 
 
Novel 
object/ A 
Captive Yes  
Reduced approach 
latencies in social 
condition  
Soma & Hasegawa 2004 
Pachyuromys duprasi 
gerbil 
Novel 
food/ C 
Captive Yes  
Subjects reduced 
food neophobia in 
presence of trained 
demonstrator 
Forkman 1991 
Canis lupus 
wolf 
Novel 
object/ B 
Captive Yes Yes 
Presence of 
conspecifics, 
especially kin, 
reduced latencies 
toward novel objects 
Moretti et al. 2015 
Canis familiaris 
dog 
Novel 
object/ B 
Captive Yes Yes 
Presence of 
conspecifics, 
especially kin, 
reduced latencies 
toward novel objects 
Moretti et al. 2015 
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Callithrix jacchus 
marmoset 
Novel 
food/ C 
Captive Yes  
Juvenile marmosets 
showed higher food 
neophobia when 
tested alone than in 
group condition 
Yamamoto & Lopes 2004 
Voelkl et al. 2006 
Cebus apella 
capuchin 
Novel 
food/ C 
Captive Yes  
Consumption of 
novel food increased 
in social setting 
compared to alone 
condition 
Visalberghi & Fragaszy 
1995 
Visalberghi & Addessi 
2000 
Crocuta crocuta 
hyena 
Novel P-
S/ D 
Wild Yes  
Presence of 
conspecific  at 
apparatus reduced 
approach latencies 
Benson-Amram & 
Holekamp 2012 
 
 
 
Table 2: Novelty response examined in a group setting where novelty is assumed equally unfamiliar to all 
subjects 
 
Species Test paradigm Setting 
Approach latency/ initial 
neophobia 
Study 
Corvus corone corone 
crow 
Novel food/ C Wild 
 
Dominant males < other 
age/sex classes 
 
Chiarati et al. 2012 
Suricata suricatta 
meerkat 
Novel P-S/ D Wild 
 
Juveniles < Adults 
 
Thornton & Samson 2012 
Rhinopithecus roxellana 
snub-nosed monkey 
Novel object/ A Wild 
 
Immatures & Adults < infants 
 
Fu et al. 2013 
Macaca fuscata 
Japanese macaque 
Novel object/ B Wild 
 
Juveniles < Adults 
 
Menzel 1966 
Papio anubis 
olive baboon 
 
Novel P-S/ D Wild 
 
Juvenile male < rest of group 
 
Laidre 2007 
Papio ursinus 
chacma baboon 
 
Novel object/ B Wild 
 
No age effect 
 
Bergman & Kitchen 2009 
Theropithecus gelada 
gelada 
Novel object/ B Wild 
 
No age effect 
 
Bergman & Kitchen 2009 
Cebus apella 
capuchin 
Novel food/ C Wild 
 
Immatures < Adults 
Visalberghi et al. 2003 
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Cebus apella 
capuchin 
Novel object/ B Wild 
 
No age effect 
 
Visalberghi et al. 2003 
Pan troglodytes 
chimpanzee 
Novel food/ C Wild 
 
Immatures < Infants, Adults 
 
Biro et al. 2003 
Crocuta crocuta 
hyena 
Novel P-S/ D Wild 
 
Juveniles < Adults 
 
Benson-Amram et al. 2013 
Crocuta crocuta 
hyena 
Novel P-S/ D Captive 
 
Adults < Juveniles 
 
Benson-Amram et al. 2013 
Canis lupus 
wolf 
Novel Object/ B Captive 
 
Older individuals < Younger 
individuals 
 
Moretti et al. 2015 
Canis familiaris 
dog 
Novel Object/ B Captive 
 
Older individuals < Younger 
individuals 
 
Moretti et al. 2015 
Erythrura gouldiae 
Gouldian finch 
Novel object/ A & 
B 
Captive 
 
Older birds < younger birds 
(relative age) 
 
Mettke-Hofmann 2012 
Callicebus moloch 
titi monkey 
Novel Object/ B Captive 
 
Juveniles < Adults 
 
Mayeaux & Mason 1998 
Callicebus moloch 
titi monkey 
Novel Food/ C Captive 
 
No age effect 
 
Mayeaux & Mason 1998 
Callithrix spp 
marmoset 
Novel P-S/ D Captive 
 
No age effect 
 
Kendal et al. 2005 
Saguinus fuscicollis 
tamarin 
Novel object/ B Captive 
 
Adult male/ older offspring < 
other 
  
Menzel & Menzel 1979 
Cebus apella 
capuchin 
Novel object/ B Captive 
Males < Females,  
Young adults, Juveniles < 
Adult, Infants 
Visalberghi 1988 
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Table 3: Intrinsic tendencies; subjects tested alone excluding social effect 
Species Test paradigm Setting 
Fastest approach/ 
ingestion 
latencies 
Study 
Canis lupus 
dog 
 
Novel object/ A Captive Adults Moretti et al. 2015 
Canis familiaris 
wolf 
 
Novel object/ A Captive Adults Moretti et al. 2015 
Callithrix jacchus 
marmoset 
 
Novel food/ C Captive Adults Yamamoto & Lopes 2004 
Cebus apella 
capuchin 
 
Novel food/ C Captive No age effect Visalberghi & Addessi 2000 
Milvago chimango 
falcon 
 
Novel object/ A Captive Juveniles Biondi et al. 2010 
Pongo spp. 
orangutan 
 
Novel object/ B Wild Adolescents Forss et al. 2015 
Equus caballus 
horse 
Novel object/ B Captive 24 week old less neophobic 
than 3- and 12 week old 
foals 
Lansade & Bouissou 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Papio papio 
Guinea baboon 
Novel object/ B Captive 
 
Juveniles & Males < Females 
 
Joubert & Vauclair 1985 
Daubentonia  
madagascariensis 
Aye-aye 
Novel food/ C Captive 
 
Mothers < Infants 
 
Krakauer 2005 
Cercopithecus a.  sabaeus 
vervet monkey 
Novel object/ A Captive Juveniles < Mothers < Infants 
Fairbanks and McGuire 1993, 
Fairbanks 1993 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 
Table 4: Asymmetry in knowledge and impact of specific social cues 
Species 
Test 
paradigm 
Social cue 
reduce 
neophobia 
Influential 
social source 
Comparison Study 
Salmo salar 
Atlantic salmon 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes 
Trained 
conspecific 
 
Influence of trained versus 
untrained conspecific 
 
Brown & Laland 2002 
 
Gallus 
spadieceius       
red jungle fowl 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes 
Video of 
conspecific 
Video showing conspecifics 
feeding on different food dishes 
and general activities near food 
 
McQuoid & Galef 1993 
Gallus 
domesticus 
domesticated 
fowl 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes 
Trained 
conspecific 
Demonstrator’s disgust response 
versus demonstrator preference 
 
Sherwin et al. 2002 
Corvus corax 
raven 
Novel 
object/ A 
Yes 
Human 
observer 
 
Ravens would approach objects 
faster if observing human 
caretaker providing the objects. 
(No control reported) 
Heinrich 1988 
Rhabdomys 
pumilio 
striped mouse 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes Mother 
 
Mothers versus fathers as 
demonstrators 
Rymer et al. 2008 
Sus domesticus 
pig 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes 
Demonstrator 
familiar 
 
Demonstrator from same versus 
different pen 
 
Figueroa et al. 2013 
Eulemur macaco 
macaco 
lemur 
Novel 
food/ C 
 
Yes 
Dominant 
female 
Dominant female present versus 
absent 
Gosset & Roeder 2001 
Macaca mulatta 
macaque 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes 
Human 
observer 
 
Food found without human 
present versus food given by 
human observer 
 
Johnson 2000a 
Pan troglodytes 
chimpanzee 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes Mother 
Familiar food versus novel food. 
Mothers influenced ingestion of 
novel but not familiar foods 
 
Ueno & Matsuzawa 
2004 
Homo sapiens 
human 
Novel 
food/ C 
Yes Familiar adult 
Three conditions: A. adult model 
not eating, B. adult model eating 
different food and C. adult model 
eating same food 
Addessi et al. 2005 
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Table 5: Species where a captivity effect of neophobia has been examined 
Species Test paradigm Effect of human rearing 
Reduced neophobia in 
captivity 
Study 
Corvus corax 
raven 
 
Novel food Yes Yes Heinrich 1988, 
Heinrich et al. 1995a 
Amazona amazonica 
parrot 
 
Novel object Yes Yes Fox and Millam 2004 
Pica pica 
Magpie 
 
Novel object  Yes Shephard et al. 2015 
Mus m. domesticus 
Mouse 
 
Novel food  Yes Kronenberger and 
Médioni 1985 
Rattus norvegicus 
rat 
 
Novel food  Yes Barnett 1958  
Rattus norvegicus 
rat 
 
Novel object  Yes Tanas and Pisual 2010 
Vulpes velox 
fox 
 
Novel object  Yes Bremner-Harrison et 
al. 2004 
Crocuta crocuta 
hyena 
 
Novel P-S 
apparatus 
 Yes Benson-Amram et al. 
2013 
Cebus apella 
capuchin 
 
Novel object + 
Novel food 
 Yes Visalberghi et al. 2003 
Papio papio 
baboon 
 
Novel P-S 
apparatus 
 Yes Laidre 2007, Joubert & 
Vauclair 1985 
Pongo abelii 
orangutan 
Novel object Yes Yes Forss et al. 2015 
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Appendix II: Additional figures & tables for chapter 4 
 
     Table 2: List of all subjects participating in the cognitive tasks. 
Subject Species 
Age at 
testing 
 Current Zoo 
# Zoos 
lived in 
Sex 
Ito Pongo pygmaeus 6 Allwetterzoo Münster 1 Male 
Pongo Pongo pygmaeus 15 Allwetterzoo Münster 2 Male 
Amos Pongo pygmaeus 13 Apenheul 2 Male 
Radja Pongo pygmaeus 52 Apenheul 3 Female 
Silvia Pongo pygmaeus 49 Apenheul 2 Female 
Jose Pongo pygmaeus 21 Apenheul 2 Female 
Sandakan Pongo pygmaeus 32 Apenheul 3 Female 
Samboja Pongo pygmaeus 9 Apenheul 1 Female 
Willie Pongo pygmaeus 12 Apenheul 1 Male 
Batu Pongo pygmaeus 14 Twycross zoo 2 Male 
Summer Pongo pygmaeus 13 Blackpool zoo 1 Female 
Cherie Pongo pygmaeus 18 Blackpool zoo 1 Female 
Mali Pongo pygmaeus 20 Paignton zoo 2 Female 
Gambira Pongo pygmaeus 18 Paignton zoo 1 Female 
Anette Pongo abelii 30 Durrell wildlife trust 3 Female 
Jaya Pongo abelii 9 Durrell wildlife trust 1 Male 
Dagu Pongo abelii 28 Durrell wildlife trust 5 Male 
Dana Pongo abelii 25 Durrell wildlife trust 3 Female 
Gina Pongo abelii 49 Durrell wildlife trust 1 Female 
Budi Pongo abelii 8 Basel zoo 2 Male 
Maia Pongo abelii 5 Basel zoo 2 Female 
Kila Pongo abelii 13 Basel zoo 2 Female 
Vendel Pongo abelii 13 Basel zoo 4 Male 
Djamuna Pongo abelii 13 Dortmund zoo 3 Female 
Toba Pongo abelii 18 Dortmund zoo 2 Female 
Tao Pongo abelii 8 Dortmund zoo 2 Female 
Walter Pongo abelii 23 Dortmund zoo 4 Male 
Dokana Pongo abelii 25 Leipzig zoo 4 Female 
Padana Pongo abelii 16 Leipzig zoo 1 Female 
Pini Pongo abelii 25 Leipzig zoo 1 Female 
Raja Pongo abelii 13 Leipzig zoo 1 Female 
Tanah Pongo abelii 5 Leipzig zoo 1 Female 
Suaq Pongo abelii 5 Leipzig zoo 1 Male 
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Table 3: Zoos and housing conditions where data was collected  
Zoo Species Time of study 
Group 
size 
Outdoor 
Enclosure 
Sleeping 
quarters 
# permanent 
enrichment 
devices 
Twycross zoo Pongo pygmaeus 
January- 
February 2013 
4 Yes Yes 1 
Allwetter zoo münster Pongo pygmaeus April- May 2013 6 Yes Yes 3 
Apenheul Primate Park Pongo pygmaeus 
January- 
February 2014 
12 Yes Yes 2 
Blackpool zoo Pongo pygmaeus January 2015 4 Yes Yes 1 
Paignton zoo Pongo pygmaeus February 2015 5 Yes Yes 1 
Dortmund zoo Pongo abelii 
November- 
December 2012 
6 No Yes 1 
Durrell Wildlife Trust Pongo abelii March 2013 6 Yes Yes 3 
Basel zoo Pongo abelii November 2013 6 Yes Yes 1 
Leipzig zoo Pongo abelii March 2014 10 Yes Yes 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of subjects that successfully solved each task. Sumatran species (Pongo abelii) would 
perform significantly better than the Bornean species throughout all tasks (Pongo pygmaeus) (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test: NP.abelii=7, NP.pygmaeus=7, Z=-2.366, P=0.018). 
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In addition, I evaluated the level of difficulty for each task by looking at how many out of all tested zoo 
orangutans, successfully solved a task or not and performed supplementary analyses on the data set 
including the assessment of task difficulty. The task measurements were ranked in following order 
ranging from the easiest to the most demanding task: (1) Detour reaching (N=29; correctly solved: 
26/29=90%) (2) Visible honey trap; solution straight trap (N=42; correctly solved: 30/42=71%) (3) 
Reversal learning (N=29; learned reverse: 12/29=41%) (4) Visible honey trap; re-use of stick (N=42; 
used given stick: 13/42=31%) (5) Visible honey trap; use rope as a tool (N=42; tried rope as tool: 
9/42=21%) (6) Visible honey trap; solution L-shaped trap (N=42; correctly solved: 5/42=12%) (7) 
Tube trap task; solved more than 60% of tubes correct (N=31; correctly solved: 4/31=13%). In a 
binomial generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) the data was analyzed based upon weather each 
individual solved or failed a task, including species as a random factor and controlling for age, sex, and 
group size. Because some zoo housed apes are moved in between zoos during their lifetime, they may 
differ in their experiences and thus we also included the number of zoos a subject has been housed as 
a random factor into our model. The model was highly significant (χ2ML=63.83, Ntotal=196, Nind=33, 
P<0.001) and showed a substantial species difference in task performance (Ntotal=196, Nind=33, 
SE=0.59, Z=2.67, P=0.0075, Figure 11). We also found a negative trend of number of zoos an individual 
had lived on task performance (Ntotal=196, Nind=33, B=-0.493, SE=0.25, Z=-1.88, P=0.0601). 
Compellingly, even if we tested for multiple tasks and measurements varying in difficulty, there was 
no single task were the Bornean species would show higher percentage of performance than the 
Sumatran species, which exceeded in all tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Overall task performance over the different tasks listed according to difficulties. Performance of each 
subject is plotted as solved or failed, Pongo abelii is assigned in red and Pongo pygmaeus in blue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Table 3: Output from the binomial generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) showing species differences in task 
performance. 
 
 B SE z-value P 
Intercept 1.481 1.06 1.39 0.1634 
Task difficulty -0.750 0.13 -5.91 0.0000 
Species     
   Pongo pygmaeus - - - - 
   Pongo abelii 1.576 0.59 2.67 0.0075 
Sex     
   Female - - - - 
   Male 0.487 0.58 0.83 0.4043 
Age 0.008 0.02 0.34 0.7354 
Number of zoos -0.478 0.25 -1.88 0.0601 
Group size 0.113 0.10 1.12 0.2632 
Nobs= 196 on 33 individuals from 9 zoos; X2ML= 63.83, p< 0.0001 
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Appendix III: Additional figures & tables for chapter 5 
 
Table 5: Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the task when 
excluding independent variables for the novelty response tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
Generalized Linear Mixed Model of overall performance in the honey tool-task. 
Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the task. 
   B  SE Z p value 
 
Human Orientation Index 0.243 0.09 2.679 0.007 ** 
Age -0.018 0.03 -0.582 0.561 
SEX (male) -0.619 0.53 -1.158 0.247 
Species (Sumatra) 0.295 0.60 0.484 0.628 
Background     
   Wild vs. Rest -0.212 0.24 -0.890 0.373 
   Rehab vs. Zoo -0.131 0.30 -0.436 0.663 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest 0.160 0.22 0.730 0.466 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation station) -0.489 0.52 -0.933 0.351 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo) 0.383 0.52 0.573 0.465 
Accessibility (trend analysis)     
   Linear 1.211 0.87 1.395 0.163 
   Quadratic 1.209 0.97 1.249 0.212 
   Cubic 0.099 0.97 0.103 0.918 
Sub-task (trend analysis)     
   Linear -5.046 0.72 -6.981 <0.001*** 
   Quadratic 1.512 0.42 3.567 <0.001*** 
   Cubic -0.149 0.33 -0.457 0.648 
Note: Analysis included 94 individuals in 10 different zoos/rehab stations, totalling 376 observations,  χ2ML= 
220.60, P< 0.001 
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Table 6: Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the task. 
Analysis without the HOI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Linear Mixed Model of overall performance in the honey tool-task. 
Parameter estimates from a binomial GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the task. 
   B  SE Z p value 
(Intercept) -0.609 0.91 -0.670 0.503 
Age 0.001 0.03 0.023 0.981 
SEX (male) -0.638 0.51 -1.252 0.210 
Species (Sumatra) 0.186 0.56 0.332 0.740 
Background     
   Wild vs. Rest -0.360 0.22 -1.604 0.109 
   Rehab vs. Zoo -0.115 0.26 -0.447 0.655 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest 0.221 0.21 1.041 0.298 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation station) -0.613 0.51 -1.201 0.230 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo) 0.157 0.41 0.381 0.704 
Accessibility (trend analysis)     
   Linear 0.910 0.81 1.118 0.263 
   Quadratic 1.499 0.83 1.803 0.071 . 
   Cubic 0.120 0.82 0.146 0.884 
Sub-task (trend analysis)     
   Linear -4.905 0.66 -7.478 <0.001 *** 
   Quadratic 1.509 0.39 3.830 <0.001 *** 
   Cubic 0.036 0.31 0.118 0.906 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each facility and individual. The performance in 
the honey tool-task was binary measured. The Analysis included 103 individuals in 12 different zoos/rehab 
stations, totalling 412 observations,  χ2=  236.43, P< 0.001 
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Table 7: Detailed list of all different exploration actions coded as relevant and irrelevant exploration during the time 
an individual engaged with the honey tool-task. 
Relevant Exploration Actions Irrelevant Exploration Actions 
Insert stick into L-shaped channel Hit (with any body parts) test apparatus or board 
Insert finger into L-shaped channel Hit (with any body parts) table on which apparatus is presented 
Insert finger into I-shaped channel Pull/ Push test apparatus, plexiglas, screws  
Insert rope into I-shaped channel Pull/ Push table or board on which apparatus is presented 
Trace/ Poke finger outside glass of either I- or L-shaped channel Touch test apparatus, plexiglas, screws (elsewhere but channels) 
Trace/ Poke stick outside glass of either I- or L-shaped channel Touch table or board on which apparatus is presented 
Tool modification/ manufacture Poke stick at apparatus, plexiglas, screws (elsewhere but channels) 
Insert any other tool than stick or rope into L-shaped channel Poke stick at board/table on which apparatus is presented 
Insert any other tool than stick or rope into I-shaped channel Touch sticks on the floor or besides test apparatus 
Poke or push stick at opening of L-shaped channel Touch ropes on the floor or besides test apparatus 
Poke or push stick at opening of I-shaped channel  
Poke or push finger at opening of L-shaped channel 
Poke or push finger at opening of I-shaped channel 
 
Table 8: Linear Mixed-Effects Model of relevant exploration variety controlling for repeated observations on each 
facility. 
 
 
 
 B SE df t value p value 
(Intercept)  1.209 1.41 48.66  0.857 0.396 
HOI  0.221 0.05 80.07  4.049 <0.001 *** 
Age  0.014 0.03 80.84  0.414 0.680 
SEX (male) -0.059 0.55 79.52 -0.106 0.916 
Species (Sumatra)  0.946 0.87 6.31  1.084 0.318 
Background      
   Wild vs. Rest  0.162 0.25 75.37  0.652 0.517 
   Rehab vs. Zoo  0.356 0.33 42.06  1.063 0.294 
   Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest  0.408 0.23 80.76  1.746 0.085 . 
   Human vs. Station (within rehabilitation station) -0.257 0.53 79.81 -0.483 0.630 
   Mother vs. Hand (within zoo)  0.314 0.58 65.78  0.544 0.589 
Accessibility (trend analysis)      
   Linear  0.316 1.11 12.64  0.285 0.780 
   Quadratic  0.467 1.13 23.52  0.411 0.685 
   Cubic  1.540 1.04 77.21  1.486 0.141 
Note: The model is controlling for repeated observations on each facility. The analysis was totalling 94 observations 
in 10 different zoos/rehab stations,  χ2= 30.91, p< .0005  
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Table 9: Pairwise comparisons of the Human Orientation Index (HOI) between the different background and rearing 
categories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Novelty response across individuals of different background categories. (a) Latency to touch novel 
food and (b) Latency to touch a novel object.  
Pairwise comparisons of HOI between different background categories, controlling for age, sex, island and 
repeated observations from each zoo and rehabilitation station. 
   B  SE Z p value 
 
Hand-reared zoo - Station        1.649      2.03    0.814     0.960 
Human - Station          -1.452 1.35   -1.078     0.877 
Mother-reared zoo - Station    -0.605 1.62 -0.372 0.999 
Unknown - Station -0.279 1.28 -0.217 1.000 
Wild - Station -3.568 2.46 -1.450 0.670 
Human – Hand-reared zoo          -3.102 1.82 -1.707 0.497 
Mother-reared zoo – Hand-reared zoo -2.254 1.50 -1.499 0.637 
Unknown – Hand-reared zoo -1.928 1.74 -1.106 0.864 
Wild – Hand-reared zoo -5.217 2.70 -1.931 0.354 
Mother-reared zoo - Human  0.847 1.35 0.626 0.987 
Unknown - Human    1.174 0.94 1.249 0.792 
Wild - Human -2.116 2.25 -0.941 0.927 
Unknown – Mother-reared zoo 0.326 1.25 0.260 1.000 
Wild – Mother-reared zoo      -2.963 2.41 -1.227 0.805 
Wild - Unknown  -3.289 2.41 -1.468 0.658 
P-values corrected for multiple comparisons using Tukey. 
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Figure 9: The independent time measurement (seconds a subject spent within one meter to the human stranger) 
throughout the whole HOI-test strongly correlated with the scored behavioral HOI-index:  (Spearman’s 
correlation, two-tailed: r=0.600, N=96, P<0.001). 
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Caroline Schuppli 
 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, February 2016 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Young orang-utans are highly neophobic, avoid independent exploration, and show a preference for 
social learning. Accordingly, they acquire virtually all their learned skills through exploration that is 
socially induced. Adult exploration rates are also low. Comparisons strongly suggest that major 
innovations, i.e. behaviors that have originally been brought into the population through individual 
invention, are made where ecological opportunities to do so are propitious. Most populations 
nonetheless have large innovation repertoires, because innovations, once made, are retained well 
through social transmission. Wild orang-utans are therefore not innovative. In striking contrast, zoo-
living orang-utans actively seek novelty and are highly exploratory and innovative, probably because 
of positive reinforcement, active encouragement by human role models, increased sociality, and an 
expectation of safety. The explanation for this contrast most relevant to hominin evolution is that 
captive apes generally have a highly reduced cognitive load, in particular due to the absence of 
predation risk, which strongly reduces the costs of exploration. If the orang-utan results generalize to 
other great apes, this suggests that our ancestors could become more curious once they had achieved 
near-immunity to predation on the eve of the explosive increase in creativity characterizing the Upper 
Palaeolithic Revolution. 
 
 
Observational learning and socially induced practice of routine skills in wild immature orang-
utans 
 
Caroline Schuppli, Ellen Meulman, Sofia Forss, Fikty Aprilinayati, Maria van Noordwijk & Carel van 
Schaik 
 
Animal Behaviour, September 2016 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Laboratory experiments have shown that great apes are capable of observational learning and 
patterns of cultural variation among populations suggest they also use this capacity in the wild. So far, 
however, the contexts and extent of observational learning in the wild remain unclear.  Social learning 
is expected to be most pronounced during immature skill acquisition. We therefore examined peering 
(attentive close range watching) by immatures in two populations of wild orangutans (Pongo spp.). At 
total of 1537 peering events, collected during 2571 observation hours were analyzed. We found, first, 
that peering was most frequent in contexts where learning is expected, namely feeding and nest 
building. Second, peering in the feeding context was significantly positively correlated with complexity 
of food processing and with an item’s rarity in the mother’s diet. Food peering was also followed by 
significantly increased rates of explorative behaviors with the same food items, showing peering leads 
to selective practice, and decreased with age and increasing feeding competence of the immatures. 
Third, the age of peering in the nesting context coincided with the onset of nest-practice behavior, and 
peering events were directly followed by significantly increased rates of nest-practice behavior. 
Fourth, the proportion of peering directed at other individuals rather than the mother increased with 
age. These findings confirm the prediction that immature orangutans learn by observing others 
through peering. Furthermore, we could show that they do so in a broad variety of contexts. We 
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conclude that observational learning, followed by socially induced practice, over a period of several 
years is a critical component of the acquisition of learned subsistence skill acquisition in orangutans. 
 
 
 
Development of foraging skills in two orangutan populations: needing to learn or needing to 
grow? 
Caroline Schuppli, Sofia Forss, Ellen Meulman, Nicole Zweifel, Kevin Lee, Maria van Noordwijk & Carel 
van Schaik  
Frontiers in Zoology, September 2016 
 
ABSTRACT 
Background 
 
Orangutans have one of the slowest-paced life histories of all mammals. Whereas life-history theory 
suggests that the time to reach adulthood is constrained by the time needed to reach adult body size, 
the needing-to-learn hypothesis instead suggests that it is limited by the time needed to acquire adult-
level skills. 
 
To test between these two hypotheses, we compared the development of foraging skills and growth 
trajectories of immature wild orangutans in two populations: at Tuanan (Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii), 
Borneo, and Suaq Balimbing (Pongo abelii), Sumatra. We collected behavioral data on diet repertoire, 
feeding rates and ranging competence during focal follows, and estimated growth through non-
invasive laser photogrammetry. 
 
Results 
 
We found that adult-like diet repertoires are attained around the age of weaning and that female 
immatures increase their repertoire size faster than their male peers. Adult-level feeding rates of easy 
techniques are reached just after weaning, but several years later for more difficult techniques, albeit 
always before adulthood (i.e. age at first reproduction). Independent immatures had faster feeding 
rates for easy to process items than their mothers, with male immatures achieving faster feeding rates 
earlier in development relative to females. Sumatran immatures reach adult-level feeding rates 2–3 
years later than their Bornean peers, in line with their higher dietary complexity and later weaning. 
The range-use competence of independently ranging and weaned immatures is similar to that of adult 
females. Body size measurements showed, immatures grow until female age of first reproduction. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, unlike in humans, orangutan foraging skills are in place prior to reproduction. Growth 
trajectories suggest that energetic constraints, rather than skills, best explain the length of immaturity. 
However, skill competence for dietary independence is reached later where the adult niche is more 
complex, which is consistent with the relatively later weaning age with increasing brain size found 
generally in primates, and apes in particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Contrasting Responses to Novelty by Wild and Captive Orangutans
SOFIA I. F. FORSS*, CAROLINE SCHUPPLI, DOMINIQUE HAIDEN, NICOLE ZWEIFEL,
AND CAREL P. VAN SCHAIK*
Anthropological Institute and Museum, University of Z€urich, Z€urich, Switzerland
Several studies have suggested that wild primates tend to behavewith caution toward novelty, whereas
captive primates are thought to be less neophobic,more exploratory, andmore innovative. However, few
studies have systematically compared captive andwild individuals of the same species to document this
“captivity effect” in greater detail. Here we report the responses of both wild and captive orangutans to
the same novel items. Novel objects were presented to wild orangutans on multiple platforms placed in
the canopy and equipped with motion-triggered video cameras. The same and different novel objects
were also presented to orangutans in two different zoos. The results demonstrate extreme conservatism
in both Bornean and Sumatran wild orangutans, who gradually approached the novel objects more
closely as they became familiar, but avoided contact with them over many encounters spanning several
months. Their zoo-living conspeciﬁcs, in contrast, showed an immediate neophilic response. Our results
thus conﬁrm the “captivity effect.” To the various ecological explanations proposed before (reduced risk
and increased time and energy balance for captive individuals relative to wild ones), we add the social
information hypothesis, which claims that individuals confronted with novel items preferentially rely
on social cues whenever possible. This caution toward novelty disappears when human caretakers
become additional role models and can also be eroded when all experience with novelty is positive.
Am. J. Primatol. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Key words: novelty response; orangutans; wild; zoo; captivity effect
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, interest in novelty response has
soared because it is generally seen as amajor source of
behavioral innovations and creativity [Auersperg
et al., 2011; Greenberg, 1990; Kaufman & Kaufman,
2004; Kaufman et al., 2011; Mettke-Hofmann et al.,
2002; Reader, 2003], which in turn are regarded as a
good measure of cognitive abilities [Reader & Laland,
2002; Reader et al., 2011]. Novelty response is usually
described by two main outcomes, neophilia and
neophobia, which are generally considered two inde-
pendent mechanisms [Carter et al., 2012; Greenberg,
2003; Greenberg & Mettke-Hofmann, 2001; Hughes,
2007;Mettke-Hofmann, 2014;Mettke-Hofmannetal.,
2002;Miranda et al., 2013; Pisula et al., 2012; Russell,
1973; Sabbatini et al., 2007].While neophilia refers to
the seeking, approaching, and exploration of novelty,
neophobia refers to avoidance of, reluctance to
approach, or even fear of, novelty [Greenberg, 1990;
Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006; Mettke-Hofmann,
2014].
The aim of this study was to examine how wild
and captive orangutans respond to novel artifacts. As
what is novel is highly context dependent, responses
may differ both qualitatively and quantitatively
[Heyser & Chemero, 2011; Mettke-Hofmann et al.,
2006]. Because we could not measure the subjects’
internal state [Mettke-Hofmann et al., 2006], and
thus could not estimate distress and fear, our focus
here is on the observable behaviors. Various other
studies have also estimated neophilia/neophobia as
approach rates to novel artifacts and/or willingness
to feed near them [Benson-Amram et al., 2013;
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Bergman & Kitchen, 2009; Mettke-Hofmann et al.,
2002; Webster & Lefebvre, 2001].
In primates, most studies of novelty response
conducted on captive groups describe neophilia
[Addessi et al., 2007; Chamove, 1983; Ehrlich, 1970;
Glickman & Sroges, 1966; Joubert & Vauclair, 1986;
Visalberghi, 1988]. In contrast, the few available
studies of wild primates report cautiousness toward
novel artifacts [Menzel, 1966; Visalberghi et al.,
2003]. To ensure that this difference reﬂects the
contrast betweenwild and captive conditions, within-
species comparisons are required. We know of only
two such comparisons with primates. First, after a
habituation phase of banana provisioning on plat-
forms, Visalberghi et al. [2003] investigated reactions
toward novel food and objects in a group of free-
ranging capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella. In contrast
to captive capuchins [Visalberghi, 1988; Visalberghi
& Fragaszy, 1995], wild capuchins consumed very
little of thenovel foodpresented to them; furthermore,
they delayed approaching both novel food and objects
compared to familiar food. A second study, involving
rhesusmacaques,Macacamulatta, compared captive
with semi-free ranging individuals, with similar
results [Johnson, 2000]. Thus, in contrast to the
curiosity and neophilia reported from captivity,
among wild primates novelty seems to elicit avoid-
ance. Among non-primates, the only such comparison
involves spotted hyenas, Crocuta crocuta, again with
the same outcome [Benson-Amram et al., 2013].
Moreover, among primates, there is growing evidence
for social inﬂuences on the integration of novel food
items into feeding repertoires [Addessi et al., 2007;
Leca et al., 2007; Schuppli et al., 2012; Ueno &
Matsuzawa, 2005; Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000;
Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1995], suggesting that
upon encounter with novelty, primates use social
cues rather than risk-independent exploration.
Other differences between wild and captive
primates in the cognitive domain are consistent
with differential responses to novelty, although they
may also have other causes. Some primate species
are known to use tools only in captivity, and some
species using tools in the wild only manufacture
them in captivity [Haslam, 2013; van Schaik et al.,
1999]. Wild orangutans (Pongo spp.), for instance,
use a handful of simple tools, such as sticks and
leaves, whereas their captive counterparts have a
broader tool repertoire, perhaps because human-
induced artifacts create a broader range of oppor-
tunities than possible with naturally occurring
objects [Byrne & Russon, 1998; Russon & Galdikas,
1993; Shumaker et al., 2011]. Moreover, captive
baboons, Papio anubis, performed better in problem-
solving tasks than wild conspeciﬁcs [Laidre, 2007], a
pattern also conﬁrmed in spotted hyeans [Benson-
Amram et al., 2013].
This captivity effect has mostly been explained
with reference to environmental factors. Reduced
predation and foraging pressure provide captive
individuals with a risk-free environment, abundant
free time, and excess energy [Benson-Amram et al.,
2013; Haslam, 2013; Kummer & Goodall, 1985;
Laidre, 2007]. In addition, it has been suggested
that the exposure to man-made objects reduces
neophobia and enhances object handling [Benson-
Amram et al., 2013; Laidre, 2007; van de Waal &
Bshary, 2010]. Further, in some species the social
environment also differ in captivity not only result-
ing in increased social contacts with conspeciﬁcs
[Haslam, 2013], but also social inﬂuence on behavior
caused by the ability to attend to humans [Fredman
& Whiten, 2008; Hirata et al., 2009]. It is therefore
worth exploring the role of novelty response in the
overall cognitive differences between wild and
captive conspeciﬁcs.
The purpose of this study was to compare the
novelty response between wild and zoo-living orang-
utans in order to examine to what extent we could
replicate the “captivity effect” in novelty reactions
within this species. We tested novelty responses in
two wild populations, one on Sumatra (Pongo abelii)
and one on Borneo (Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii). We
also did two different kinds of zoo controls, one in
which the exact same items were used and one in
which other novel items were used.
METHODS
The Wild Populations
The experiments on novelty response were
conducted on wild orangutans in Indonesia at two
study sites: SuaqBalimbing on Sumatra andTuanan
on Borneo. The study site of Suaq Balimbing is
situated in the Kluet region of the Gunung Leuser
National Park in the province of Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam (03°390N, 97°250E). The Tuanan re-
search site is located in the Mawas Reserve in the
Central Kalimantan province (2°090S, 114°260E). At
Suaq, the experiment was conducted between No-
vember 2010 and April 2011, and at Tuanan between
August 2010 and April 2011. During these periods,
28 orangutans were followed as focal subjects and
regularily seen in the study area of Suaq Balimbing;
eight adult females, two ﬂanged males, four un-
ﬂanged males, seven adolescents, and seven infants.
At Tuanan, 28 individuals were regular subjects of
focal follows; seven adult females, seven ﬂanged
males, two unﬂanged males, ﬁve adolescents, and
seven infants. The procedures for these experiments
were approved by the Department of Forestry and
Nature Conservation (PHKA) of the Republic of
Indonesia and complied with the American Society of
Primatologists’ (ASP) Principles for the Ethical
Treatment of Primates.
During the time period of these experiments we
exposed the orangutans in their natural habitat to
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items they had never encountered before. The novel
materials presented were placed upon natural-
looking platforms high in the canopy at various sites
in the center of the study area, where the home
ranges ofmany known females overlap. Because wild
orangutans are occasionally seen exploring old nests
in search of insects or re-building them for their own
resting purpose, the platforms were established on a
rattan base covered with leaves and branches of
familiar tree species woven together to resemble
orangutan nests, so the subjects would react toward
the novel items rather than the construction itself
(Fig. 1a and b).
In Suaq, 15 such platforms were placed at the
most common travel height of orangutanswithin this
habitat, 15–30m [Prasetyo et al., 2009], in four
different tree species: Tetramerista glabra, Horsﬁel-
dia polyspherulla, Parastemon urophyllus, and
Sandoricumbeccarianum. The tree species and exact
location for the platforms were selected based on
ranging patterns and most visited feeding trees,
where the orangutans passed by on a regular basis
(Fig. 2). In Tuanan, where the forest canopy is lower,
ten platforms were put up on a height of 10–15m in
the following species in the center of the study area
(Fig. 2): Syzygium sp., Notophoebe umbeliﬂora,
Fig. 1. Platforms and novel objects presented to the wild orangutans: A fresh made orangutan night nest (a); a platform nest made to
present the novel objects in the forest (b); a quadratic red Swiss ﬂag presented together with plastic fruits (c, d); plastic ﬂowers (e), and
an orangutan doll (f).
Fig. 2. a and b: SuaqBalimbing and Tuanan: orangutan travel routes and passes by the platform locations (30m, 60m and 90m) during
the experimental time period 2010–2011. c and d: Suaq Balimbing and Tuanan: travel routes and passes by the platform locations (no
platform) during the control period (Suaq Balimbing: 2013–2014, Tuanan: 2012–2013).
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Shorea parvistipulata, Dyera lowii, Neoscortechinia
kingii, Sandoricum borneense, and Payena leerii.
The novel objects presented on the platforms
were yellow, white, or pink plastic ﬂowers, a small
red quadratic ﬂag (Swiss) in combinationwith plastic
fruits and a small plush orangutan doll (40 cm)
(Fig. 1c–f). Plastic ﬂowers were chosen because their
colors stood out against the otherwise green canopy
but also might be visually recognized from a distance
as a potential food item. Orangutans occasionally
feed on ﬂowers from multiple different species
familiar to them. The red quadratic ﬂag represented
a shape–color combination not naturally occurring in
orangutan habitats. It was placed above the platform
in order to draw attention to the location and
the explorable plastic fruits on the platform below
it. The orangutan doll could potentially at a distance
resemble an infant sitting on a nest, but at closer
proximity perceived as a novel stimulus.
During focal follows at both Suaq Balimbing and
Tuanan throughout the experimental period, we
recorded all approaches toward a platform within
30m (the approximate distance at which objects can
be seen in the mid-canopy) using standardized focal
protocols and ad libitum data [Martin & Bateson,
2007]. Focal methods basically followed van Schaik
[1999]; a complete description can be found at: www.
aim.uzh.ch/Research/orangutannetwork.html. At
Suaq Balimbing, we additionally recorded all ap-
proaches to <10m to a platform, gaze direction if at
<10m and any other responses (when present) of the
orangutan. In order to maximize data collection
but also to control for human inﬂuences on novelty
response, ﬁve of the ﬁfteen platforms at Suaq
Balimbing and four out of ten at Tuanan (one camera
less due to technical problems) were equipped with
small and inconspicuously placed infra-red-motion-
detection video cameras (DVREye Pixcontroller,
PixController, Inc, Murry Corporate Park, Export,
PA). The cameraswere installed to record videos both
day and night; batteries lasted up to 3 weeks, mainly
depending on the number ofmotion-triggered events.
The cameras were situated 2m in front of the
platform to ensure covering all possible physical
interactions on or with the platform.
The Captive Populations
It may be difﬁcult to compare wild and captive
conspeciﬁcs, because zoo-living subjects have been
exposed to a wide variety of artifacts, making it
harder to decide what is truly novel for them rather
than merely similar and thus somewhat novel. We
thus use the term “novel” for artifacts never seen
before by our subjects and adopted a dual approach.
In our ﬁrst control experiment with a zoo group, we
used the same objects that had previously been
tested in thewild populations. For the objects used in
the wild, we chose natural-looking artifacts in order
to reduce the degree of novelty, as captive subjects
may have more experience with artifacts in general.
In an additional experiment on another zoo group, we
presented subjects with two novel items of different
categories, albeit different from the ones used in the
wild, presented in the open. The data collected with
the captive populations complied with the Swiss
animal protection law and consisted only of non-
invasive experiments and behavioral observations in
accordance with the principles of the American
Society of Primatologists (ASP).
The ﬁrst control experiment was conducted on
seven Sumatran orangutans, P. abelii, housed in the
Zurich zoo: one unﬂanged male, one male infant, and
ﬁve adult females, one of whom experienced her ﬁrst
pregnancy. The captive subjects were housed in an
indoor enclosure of 480m3 connected with an outdoor
area of 188m3. Every morning these orangutans are
brieﬂy sent into their sleeping quarters or a smaller
room while their enclosure is being cleaned. As the
orangutans are let back into their main enclosure,
they can encounter enrichment objects such as old
footballs, rubber pieces, cardboard boxes, and paper
sacks,withinwhich food is occasionally hidden. These
are provided routinely and the orangutans are very
familiar with the cleaning process and the objects
normally lying around in their enclosure. In order to
keep everything as normal as possible during the
experimental observations, in the morning after
enclosure cleaning, the zookeeper placed the novel
objects on the ﬂoor in themiddle of the enclosure. The
orangutanswouldenter their enclosure fromdifferent
sleeping quarters at slightly different angles to the
object location,but theobjectsweredetectable fromall
different perspectives. We performed the novelty
experiments during three continuous days in Decem-
ber 2011, presenting one type of novel object each day.
Basedupon information by the keepers, this group
of subjects had never encountered any of these or
similar artifacts before. However, the red quadratic
ﬂag was excluded from the captive part of this study,
because these zoo orangutans are provided with red
rectangular paper sacks on a regular basis, and a red
ﬂagwould therefore not represent any particular novel
shape or item to them, and alsowasnot needed to draw
attention in the openenclosure.The experimental time
wasset to1hr,although inall sessions theexperiments
were discontinued earlier because the objects had been
torn into small pieces. The enclosure was video
recorded from two different angles throughout the
experimental sessions with two SONY HDV handy
cameras (SonyCorporation, Switzerland). Time toﬁrst
approach until contact with the objects, exploration
spans, deﬁned as durations of themanipulations of the
objects, and distances to other group members were
recorded directly at the test sessions as well as
subsequently from the videos. As a control condition
we used the video recordings of one morning without
any novel objects; the same data were collected on
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interactions with objects familiar to the orangutans in
this zoo. On this randomly picked day the familiar
enrichment items were red paper sacks and cardboard
boxes.
The second control experiment involved slightly
different novel artifacts. It was conducted in Febru-
ary 2009 on seven Sumatran orangutans, P. abelii,
housed in Frankfurt zoo. This group of captive
subjectswas kept in a 253m2 enclosure and consisted
of one ﬂanged male, three adult females, two
immature males, and one immature female. In this
data set each subject was tested individually, except
for mothers with dependent offspring (the latter
would not participate in the test). On any given day,
one individual was testedwith one novel item in their
main sleeping quarter. The following novel artifacts
were presented on a small open platform: a soft blue
rubber ball (diameter 13.5 cm) normally functioning
as a dog toy and an Osram LED light, as a control
condition approach latencies towards an empty
platform were used. The degree of novelty inevitably
differed somewhat between the used artifacts: due to
the subjects’ previous experience with old footballs,
the blue rubber ball might be less novel to them than
the ﬂashlight. All experiments were video recorded
and analyzed usingMangold INTERACT 8 (Mangold
International GmbH, Arnstorf, Germany).
All statistical tests were run in SPSS 19. For the
wild population of Suaqwe hadmore detailed data on
distances and gaze direction; here we used binary
logistic regression to calculate the minimal distance
at which gaze directed toward novelty occurred, and
thus the platform was noticed by the orangutan. We
used Spearman rank correlations to investigate the
relationship between approaches to novelty and
exposure time. For the zoo population, we used the
non-parametric Friedman’s test, with additional post
hoc analysis [Siegel & Castellan, 1988] in order to
correct for multiple comparisons with the same
subjects. All the data on the captive study at Zurich
zoo was taken by SF and in Frankfurt zoo by DH. The
data on the wild populations was taken by SF and
NZ, accompanied by well-trained ﬁeld assistants. All
the data used in the analyses from the wild involve
distances; these are frequently measured by all ﬁeld
staff in our study and trained with calibrated poles.
RESULTS
Response to Novelty in Wild Orangutans
At Suaq Balimbing, platforms were maintained
for 145 days and at Tuanan for 251 days. We ﬁrst
needed to exclude the possibility that there was
something about the platform locations, other than
the novel objects per se, that kept the orangutans
from approaching them. The tree species itself, in
which the novel objects were placed, did not inﬂuence
the likelihood of approaching a platform (x2
(1,6)¼ 8.316, P¼ 0.216, N¼71). Furthermore, we
used ArcGis and GPS data to compare the range use
patterns of the focal orangutans in the area with the
platforms during the experimental period to a control
period (the following year: Suaq Balimbing 2013–
2014, Tuanan 2012–2013), when orangutans were
followed during the exact same time period (and
fruiting season), but in the absence of any platforms
or cameras. We calculated the rates at which the
orangutans passed the platforms at a distance of
<30m, <60m, and < 90m during the experimental
period (Fig. 2a and b), and repeated exactly the same
analysis during the subsequent period, examining
the passing of the same locations as where the
platforms had been situated (Fig. 2c and d).
Fig. 3. Average passes per full-day follow by wild orangutans at 30m, 60m, and 90m distance from the platform locations during the
experimental year 2010–2011 (test) and during the control periods, when no platforms were present. The straight lines are ﬁtted linear
regressions. Note that they all approximately intersect the origin, suggesting no avoidance of the imaginary 30m circle around the
platform.
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The average passes per focal follow for both study
sites, Suaq Balimbing and Tuanan (test- and control
period), are shown in Figure 3. The passing rates of
the imaginary circles (30m, 60m, and 90m) of the
platforms during the control phase were slightly
lower, because we had used the observed trafﬁc
patterns right before the experimental period to
decide on the locations of the platforms in order to
maximize the possible approach rate. However, there
was no evidence that the imaginary 30m circles
around platforms were avoided (Fig. 3). We ﬁtted
regression lines to the average rate of passes per
follow as a function of distance from the platform
locations to assess whether movement was basically
random. If there was avoidance of the closest circles
to the platform, the ﬁtted lines would intersect the
abscissa at values well below zero. The regression
lines approximately pass through the origin and
their conﬁdence limits all include zero, as expected
when movement was random relative to platform
location. Similarly, the observed 30m points during
the experimental period do not lie clearly below the
line connecting the origin and the rates observed at
60m and 90m distance. Because the ranging
patterns of the orangutans were random relative to
the 30m circle surrounding the platform, we
conclude the orangutans showed neither active
avoidance of, nor active attraction to the general
area around the platforms during the experimental
time period.
In the focal follows during the observation
period, 59 cases were recorded at Suaq where an
orangutan passed the platforms within possible
viewing distance (30m). The number of recorded
approaches across the 28 focal followed individuals
ranged from0 to 10. In addition, themotion-triggered
video camera traps captured 12 additional indepen-
dent passes when no human was present (none of
which involved physical contact). In total at Suaq 49
approaches to 10m or closer were noted. At Tuanan,
20 approaches within 30m were recorded during
focal observations, plus none captured on camera
(Table I). Because the focal data per individual were
too sparse, we used the average pass rate (entering
the imaginary 30m circle) during all focal follows in
the experimental period to characterize the average
rate for the local population of coming close enough to
the novel objects to view them. This rate, as extracted
from GPS data in the platform area, was 0.78 per
follow for Suaq and 0.37 for Tuanan (Table I). No
individuals, apart from two adolescents Shera and
Jerry (see below), were recorded to proceed until
physical contact with the objects on the platforms
during the experimental periods of 145 and 251 days
for Suaq and Tuanan.
At Suaq, data was taken on close proximity and
gaze direction toward the platforms. At this study
site, from 59 recorded approaches to within at least
30m, 49were towithin 10m or less.Wild orangutans
would direct gaze signiﬁcantly more toward the
platform while they had approached to within 10m
radius than when farther away (binary logistic
regression: N¼59, Exp (B)¼0.861, P¼0.006,
Fig. 4). This implies that at a 10m distance, the
orangutans had usually noted the platform. For all
focal follows at Suaq Balimbing we calculated the
approach rates (corrected for focal time of each
individual) and found that as time went by and the
novel objects thus became gradually more familiar,
individuals were more likely to approach to within
30m (Spearman’s r: r¼ 0.260, N¼48, P¼0.081,
TABLE I. Approaches to the Platform by Wild Orang-
utans at Suaq Balimbing (Sumatra) and Tuanan
(Borneo)
Data recorded in the
wild populations
Suaq
balimbing Tuanan
Number of approaches recorded
during focal observations
59 20
Number of approaches recorded by
video camera trap
12 0
Average passes (<30m) per follow
day
0.78 0.37
Average passes (<60m) per follow
day
1.60 0.76
Average passes (<90m) per follow
day
2.48 1.09
Number of experimental days 145 251
Number of days until first physical
interaction with platform
110
(Shera)
74
(Jerry)
Number of focal follows (>6hr) in the
area during experimental time
period
139 311
Fig. 4. Median distance to platform, provided the focal animal
had approached to within 30m to the platform, when it did not
direct its gaze toward the platform with novel objects (n¼26)
versus when it clearly did (n¼33).
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Fig. 5a). Furthermore, we found that the minimum
approach distances, provided there was a close
approach to 10m or less, decreased over time
(Spearman’s r: r¼0.439, N¼ 49, P¼0.002,
Fig. 5b). Thus, as time of exposure increased the
orangutans gradually approached the objects more
closely.
The ﬁrst and only time a wild orangutan at Suaq
made contact with a platform and physically
explored its contents was after 110 days. Similarly,
at the study site of Tuanan the ﬁrst and only physical
approach was recorded after the novelty had been
presented for 74 days (Table I). The adolescent
female that explored the novel objects at Suaq
Balimbing (Shera) only approached after her
attention had inadvertently been drawn to the
platform because she noted a human restoring the
platform. After observing the person handling the
objects on the platform from a distance, the female
approached immediately after the human had
climbed down. She moved onto the platform and
picked up a plastic red apple and tried to bite in it.
After several biting attempts she made a tool out of a
small twig and poked at the plastic apple with her
twig tool. After unsuccessful attempts with the twig
tool she picked up a second red plastic apple and tried
a third processing technique by striking it back and
forth onto a branch. Shera’s manipulation involved a
feeding technique frequently used in her population,
twig tool use [van Schaik et al., 1996]. Further, her
exploration span resembles the one measured in
captive orangutans handling the same objects for the
ﬁrst time (Fig. 6). Besides this one approach of
physical exploration of the novelty, throughout the
same time period at Suaq, 28 cases were recorded
during focal follows, where an orangutan would
explore a normal old nest, but no cases were seen
where an orangutan handled the novel objects. The
only individual in Tuanan who approached and
physically explored the plastic ﬂowers was a male
adolescent (Jerry).
Both exploring individuals were adolescents.
After their exploration of the novel objects no further
physical investigation by the same individuals were
recorded within the experimental time period.
However, Shera passed a second platform with
exactly the same objects on the same day only a
fewhours after she examined the plastic fruits for the
ﬁrst time. The second time around she approached to
zero meters of the platform but only visually
examined them and did not touch the plastic fruits
presented there.
Fig. 5. a:Approach rates (number of approaches30m per hour
focal time) for all individuals with at least ﬁve approaches
recorded during focal follows as a function of the time elapsed
since the novel objects were ﬁrst presented (exposure time); b:
relationship between all close approaches (10m) and exposure
time. The data refer to the wild population of orangutans, P.
abelii at Suaq Balimbing.
Fig. 6. Comparison of exploration spans (in min) between wild
(black bars) and captive (gray bars) subjects handling a novel
object: a plastic fruit.
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Before these ﬁrst contacts by the adolescents, it
is highly unlikely that an orangutan at either site
had approached to such close proximity that exami-
nation or manipulation of the novel objects would
have taken place. First, in ﬁve of the 15 platforms at
Suaq and four of 10 at Tuanan, such an event would
have been recorded by the video camera, because the
cameras did capture a diverse range of other animal
species visiting the platforms. Second, not a single
object was removed or dropped from the platforms,
nor did the objects show any bitemarks or other signs
of physical exploration or disturbance. By using a
crude estimate of approaches (mean number of 30m
passes per follow day times experimental days), by
the end of the experiment the average orangutan at
Suaq Balimbing had passed the platform location
approximately 113 times, or 93 times at Tuanan,
without ever handling the objects. However, it has to
be noted that this estimate is based on the assump-
tion of equal travel patterns for all individuals.
Neither Shera nor Jerry was unusually keen to
approach the platforms: 0.44 per follow day (N¼ 16)
and 0.25 per follow day (N¼8), respectively, close to
the average values for their population. Shera’s
response was similar to that of the population in
general, as she too approached the platform to within
30mmore as timewent by (approach rate: Spearman’s
r: r¼ 0.636, N¼13, P¼0.019) and gradually de-
creased her approach distance when getting to at least
10m (Spearman’s r: r¼0.824, N¼ 6, P¼0.044). By
day 110, whenSheramade contactwith a platform,we
estimate that she had passed by (<30m) roughly 48
times. The respective estimate for Jerry at day 74 at
Tuanan would be 19 passes. Moreover, another
adolescent at Suaq (Ellie) was observed within 10m
to a platform 10 times during the study period, but
never physically explored the novel objects.
Response to Novelty in Captive Orangutans
In Zurich zoo, the general approach latency
towards novel objects was quite different: the
Sumatran orangutans approached all novel objects
tested within a few minutes (Fig. 7a). They had
similar approach latencies for the novel objects as for
the familiar objects in the control condition (Fried-
man’s test: x2 (3)¼5.229, N¼ 7, P¼0.156). Similar-
ly, the Sumatran orangutans housed in Frankfurt
zoo approached the presented novel objects equally
fast as the control condition when the platform
was empty (Friedman’s test: x2 (2)¼0.519, N¼7,
P¼0.772) (Fig. 7a). In both zoo groups approach
latencies varied individually, but were similar
between the zoos despite the fact that experiments
were performed in the group in Zurich and individu-
ally in Frankfurt. In the Zurich group, the wider
distribution of approach latencies toward the novel
objects versus the control condition, especially the
orangutan doll, was probably caused by the fact that
only a single doll was presented in their enclosure.
Therefore, not all individuals had access to it
simultaneously, whereas the familiar objects and
the bundles of ﬂowers and fruits could be thorn apart
for investigation by multiple individuals. In Zurich,
because of the dominance hierarchy (S. Lehner,
unpublished data), the two older females could not
approach while the doll was being monopolized by
the adult male.
In Zurich zoo, where familiar objects served as a
control condition, exploration spans were signiﬁ-
cantly different between conditions (Friedman’s
test: x2 (3)¼8.657, N¼7, P¼0.034), but using
post hoc analyses and applying a Bonferroni
correction, pairwise comparisons revealed that
none of the durations between the control condition
Fig. 7. a: Approach to contact latencies (in min) to novel objects
by the orangutans in Zurich zoo (the same ones as used for wild
orangutans) and in Frankfurt zoo (a blue rubber ball with holes,
normally used as a dog toy, and a ﬂashlight), compared with
those to familiar objects or an empty platform, respectively,
serving as a control condition; b: Total exploration time in
minutes for the orangutans at Zurich zoo handling a familiar
object and three novel objects.
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and the novel objects were signiﬁcantly different
(between all condtions the critical difference at
P¼ 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons, was
12.74, Fig. 7b) [Siegel & Castellan, 1988].
Social proximity during novelty response in
Zurich increased during the physical exploration of
novel objects. A social partner was signiﬁcantly more
likely to bewithin twometerswhen a subject handled
one of the novel items than when it was engaging
with the familiar paper bags or cardboard boxes
(Friedman’s test: x2 (3)¼ 9.927, N¼ 7, P¼0.019,
critical difference¼12.74, Fig. 8). During this closer
proximity individuals often tried to grab the novel
item from the individual handling it.
DISCUSSION
Wild Versus Zoo Orangutans
Wild orangutans were extremely unresponsive
toward the novel artifacts. In fact, the novel objects
did not elicit any particular reactions for several
months, and therefore we could only report approach
data, except for the two cases in which individuals
actually handled the novel objects. Although not all
platforms were supplemented with cameras, the
absence of any physical contact by the orangutans is
highly plausible. First, whenever we checked the
platforms, the objects showed no signs of having been
handled or bitten, and were never found to have been
removed.Second,werecordednocontacts during focal
follows, except for the twocases ofphysical interaction
(which also left obvious signs of handling on the
platforms). Closer approaches were more frequent as
time went by (Fig. 5a and b), and these closer passes
were accompanied by visual inspection at a distance,
suggesting gradual habituation to the novelty but no
approach proceeding to physical exploration of the
artiﬁcial objects. The two adolescents who eventually
responded (one in eachpopulation) did soafter several
months of potential exposure. Indeed, contact laten-
cies amounted to dozens of passes in thewild, even for
the two adolescents who made contact after an
estimated 48 and 19 passes (the latter necessarily
are estimates, extrapolated from their mean number
of passes per follow day). Although the others
orangutans had passed the platforms with novel
objects at <30m about 100 times, they did not make
contact with them.
In contrast to their wild counterparts, zoo
orangutans approached almost immediately after
noticing the novel objects for the ﬁrst time, regard-
less of whether they were the same items as used in
the wild (Zurich zoo) or other perhaps somewhat
more novel objects (Frankfurt zoo), and irrespective
of whether they were tested as a group (Zurich) or
alone (Frankfurt). Thus, their contact latencies
correspond to a single pass in the wild, and contact
ensuedwithin a fewminutes atmost. Zoo orangutans
approached all the novel objects as fast as the control
conditions of familiar paper sacks and cardboard
boxes or an empty platform (Fig. 7a and b).
In the zoo setting the subjects also spent equal
time exploring the novel objects as they did the
familiar ones (Fig. 7b), suggesting interest in the
unfamiliar even though no success in food search
followed. Even if the zoo subjects regarded the novel
objects as less novel than their wild counterparts,
given their previous enrichment experience, they
were clearly equally willing to approach and explore
the novel objects as the familiar ones. This indicates
that these groups of zoo-housed orangutans do not
distinguish novel items as irrelevant nor potentially
harmful compared to familiar ones.
The comparison, though producing a striking
contrast,wasnot entirelyunbiased.First, theanimals
tested in Zurich zoowere always in association, and it
has been shown that association reduces neophobia so
that novelty is approached faster in a group context
than alone [Marzluﬁ & Heinrich, 1991; St€owe et al.,
2006]. However, in the study performed at Frankfurt
zoo each subject was tested individually and showed
similar short approach latencies. Moreover, the
orangutans at Suaq are also frequently in association
[van Schaik et al., 1999], so differential sociality can
only explain a small part of the difference. Second,
novelty may cause stronger reactions in a familiar
environment [Harris & Knowlton, 2001], and the zoo
animals live in far smaller enclosures than their wild
counterparts. However, the latter are obviously also
very familiar with their habitat, [e.g., Janmaat et al.,
2012], and continued to show no response toward
the novel objects after dozens of passes. Thus,
while the comparison cannot be made totally unbi-
ased, the dramatic difference we observed is real and
requires explanation.
Fig. 8. Comparison of close social proximity (<2m) when
handling a familiar object versus novel objects presented to
the orangutans at Zurich zoo.
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Explaining the Captivity Effect
This documented marked difference between
wild and zoo orangutans in their response to artiﬁcial
novel objects suggests that something about these
two conditions fundamentally changes the response
to novelty. So far, the main explanation has referred
to time constraints. Due to the lack of predation
pressure and foraging challenges, captivity has been
argued to provide animals with a more relaxed time
budget [Kummer & Goodall, 1985] or an excess of
energy [Benson-Amram et al., 2013], allowing for
more exploration. However, Benson-Amram et al.
[2013] demonstrated that the higher problem-solving
ability in captive versus wild spotted hyenas could be
attributed to reduced neophobia rather than differ-
ences in time and energy. Thus, while the reduced
attentional and perceptual load in captivity (due to
lack of predation or the need to search for food and
plan the daily routes) may free up animals to become
more exploratory, having more free time per se does
not explain reduced neophobia.
One key factor may well be risk [Haslam, 2013;
Kummer & Goodall, 1985]. Wild orangutans cannot
knowwhether novel objects are dangerous, and given
their long life expectancy [Wich et al., 2004] may
beneﬁt from being conservative. Because exploration
times themselves were similar for zoo and wild
orangutans, once the latter approached the items
(Fig. 7a and b), the difference between the wild and
captivity is truly in the lack of avoidance of novelty.
Risk assessment surely differed between the two
conditions. Zoo-living animals only have positive
experiences with novel items, which are usually food
or playthings, and thus may have overcome any
initial neophobia as a consequence of positive
reinforcement with man-made objects. In fact given
the less diverse environment of a zoo, the zoo subjects
may have seen the artifacts as worth approaching
and exploring. Their wild counterparts clearly did
not. This may appear surprising, given that in the
wild especially immature orangutans can spendup to
45% of their daily activity budget engaged in play,
including play with familiar objects in their habitat
[van Noordwijk et al., 2009]. On the other hand,
exploration spans were similar between wild and
captive subjects once an approach was made. If
limited time and energy determined the response,
this would not be expected.
While lack of risk and increased value of the
objects may cause part of the documented difference
betweenwild and captive orangutans in our study, we
also propose social information as a complementary
explanation. One obvious way to avoid risk when
dealing with novelty is to use social information.
Naive wild orangutans can attend to role models and
heavily rely on social learning in the acquisition of
their diet. Maturing individuals with abundant
opportunities for social learning have come to rely
preferentially on socially learned skills to construct
their cognitive abilities [the cultural intelligence
hypothesis: van Schaik & Burkart, 2011; see also
Herrmann et al., 2007; Whiten & van Schaik, 2007].
They thus follow experienced role models around and
minimize independent exploration [e.g., orangutans:
Jaeggi et al., 2008; Jaeggi et al., 2010; van Schaik
et al., 2003]. As a result, naive orangutans tend not to
interact with novel features in their environment
until they have seen experienced role models interact
with them. Rare food items are more likely to be
unfamiliar to these naive immatures, and indeed in
their natural environment, orangutan infants focus
much more visual attention toward their mothers
when the latter are feeding on food items that are very
rare in the feeding repertoire [Jaeggi et al., 2010; C.S.,
unpublished]. Interestingly, unfamiliar objects in
captivity also elicited social attention (Fig. 8). Thus,
theavailability of social information is consistentwith
the novelty avoidance in wild orangutans.
This account suggests that novelty avoidance is
the natural response of wild orangutans. The
availability of social information can help us under-
stand the loss of novelty avoidance in captivity
because in a zoo environment, human keepers serve
as additional role models. Once these conditions are
in place, the greater opportunity for social learning
due to intense contact with conspeciﬁcs maintains
and even boosts this captivity effect. Thus, we
suggest that in species that have the ability to attend
to humans as an additional source of information the
neophilia seen in captivity arises in part because the
novel items (objects, stimuli, and even spaces to some
extent) are associated with humans and thus are
implicitly approved for exploration. Indeed, semi-
free ranging rhesus macaques have been reported to
accept novel food faster when handed to them by
humans than when they independently discovered it
in their habitat [Johnson, 2000]. Likewise, orangu-
tan orphans reared in rehabilitation centers and
sanctuaries, experience human role models as
replacement for their own mothers, and when in
semi-natural conditions become very exploratory
[Russon et al., 2009; Russon et al., 2010].
The two cases of contact in the wild are also
consistent with a role for social information. When
Shera, at Suaq Balimbing, approached and explored
thenovel objects,herattentionhadbeendrawnto them
by a familiar human engaging with the objects (note
that no physical approach was recorded in the absence
of humans by the video camera traps). Furthermore,
experiments have shown that infant orangutans
refusenovel foodsofferedbyunfamiliarhumansunless
they witness them being accepted by conspeciﬁc
adults [Rijksen, 1978]. In general, the presence of
conspeciﬁcs inﬂuence the acceptance of novel food in
orangutans [Gustafsson et al., 2014; Hardus, 2012] a
pattern also found in some other primate species, e.g.,
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aye-ayes,Daubentonia [Krakauer, 2004] and capuchin
monkeys, C. apella [Visalberghi & Addessi, 2000].
Future work should examine the range of species
in which the captivity effect can be documented, and
moreover what aspects of a captive environment
causes novelty response and other behaviors to
differ from that in natural habitats. The social
information hypothesis predicts that in species with
strong orientation toward tolerant role models in
regular skill acquisition during development, but
also gregarious, tolerant foraging per se, social
attendance boosts interest in novelty. However, we
stress that this idea is not meant as an alternative
to the effects of ecological factors such as limited
environmental stimulation, abundant free time and
good physical condition. Regardless of the factors
causing the captivity effect, an important unre-
solved question remains to what extent the docu-
mented cognitive differences between wild and
captive populations [e.g., Laidre, 2007; Benson-
Amram et al., 2013] can be attributed to different
attitudes towards novelty.
Neophilia and Cognition
Innovations have been shown to correlate with
neophilia [Day et al., 2003; Webster & Lefebvre,
2001]. Wild orangutans avoid novelty. Yet, they
have large innovation repertoires [van Schaik
et al., 2006], and the Sumatran population at
Suaq is the technologically most advanced orang-
utan population, showing a variety of tool uses,
which are known to be based on innovations [van
Schaik, 2004; van Schaik & Knott, 2001; van
Schaik et al., 1996]. Admittedly, the one individ-
ual (Shera) at Suaq exploring a plastic apple used
a stick tool to do so, but most others at Suaq
ignored these novel objects, also after long expo-
sure time. Moreover, we found no major differ-
ences between the Bornean and Sumatran sites
with regard to reactions after passing within 30m
of a platform.
This comparison thus supports the idea that
novelty response and high innovative ability do not
necessarily go together [Brosnan & Hopper, 2014;
Grifﬁn & Guez, 2014]. First, as noted above, the
attitude toward novelty and the tendency to explore
are probably independently regulated at the proxi-
mate level. There were no differences between the
wild and zoo individuals in exploration time, once
the latter had proceeded to physical contact with
the novel objects. Second, as suggested by the
orangutan comparison, highly technologically inno-
vative species, such as great apes, may well owe
their large innovation repertoires to their efﬁcient
social learning, which strongly increases the chan-
ces of persistence of any innovations that happen to
have been made [Koops et al., 2014; van Schaik
et al., 2003].
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Cognitive differences between 
orang-utan species: a test of the 
cultural intelligence hypothesis
Sofia I. F. Forss1, Erik Willems1, Josep Call2 & Carel P. van Schaik1
Cultural species can - or even prefer to - learn their skills from conspecifics. According to the cultural 
intelligence hypothesis, selection on underlying mechanisms not only improves this social learning 
ability but also the asocial (individual) learning ability. Thus, species with systematically richer 
opportunities to socially acquire knowledge and skills should over time evolve to become more 
intelligent. We experimentally compared the problem-solving ability of Sumatran orang-utans (Pongo 
abelii), which are sociable in the wild, with that of the closely related, but more solitary Bornean orang-
utans (P. pygmaeus), under the homogeneous environmental conditions provided by zoos. Our results 
revealed that Sumatrans showed superior innate problem-solving skills to Borneans, and also showed 
greater inhibition and a more cautious and less rough exploration style. This pattern is consistent 
with the cultural intelligence hypothesis, which predicts that the more sociable of two sister species 
experienced stronger selection on cognitive mechanisms underlying learning.
Socially mediated learning1 has been studied mainly because it is increasingly shown to be responsible for geo-
graphically distinct traditions in many non-human animals2–7. However, social learning also turns out to be 
instrumental in the acquisition of critical ecological8–10 and social skills11,12. The cultural intelligence hypothesis 
proposes that opportunities to learn skills socially during development facilitate the construction of an individ-
ual’s intellectual abilities13,14. Thus, the greater the quantity and quality of such social inputs during ontogeny, the 
more learned skills an individual can acquire, but also the more experience it can accumulate and thus the better 
it will be at asocial learning or problem-solving. This process also generates a larger skill pool in a population, 
which in turn enlarges the individual’s set of learned skills14.
So far this developmental dimension of cultural intelligence is well supported both in humans15 and nonhu-
man primates16,17. However, the hypothesis also has an evolutionary dimension, which posits that species with a 
social system that predictably exposes maturing individuals to numerous opportunities for social learning will be 
subject to selection on cognitive abilities, whenever fitness is improved by having a larger set of skills, more com-
plex skills, or mastering them earlier in life. Because maturing individuals in such species will routinely accumu-
late greater experience, they should be more likely to transfer knowledge to other tasks, and thus further improve 
their ability to solve problems. This process may select for enhanced exploration strategies. Moreover, on longer 
time scales, such species should also experience selection to enhance the underlying social learning mechanisms. 
Importantly, due to the cognitive overlap with asocial learning mechanisms18–20, this selection will indirectly also 
produce improved asocial learning ability, which over time, will lead to an increase in the innate general cognitive 
performance in conditions identical to the ancestral state, as well as increased brain size.
The cultural intelligence hypothesis should apply to any species that learns socially and transmits this knowl-
edge across generations, although the strength of the effect is likely to depend on the social learning mechanisms, 
the number of experts, the duration of the learning period, and the role played by experts. The cultural intelli-
gence found in humans can be regarded as an example of this, because the capacity of infants to attend to skills 
actively demonstrated by experts is an essential ingredient enabling exchange of knowledge across our cooper-
ative and social lifestyle15,21. Thus, humans have evolved unique predispositions in both infants and caretakers 
towards active skill transmission (pedagogy: see ref. 22). However, apart from the human case, there are very few 
formal comparative tests of the correlation between social learning and innovativeness23 or brain size as a proxy 
for asocial learning or innovation ability24.
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Here we tested the prediction that greater opportunities for social learning are associated with a different 
exploration style and greater asocial learning ability14. A systematic comparison of the cognitive abilities of the 
two orang-utan species (Pongo abelii on Sumatra, and P. pygmaeus on Borneo, with an evolutionary divergence 
estimated from autosomal gene pools of around ~0.9–1.1 Ma25) provides an excellent test of this prediction. 
Orang-utans show extensive social learning during skill development10,26,27, with more frequent peering and sub-
sequent practice as the complexity of foraging skills increases28. They also show extensive evidence for geographic 
variation in a variety of skills6,29,30. Crucially, Sumatran and Bornean orang-utans differ systematically in the 
frequency of the opportunities for social learning. In similar habitats, Sumatran populations show higher densi-
ties31,32 and are consistently more gregarious and socially tolerant32,33. They also show much greater repertoires 
of learned skills and exploratory behaviour28, along with greater cultural repertoires in general6. This difference 
in socio-ecology has likely persisted over evolutionary time25,34. Note that our choice of species provides a par-
ticularly stringent test of the hypothesis because their broadly similar brain size35 means that we test the genetic 
impact of cultural intelligence before pronounced brain size differences have evolved.
Because housing and rearing conditions, which may range from deprivation to enculturation, have a major 
impact on the cognitive development of apes36,37, a proper test of the possibly subtle differences in cognitive per-
formance crucially requires that the conditions be as identical as possible. Since this cannot possibly be achieved 
in the natural environment, we therefore turned to zoo-housed orang-utans. All subjects in this study were 
zoo-born and mother-reared, and experienced highly similar feeding routines, sleeping quarters, encounters 
with human keepers and visitors, out-door enclosures and enrichment regimes. In all, 33 subjects in 9 different 
European zoos were tested on their physical cognitive skills on 4–7 different tasks inspired by the test battery 
employed by Herrmann et al.21.
When groups of animals differ in cognitive performance, it is informative to look for underlying differences 
in their problem-solving strategies, because selection on cognitive performance may actually have targeted these 
mechanisms. We therefore also tested for the possible role of novelty response, exploration style and inhibitory 
control, since recent literature has identified these as potentially important mechanisms in conspecific compari-
sons. First, since cognitive tests inevitably involve some element of novelty, how animals respond to novelty may 
affect their cognitive performance, as found in several studies23,38,39. Second, exploration styles have been reported 
to influence cognitive performance. Sometimes, the best problem solvers are the boldest individuals40, at other 
times, they are the individuals showing frequent and persistent exploration41,42, whereas in yet other cases, they 
are those with the most diverse exploratory actions43. Finally, some studies suggest a relationship between inhib-
itory control and higher cognitive abilities44,45.
Results
We presented orang-utans of the two species with a set of physical-cognition tasks and additionally two tests of 
novelty response (a novel food and a novel toy).
Cognitive performance. Overall performance, across 7 tasks on physical cognition, was assessed for a total 
of 33 subjects (14 Bornean, 19 Sumatran) from 9 different zoos (Supplementary Table S1 & Table S2). A highly 
significant binomial GLMM (χ2ML = 33.24, Nobs = 196, P < 0.0005; Table 1) revealed that, while controlling for 
the potentially confounding effects of age, sex, group size, the number of zoos a subject had lived in, and task 
B SE z value P
Intercept 1.998 1.44
Species
 Pongo pygmaeus – – – –
 Pongo abelii 1.934 0.74 2.63 0.0085
Confounding variables:
 Task
  Detour reaching – – – –
  HT: Straight trap −1.446 0.97 −1.49 0.1355
  HT: Re-use −4.147 1.06 −3.92 0.0001
  HT: Rope tool −5.258 1.15 −4.58 0.0000
  HT: Curved trap −6.268 1.27 −4.93 0.0000
  Reversal learning −3.441 1.06 −3.26 0.0011
  Tube trap: >60% −4.260 1.12 −3.81 0.0001
Sex
 Female – – – –
 Male 0.448 0.72 0.63 0.5321
 Age 0.006 0.03 0.21 0.8306
 Number of Zoos −0.543 0.31 −1.77 0.0774
 Group size 0.122 0.12 0.99 0.3235
Table 1.  Output from the generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) showing species differences in task 
performance. 196 observations on 33 individuals from 9 different zoos, χ2ML = 86.45, P < 0.0001.
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identity, Sumatran subjects were significantly more likely to solve a task than their Bornean congeners (B = 1.934, 
SE = 0.74, z = 2.63, P < 0.01, Fig. 1, Table 1). In fact, the odds ratio indicated that the overall odds of a Sumatran 
subject solving a task were more than 6 times as high as those of a Bornean subject. Our model also reflected 
that, compared to the detour-reaching task, performance was significantly worse on most other tasks (Table 1). 
Follow-up models constructed to investigate the interaction between species and task, failed to converge due 
to singularities in the Hessian matrix. However, visual inspection of a plot depicting the proportion of subjects 
within each species that solved each task (Fig. 1), suggests that the difference between Sumatran and Bornean 
individuals was both consistent and of a similar magnitude across all tasks (although possibly more pronounced 
for the tube trap experiment).
The differences between Sumatran and Bornean subjects actually held across individual tasks and subtasks, 
even though they were not always significant and we could not control for all the confounding variables in these 
comparisons. The detour-reaching task measured inhibitory control as well as exploration actions (see methods). 
Data on latency to solution and exploration behaviour was log transformed in order to reach normally distributed 
residuals. Our results showed that among successful solvers, Sumatran subjects were significantly faster in solving 
this problem (LM: NSumatra = 10, NBorneo = 10, Pspecies = 0.049, βspecies = −94.53 ± 44.28, Page = 0.155, Psex = 0.760; 
Fig. 2).
In the honey tool-task consisting of multiple cognitive measurements (see methods), Sumatrans were some-
what more likely to solve the stick solution, but the difference in latencies was not significant (LM: NSumatra = 19, 
NBorneo = 13, Pspecies = 0.159, Page = 0.143, Psex = 0.826). The three individuals who managed to solve the more dif-
ficult task of using the rope for the curved trap were all Sumatran.
Because the tube trap task (see methods, Supplementary Fig. S1), was designed with equally many tubes 
providing the correct solution toward the left and the right side, a subject with a strong preference for one side 
would correctly solve the problem 50 percent of the time. Thus to reach a higher level in this task an individual 
had to suppress any existing side preference and instead decide in each instant towards which side to move the 
food item. We therefore first looked for the existence of a side preference and found that Sumatrans and Borneans 
Figure 1. Overall task performance over the different tasks and subtasks by Pongo pygmaeus and Pongo 
abelii. Subjects of P.abelii were significantly more likely to solve a task than P. pygmaeus subjects (Binomial 
GLMM: B = 1.934, SE = 0.74, z = 2.63, P < 0.01).
Figure 2. Latency to solution in detour reaching task. Among the subjects who solved the task, Sumatrans 
showed faster latencies until solution in detour reaching task (LM: NSumatra = 10, NBorneo = 10, Pspecies = 0.049,  
βspecies = −94.53 ± 44.28, Page = 0.155, Psex = 0.760).
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did not differ significantly in the tendency to have a side preference: 70% for Borneans and 85.7% for Sumatrans 
(Chi-square test: NSumatra = 14, NBorneo = 10, χ2 = 2.33, P = 0.311). When comparing the proportion of tubes solved 
correctly, we found that Sumatran individuals achieved a significantly higher proportion of correct tubes than 
Borneans (LM: NSumatra = 14, NBorneo = 8, Pspecies = 0.011, βspecies = 0.127 ± 0.045, Page = 0.123, Psex = 0.737; Fig. 3).
In the reversal-learning task all individuals in our sample, both Bornean and Sumatran learnt the first associ-
ation between lid colour and food reward. Further, 37.5% of the Bornean subjects and 56.3% of Sumatran learnt 
the reverse colour association (Chi-square test: NSumatra = 16, NBorneo = 8, χ2 = 0.230, P = 0.891), which did not 
amount to a significant difference.
Task exploration. We also examined possible mechanisms that could underlie the species difference in cog-
nitive performance, focusing on the latency to ingest novel food, the exploration during tasks as well as of a novel 
toy, and an assessment of inhibitory control.
Novel food reactions. We compared the two species in their response towards novel food, using their reactions 
to a familiar food item as the control condition. Data of the response variable (latency to taste novel food) was log 
transferred in order to reach evenly distributed residuals. We found that the Sumatran species took significantly 
longer before ingesting the new food than Bornean. Moreover, we found an age effect showing that younger 
Sumatran subjects would take longer to taste novel food than older individuals. However, this age effect was not 
found in the Bornean sample: (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 12, Pspecies < 0.001, βspecies = 2.179 ± 0.433, Psex = 0.726, 
Page = 0.686, Pinteraction: age/species = 0.001, βinteraction: age/species = −0.071 ± 0.018; Fig. 4a,b). Relative to the Bornean 
sample, our Sumatran sample contained more young individuals who responded with longer delays to try the 
novel food. To exclude the fact that those young individuals drove the results of novel food reaction, we also ran 
the same model excluding all individuals younger than six years. We still obtained the same species difference 
(LM: NSumatra = 14, NBorneo = 12, Pspecies < 0.001, βspecies = 2.123 ± 0.496, Psex = 0.990, Page = 0.781, Pinteraction: age/species 
= 0.001, βinteraction: age/species = −0.069 ± 0.020). In the familiar food condition, we found neither a species nor an age 
effect (LM: NSumatra = 15, NBorneo = 9, Pspecies = 0.340, Psex = 0.500, Page = 0.257; Fig. 4c,d).
Exploration styles. We also found species differences in the exploration of a novel toy. Compared with Sumatran-, 
Bornean orang-utans showed a higher rate of gentle exploration, measured as touching, rotating or sliding the 
tennis balls presented as the novel toy (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 9, Pspecies = 0.031, βspecies = −0.163 ± 0.071, 
Page = 0.069, Psex = 0.169; Fig. 5a) but especially a higher rate of rough exploration, which included hitting, bit-
ing or pushing the objects (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 9, Pspecies < 0.001, βspecies = −0.167 ± 0.036, Page = 0.636, 
Psex = 0.155; Fig. 5b).
The same species difference in explorative behaviour found in the novel toy test also appeared in the 
detour-reaching task. Bornean subjects showed significantly more rough exploration (controlled for time at 
apparatus) than Sumatrans (LM: NSumatra = 10, NBorneo = 10, Pspecies = 0.042, βspecies = −0.050 ± 0.023, Page = 0.301, 
Psex = 0.134; Fig. 5d). We did not find the same effect when comparing gentle exploration (LM: NSumatra = 10, 
NBorneo = 10, Pspecies = 0.648, Page = 0.794, Psex = 0.478; Fig. 5c).
In the honey tool-task, each subject was given ten minutes to engage with the apparatus in order to extract 
honey using the correct tool for two different traps; straight and curved trap. There was no species difference in 
either the attentive time (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 13, Pspecies = 0.903, Page = 0.064, Psex = 0.811, Supplementary 
Fig. S2a), or the duration of exploration in this task (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 13, Pspecies = 0.398, Page = 0.094, 
Psex = 0.449, Supplementary Fig. S2b), indicating that individuals of both species were equally motivated to 
engage with the task. They also did not differ in the variety of exploration actions (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 13, 
Pspecies = 0.930, Page = 0.465, Psex = 0.523, Supplementary Fig. S2c). However, we found that Sumatrans clearly 
tended to spend more time exploring the relevant parts of the problem-solving apparatus compared to Borneans, 
Figure 3. Proportion correctly solved tubes in tube trap task. Sumatran individuals achieved significantly 
more correct tubes than Borneans (LM: NSumatra = 14, NBorneo = 8, Pspecies = 0.011, βspecies = 0.127 ± 0.045, 
Page = 0.123, Psex = 0.737).
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and that males spent less time on relevant exploration than females (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 13, Pspecies = 0.064, 
βspecies = 0.139 ± 0.072, Page = 0.210, Psex = 0.029, βsex = −0.183 ± 0.080; Fig. 6).
Inhibition. The reversal-learning task provides the opportunity to examine inhibition. When an individual 
opens the correct lids it acquires information about the specific colour and presence of a food reward; equally, 
opening the wrong lids produces information about the absence of a food reward associated with that colour. 
Once the individual has learned where the food is hidden it should therefore inhibit the tendency to open the 
wrong lids. We calculated the total number of lids each subject touched and the proportion of which were of the 
wrong colour and log transferred our data to produce evenly distributed residuals. We found a significant differ-
ence between the species: Bornean orang-utans opened more of the wrong coloured lids than did Sumatran, (LM: 
NSumatra = 16, NBorneo = 8, Pspecies = 0.011, βspecies = −0.092 ± 0.033, Page = 0.899, Psex = 0.475; Fig. 7).
Discussion
The results showed a clear and consistent pattern: Sumatran orang-utans, Pongo abelii, performed better in a vari-
ety of tests of physical cognition compared to the Bornean species, Pongo pygmaeus (Fig. 1 and Table 1). In fact, 
there was not a single task in which Bornean subjects were more likely to solve the problem than the Sumatrans. 
The results of the GLMM reveal that variation in cognitive performance was strongly determined by species and 
revealed no significant effect of group size, age, sex, or the identity of the zoo in which they were kept. Moreover, 
in the detour-reaching task Sumatran orang-utans were faster at achieving the solution, which required inhibition 
of fixation on the visible food reward (Fig. 2). In the tube-trap task no subject manage to solve more than 12 tubes 
out of 18, perhaps because most individuals had a side preference, which would have to be suppressed in order to 
reach a high task performance. Nonetheless, Sumatran orang-utans managed to solve more tubes correctly than 
Figure 4. Latencies to taste novel (a,b) and familiar food (c,d). Sumatran subjects took longer to taste novel 
food than Bornean subjects and an interaction effect of age and species was found within the Sumatran subjects: 
(LM: NSumatra = 14, NBorneo = 12, Pspecies < 0.001, βspecies = 2.123 ± 0.496, Psex = 0.990, Page = 0.781, Pinteraction: age/species 
= 0.001, βinteraction: age/species = −0.069 ± 0.020). The familiar food condition showed neither a species nor an age 
effect (LM: NSumatra = 15, NBorneo = 9, Pspecies = 0.340, Psex = 0.500, Page = 0.257).
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the Borneans (Fig. 3). These results therefore support the existence of an intrinsic species difference in the ability 
to solve physical cognition tasks, in agreement with the prediction of the evolutionary version of the cultural 
intelligence hypothesis.
Given this clear difference in performance on tasks of physical cognition between these two closely related 
species, it is of great interest to identify possible underlying variables. We measured novelty response, inhibition 
and aspects of exploratory behaviour. Because Sumatrans were more cautious in tasting novel food (Fig. 4), better 
performance was not due to reduced neophobia, as was found in some previous studies38,41. The species difference 
was also not confounded by age effects. Although younger Sumatrans delayed their intake of novel food, when 
tested individually (Fig. 4b), the species difference remained even when we excluded the younger subjects from 
the Sumatran sample. Species with greater dependence on social learning have been suggested to also exhibit 
higher neophobia and conservative novelty response, because they strongly rely on social cues to engage in inde-
pendent exploration46. However, captivity has been shown to suppress neophobia in orang-utans47. Therefore, it 
is remarkable that we still detect this species difference in a zoo comparison, suggesting a stronger predisposition 
for cautiousness in Sumatran orang-utans than Borneans.
In the honey tool-task, which consisted of multiple problem-solving steps, both species were equally keen on 
participating and spent equal time exploring the task (Supplementary Fig. S2), but Sumatran females, though not 
males, spent more time exploring the relevant parts of the apparatus (the holes containing honey; Fig. 6). Further, 
Bornean orang-utans were more likely to apply a rougher exploration style than their Sumatran relatives, both 
in the detour-reaching box and toward the novel toy (Fig. 5b,d). Such rough actions suggest that the subjects had 
Figure 5. Exploration styles. Exploration rates (corrected for total time at apparatus): gentle exploration and 
rough exploration for both novel toy (a,b) (Gentle exploration: LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 9, Pspecies = 0.031, 
βspecies = −0.163 ± 0.071, Page = 0.069, Psex = 0.169, rough exploration: LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 9, 
Pspecies < 0.001, βspecies = −0.167 ± 0.036, Page = 0.636, Psex = 0.155), and detour reaching task (c,d) (Gentle 
exploration: LM: NSumatra = 10, NBorneo = 10, Pspecies = 0.648, Page = 0.794, Psex = 0.478, rough exploration: LM: 
NSumatra = 10, NBorneo = 10, Pspecies = 0.042, βspecies = −0.050 ± 0.023, Page = 0.301, Psex = 0.134).
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given up on trying to find a solution and were either frustrated or attempting to reach the food reward through 
force, or both.
Reversal-learning tasks entail an element of inhibition48. A higher percentage of Sumatran individuals learned 
the colour reversal. Although this was not significant, we found that Sumatrans were also better at inhibiting their 
behaviour in that they opened significantly fewer lids of the wrong colour than Borneans (Fig. 7). Orang-utans 
have previously been reported to exhibit higher inhibitory control than other great apes45, but our results suggest 
that Sumatrans show this even more than the Borneans, which complements their greater cautiousness and gen-
tler explorative behaviour.
In sum, the superior cognitive performance by the Sumatran orang-utans may well reflect their greater inhib-
itory control and more cautious exploration style, which made them less likely to turn to destructive exploration 
and more likely to focus on relevant aspects of the problem at hand.
Because group size in the zoos examined did not affect the results and the zoos did not differ greatly in their 
enrichment regimes, this species difference cannot reflect any differences in opportunities for social or asocial 
learning during development other than those caused by innate differences in attention patterns or social toler-
ance by role models. Moreover, it is unlikely to be due to innate differences in the ability to effectively manipulate 
tools, because on Sumatra the tendency to use tools is limited to particular regions32. Zoo orang-utans of both 
Figure 6. Relevant exploration. Proportion of relevant exploration time devoted to the honey extraction, 
corrected for total exploration duration of apparatus. Sumatran females spent more time exploring the relevant 
parts of the problem solving apparatus than Bornean, and males showed less relevant exploration time than 
females (LM: NSumatra = 19, NBorneo = 13, Pspecies = 0.064, βspecies = 0.139 ± 0.072, Page = 0.210, Psex = 0.029, 
βsex = −0.183 ± 0.080).
Figure 7. Reversal learning task. Proportion of lids opened of wrong colour corrected for total amount of lids 
touched in the reversal learning task. Sumatran subjects opened less wrong coloured lids than Bornean subjects, 
(LM: NSumatra = 16, NBorneo = 8, Pspecies = 0.011, βspecies = −0.092 ± 0.033, Page = 0.899, Psex = 0.475).
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species use tools regularly and all nine zoos where the data was collected provided the apes with enrichment 
devices requiring stick tool-use, with which all subjects in our study were familiar.
If the species had been very different in overall or relative brain size, the same result would presumably have 
been obtained, given the effect of brain size on cognitive abilities in primates49,50 and carnivores51. The study was 
designed to capture the effects of cultural intelligence at similar brain size. Nonetheless, there are minor brain size 
differences between the two orang-utan species. Although females are all approximately the same body size, those 
of the two western Bornean subspecies have a cranial capacity that is slightly (average 2–3%) smaller than that of 
the Sumatrans. However, those of the eastern subspecies Pongo pygmaeus morio have a cranial capacity that is on 
average 11–12% smaller than that of the other Bornean subspecies and 14% smaller than that of the Sumatrans35. 
However, because the breeding program in European Zoos that manages the population of Pongo pygmaeus, does 
not distinguish between subspecies, we do not know which individuals, if any, are of this subspecies, assuming 
there are any pure or hybrid P. p. morio at all in European zoos. Moreover, the brain size distributions between the 
species and subspecies show high overlap, and any difference in relative brain size is still less than that between 
the sexes of modern humans52. Furthermore, the greater interspecific variation in absolute and relative brain size 
among all great apes, relative to that found between Bornean and Sumatran orang-utans, does not translate into 
consistent differences in quantitative reasoning or inferential reasoning53,54. Most importantly, however, regard-
less of any residual effects of brain size, we identified plausible underlying causal differences in exploration style, 
which help us understand the species differences found here and may also be involved in species differences 
across a broader range of brain sizes (e.g. inhibitory control55).
This species comparison of physical cognitive tasks provides the first empirical confirmation of the cultural 
intelligence hypothesis in a non-human species, suggesting that the combination of more frequent opportunities 
for social learning and advanced skill repertoires have over evolutionary time produced cognitive differences 
between the two Pongo species. More generally, the traditional benefit hypotheses for the evolution of intelli-
gence, such as the social brain hypothesis56,57 or the technical intelligence hypothesis58, both face the problem of 
grade shifts, i.e. that different lineages show major differences in intelligence in spite of similar social or technical 
challenges24,59. The cultural intelligence hypothesis, which basically argues that where learning is more efficient 
intelligence can be enhanced, may therefore be essential to complement the explanatory power of these benefit 
hypotheses.
Methods
Subjects. We undertook the study in nine European zoos (Table S1, supplementary material), where both 
species of orang-utans are housed under constant and similar conditions, and tested only mother-reared individ-
uals. The European breeding program, EEP, holds all detailed information on birth dates, kinship, transfers and 
island of origin of all orang-utans in European zoos. Supplementary Table S1 describes the housing conditions 
and the time at which the experiments were run at each zoo.
During the cognitive tasks all subjects participated on their own initiative and individually, which controlled 
for variation in motivational state between subjects, albeit at the expense of a reduced sample size in some tasks. 
All tests were conducted either in the morning hours or around mid-day and all subjects were fed normally before 
and after participating in the tasks. The tasks were presented to the orang-utans in their smaller sleeping enclo-
sures or directly in the large home enclosure, whenever a subject could be separated from the rest of the group 
there. If mothers could not be separated from their dependent offspring, they were tested together with their 
infants (the latter did not participate in the tasks). Participating subjects ranged in age from five to fifty-two years 
(Table S2, supplementary material). The average age was 17 years for Sumatran subjects, 21 years for Borneans. 
All tasks were video recorded with two SONY HDR-CX200 Handy cameras, because no humans were nearby or 
interacting with the subject during testing so as to minimize human impacts.
Ethical note. All experiments were purely behavioural and fully complied with the ethical guidelines of each 
zoo, the European Directive 2010/63/EU, and were approved by the ethics committee of the University of Zurich 
in Switzerland. Further, all data collected in the United Kingdom were approved by the British and Irish associa-
tion for zoos and aquariums, BIAZA.
Description of physical cognition tasks. Inspired by the primate cognition test battery (PCTB) of 
Herrmann et al.21 we developed a modified set of physical cognition tasks to assess different aspects of cognition. 
These tasks were modified because we wanted to make it possible to collect meaningful information without 
pre-training and frequent interactions with humans, and therefore had to make them as naturalistic and simple 
as possible, as well as adjust them to different locations of testing.
Detour reaching task. A large transparent plexiglas box (100 cm × 30 cm × 30 cm) was presented in the sleeping 
enclosure of the subjects. Because the box was placed inside the enclosure it was entirely accessible to the subjects 
to explore the whole box, providing suitable measurements of explorative actions. Exploratory actions of the plex-
iglas box were divided into two categories: rough (push, pull, hit) and gentle (touch, poke). The front side of the 
box had two openings, one small round hole (diameter 2 cm) and one large rectangular opening (30 cm × 20 cm) 
situated 50 cm from the small opening (Supplementary Fig. S1a). Before the subject entered the test enclosure a 
food reward (piece of fruit) was placed inside the plexiglas box right behind the small opening, through which the 
food reward did not fit. The subject would have to prevent its focus on the visible fruit in order to find the large 
opening and thereby the solution. Each subject was given five minutes to solve this task and the task started as 
soon as the subject approached to within one meter from the box. The moment the subject touched the fruit piece 
inside the box was counted as a successful solution and ended the task.
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The honey tool-task. This problem-solving task presented a wooden box (50 cm × 80 cm × 5 cm) with two 
traps, which were covered with a plexiglas on the front side for visibility (Supplementary Fig. S1b). The upper 
trap was a straight, downward-sloping channel (30 cm × 5 cm) filled partly with honey, in which a 40-cm long 
stick was already inserted (and thus immersed into the honey). The second, lower trap was an L-shaped curve 
(15 cm × 10 cm), whose interior part, also filled with honey, could not be reached with a finger or a stick. We 
additionally provided two sticks (40 cm) and three bendable plastic ropes (20 cm) on the floor in front of the 
apparatus. In order to find the solution for the L-shaped trap, the subject needed to use one of the provided ropes 
as a tool and dip it into the L-shaped trap. The rope could also be explored as a tool in the straight trap but did not 
yield any honey reward due to its insufficient length. Likewise, the stick could not reach the honey in the L-shaped 
trap. The total time a subject was given for this task was ten minutes.
First, we assessed how attentive subjects were toward the test apparatus by calculating the time they spent 
within one meter of the apparatus as well as the duration of exploration of the apparatus. Exploration was 
defined as any event were the subject would touch and manipulate any part of the apparatus or the differ-
ent tools provided right beside the apparatus, minus the time that was spent at performing the solution, e.g. 
dipping the stick into the straight trap. We also recorded relevant exploration events, which included all 
exploration events directed toward the two traps and not the apparatus itself (and thus relevant to the actual 
problem-solving). From this, we calculated the proportion of total exploration duration during which the 
subjects focused on relevant exploration. Second, for the cognitive performance we used four measurements 
from this task:
(a)  Use of the information provided beforehand: re-use of the stick that was already provided as solution in the 
straight trap. The stick was counted as re-used if the subject did not let go of it, walked out of sight with it or 
put it on the floor before re-inserting it into the straight trap. A stick was defined as inserted if at least one 
third of the stick was inside the straight trap.
(b)  Correct solution to the straight trap: if the subject did at any point during the ten minutes insert the stick to 
the straight trap, it was defined as a successful solution to the straight trap.
(c)  Considering the rope as a tool: if the subject did at any point during the ten minutes tried the rope as a tool 
for either of the traps.
(d)  Correct solution to the L-shaped trap: if the subject inserted the rope tool into the L-shaped trap during the 
ten minutes. Any act where a subject inserted the rope and thus recognized that the rope was the correct tool 
for the L-shaped trap was regarded correct solution, regardless of whether the subject actually obtained any 
honey.
The tube-trap task. The tube-trap task was also presented to each subject outside of the enclosure mesh, along 
with sticks to reach six horizontal metal tubes (Supplementary Fig. S1d). Each tube was 30 cm long and 5 cm wide, 
with an opening on either end, where the stick could be inserted to slide a visible reward (a piece of fruit or a nut) 
in two different directions. However, the tube had a trap, visible from the outside. Thus, if the reward was moved 
in the wrong direction it would fall down a 10 cm deep metal cylinder and get trapped. However, if the reward was 
moved in the correct direction it reached the end of the tube and fell out, to be picked up. The board contained 
six tubes. Each subject encountered the task in three consecutive trials, resulting in 18 possible attempts. Three 
tubes had the correct opening on the left side, three on the right side. Thus, if a subject would have a strong side 
preference and always slid the reward toward one side, it would reach nine correct out of 18 (50%). We therefore 
calculated the percentage of tubes an individual solved correctly and used a criterion of more than 60% of the 
tubes correct as a successfully solved task.
Reversal learning task. In this task the orang-utans were presented a wooden board, at a distance of ca. 20 cm 
outside of the enclosure mesh (Supplementary Fig. S1c). The board had 12 holes with 12 lids: six black and six 
white ones. The subjects were provided sticks to reach the lids of the board. In the first part of the task a food 
reward (fruit piece or nuts, depending on recommendations or preference of the keepers) was hidden behind 
either all the black or all the white lids (colour was randomly determined for each subject). We determined that 
the subject had successfully learned the association between right colour lid and food reward once at least five out 
of the six first lids it touched were of the correct (rewarded) colour. In addition, the subject had to pass an extra 
control trial to ensure it had learned the right association. After the control trial was also successful, we switched 
the position of the food reward to the opposite colour, and counted if and how many trials it took the subject to 
learn the reverse pattern. The task continued for four days and each subject was given three to four trials per day 
(depending on when a control trial was needed or not).
Novelty response tests. Novel food. As a novel food item we used potato mash that was coloured tur-
quoise using regular food colouring and topped with a few black olives (Supplementary Fig. S1e). Each subject 
was then served a handful of the turquoise potato mash as a little pile on a board right outside the mesh of the test 
location. The novel food test lasted for a maximum of two minutes, but ended earlier in case all food had already 
been consumed. We measured the latency to taste the novel food as a proxy for cautiousness. We used the latency 
of tasting from the point when the subject first touched the item to control for potential differences due to the size 
of the enclosure mesh through which the subjects had to reach for the food items. As a control condition we also 
recorded reactions toward a familiar food item, which was either a fruit or vegetable that was part of the subjects’ 
daily diet.
Novel toy. As a novel toy we presented the orang-utans with a wooden board containing three slits, in each 
of which sat two differently coloured tennis balls that could be rotated and moved in different directions 
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(Supplementary Fig. S1f). Subjects were given two minutes to interact with the novel toy. Since many zoo-housed 
orang-utans are familiar with tennis balls (albeit not with these colours or in this context), our intention for 
this task was to capture how they explore a new task that neither presents any particular problem to be solved 
nor produces a food reward. Explorative behaviour of the toy was divided into the same categories as for the 
detour-reaching task: rough- (bite, hit, pull, push) and gentle exploration (touch, poke, rotate, slide). We calcu-
lated exploration rates, counted as number of total exploration events of each category divided by the total time 
spent with the toy.
Statistical Analyses. The same observer (SF) coded all behaviour details from the videos of each task 
using Mangold Interact 9.7. The sample size for each task varied somewhat, because zoos differed slightly in 
opportunities for separate testing and not all individuals could always be separated. To test for a potential 
species difference in overall performance (task solved: yes/no), we fitted a Generalized Linear Mixed-effects 
Model (GLMM) with a binomial error distribution to the data. We incorporated species as the main fixed 
effect, while task identity, age, sex, group size, and the number of zoos the subject had lived in over the course 
of its life-time, were included as additional (confounding) fixed effects. Planned contrasts for task (the only 
categorical predictor with more than two levels) were set to compare a subject’s performance on each task to its 
performance on the detour-reaching task (i.e. the task with the highest overall performance, solved by all but 
2 subjects). We controlled for repeated observations on each task across the same subjects from different zoos 
by specifying task identity and individual identity nested within zoo as two crossed random effects. For the 
exploration data of each task (time to solution) we used standard linear models, with species as independent 
variable while controlling for age and sex. All statistical analyses were conducted in R version 3.2.3, using the 
“lme4” package60.
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Orientation toward humans 
predicts cognitive performance in 
orang-utans
Laura A. Damerius1,*, Sofia I. F. Forss1,*, Zaida K. Kosonen1, Erik P. Willems1, 
Judith M. Burkart1, Josep Call2, Birute M. F. Galdikas3, Katja Liebal4, Daniel B. M. Haun5 & 
Carel P. van Schaik1
Non-human animals sometimes show marked intraspecific variation in their cognitive abilities that 
may reflect variation in external inputs and experience during the developmental period. We examined 
variation in exploration and cognitive performance on a problem-solving task in a large sample of 
captive orang-utans (Pongo abelii & P. pygmaeus, N = 103) that had experienced different rearing and 
housing conditions during ontogeny, including human exposure. In addition to measuring exploration 
and cognitive performance, we also conducted a set of assays of the subjects’ psychological orientation, 
including reactions towards an unfamiliar human, summarized in the human orientation index (HOI), 
and towards novel food and objects. Using generalized linear mixed models we found that the HOI, 
rather than rearing background, best predicted both exploration and problem-solving success. Our 
results suggest a cascade of processes: human orientation was accompanied by a change in motivation 
towards problem-solving, expressed in reduced neophobia and increased exploration variety, which led 
to greater experience, and thus eventually to higher performance in the task. We propose that different 
experiences with humans caused individuals to vary in curiosity and understanding of the physical 
problem-solving task. We discuss the implications of these findings for comparative studies of cognitive 
ability.
Human intellectual performance is known to be strongly affected by developmental inputs1–3. However, similar 
effects in nonhuman primates have received far less attention. So far, the possible effect of experience on cognitive 
abilities in non-human primates has mainly been studied by examining the two extreme cases of deprivation and 
enculturation. Physical and social deprivation have been reported to cause strong negative outcomes on cognitive 
development in primates; especially maternal separation has been shown to result in both short- and long-term 
socio-cognitive consequences4–11. The opposite extreme in rearing environment is enculturation. Especially 
among great apes, enriched socio-cultural inputs, in the form of extensive interactions with humans, result in 
enhanced physical cognitive skills12–14 (see also ref. 15), but particularly in improved socio-cognitive and com-
municative abilities16–20. Both deprivation and enculturation therefore demonstrate that extreme social influences 
shape the cognitive abilities of nonhuman primates.
Even without being deprived or enculturated, captive primates also show intraspecific variability in cognitive 
abilities21,22, but the sources of this variability remain largely unstudied and it remains unclear whether the same 
social processes are involved. In particular, we don’t know to what extent variable rearing histories affect cognitive 
performance across individuals under non-extreme conditions, and if so whether they do so through their effect 
on psychological variables such as motivation to solve problems, responses to novelty and exploration style.
The aim of the present study was, first, to examine in a sample of more than 100 captive orang-utans (Pongo 
abelii and P. pygmaeus) how variation in captive management regimes and individual rearing histories affects 
psychological variables, such as human orientation, motivation and exploration style, and second, to exam-
ine whether these factors explain variation in cognitive performance in a tool-use task. Our sample contained 
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orang-utans from a wide range of rearing backgrounds: both zoo groups, including mother- and hand-reared 
individuals, and individuals housed in rehabilitation stations who were wild-born but subsequently experienced 
captivity for variable periods of time, some as pets, before entering the rehabilitation station. Importantly, the 
individuals were all currently kept in captivity, allowing similar individual testing conditions. This provided us 
with an excellent opportunity to test the strength of the long-term effects of early rearing conditions on explora-
tion styles and cognitive performance.
Because our sample included individuals from both zoos and rehabilitation stations, we could also test the 
independent effect of current housing conditions. Zoos and rehabilitation stations differ in their purpose of hold-
ing captive apes. Zoo apes have lived all their lives in a similar and stable environment, mostly together with their 
mothers and in intense contact with both knowledgeable conspecifics and human caretakers, with additional 
exposure to human strangers on a daily basis. Virtually all zoos also offer additional enrichment in the form of 
various foraging activities. In rehabilitation stations the purpose is very different. Some individuals may have 
experienced traumatic events in their past (capture and loss of mother, sometimes accompanied by injury) and 
thus need to recover physically and mentally. The stations’ ultimate aim is to return individuals to the wild. They 
consequently avoid bringing about a too close attachment to humans or exposing them to artificial enrichment 
devices. Moreover, most rehabilitating apes lack the close bond to their mother and are instead housed in peer 
groups.
Reactions to an unfamiliar human have previously been used to measure temperament in great apes23 and 
physiological distress responses in monkeys24,25. In order to estimate the underlying psychological consequences 
of human-related experiences that might explain variation in exploration and cognitive performance, we devel-
oped a new measure, the human orientation index (henceforth: HOI; see Methods for details). This measure was 
developed because the effect of captivity on cognitive abilities26,27 seems to reflect a major psychological change. 
First, because in multiple species, reduced neophobia has been shown to influence problem-solving skills28–31, and 
because captive orang-utans show strongly increased interest in novel items relative to their wild counterparts32 
(as do other species27,33), we assessed the response to novelty across individuals with different captive experiences. 
Second, because the effect of captivity on cognitive performance is particularly pronounced in the context of tool 
use34–39, we assessed cognitive performance using a novel tool-use task including multi-step problem-solving 
with high ecological validity: the honey-tool task. In order to prevent variation in human orientation from 
confounding cognitive performance during the testing, no humans were present during the tests, which were 
video-recorded.
Results
Cognitive performance. For the honey tool-task, we found large variation in cognitive performance among 
the 103 orang-utans (Fig. 1). Eleven individuals did not solve a single sub-task. The modal and median score on 
total performance was 1 out of a maximum of 4. The four different cognitive measurements of the honey tool-
task varied significantly in difficulty. In order to examine whether the ability to solve the different sub-tasks was 
cumulative, we applied a Guttman scale, which showed a reproducibility coefficient of close to one (0.97). This 
strongly suggests that the ability to solve the more difficult sub-tasks was nested within the performance of the 
other sub-tasks: 90% of the 103 individuals performing the honey tool-task fitted the applied Guttman scale of 
the four different sub-tasks (see Methods and Fig. 2 for details). As expected, ‘remove stick’ was the easiest, ‘insert 
the stick in the straight channel’ was next, followed by ‘making a tool’, whereas ‘inserting the rope in the curved 
channel’ was most difficult (Fig. 2, Sub-task) for the orang-utans in this study. Due to this variation in difficulty, 
we treated the four levels of cognitive performance as an ordinal variable in further analyses.
We next tested whether background and housing conditions, species, sex, and age could explain the variation 
in cognitive performance on the honey tool-task. Table 1 shows the results of a binomial Generalized Linear 
Mixed Model (GLMM) of the honey tool-task performance, with the response variable being whether or not a 
subject solved each sub-task. The GLMM allowed us to control for repeated observations in each facility and on 
each individual. The results revealed that the human orientation index (HOI) was a good predictor of the ability 
to solve the task (B ± SD = 0.227 ± 0.08, Z = 2.699, P = 0.007; Table 1), as was the latency to touch unfamiliar 
Figure 1. Honey tool-task performance. Frequency of subjects that solved zero to all subtasks.
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food (B ± SD = − 0.034 ± 0.01, Z = − 2.263, P = 0.024; Table 1) and a novel object (B ± SD = − 0.025 ± 0.01, Z = − 
2.123, P = 0.034; Table 1). The less neophobic the individuals, the more likely they were to solve the task. When we 
removed the novelty responses from the analysis, the HOI remained the main predictor of performance (Table S1, 
supplementary material). Because an individual’s age and the time it had spent in captivity were strongly cor-
related, only the factor age was considered for the analysis, but it did not influence task performance. Subtle 
differences between enclosures, which might affect the ease of access to the apparatus, were controlled for in the 
analysis, but again did not contribute to explaining the variation in cognitive performance. Perhaps surprisingly, 
none of the other possible variables (sex, species [Sumatran or Bornean], and the various background and current 
housing conditions of the orang-utans) predicted performance; they also had no influence on task performance 
when HOI was excluded from the analyses (Table S2, Supplementary material).
Exploration behaviour underlying cognitive performance. The orang-utans’ performance on the 
tool-use task was best accounted for by exploration variety, which explained 27% of the variation (Figs 3b and 4), 
Figure 2. Overview of the design, structure and measurements of cognitive performance. The honey 
tool-task offered two problems to solve: an upper channel with a stick solution and lower channel with a rope 
solution.
B SE Z p value
(Intercept) − 2.588 1.33 − 1.943 0.052
Human Orientation Index 0.227 0.08 2.699 0.007**
Novel food: time until touch − 0.034 0.01 − 2.263 0.024*
Novel object: time until touch − 0.025 0.01 − 2.123 0.034*
Novel object: exploration duration 0.003 0.01 0.433 0.665
Age − 0.006 0.03 − 0.232 0.817
SEX (male) 0.124 0.51 0.243 0.808
Species (Sumatra) − 0.094 0.59 − 0.16 0.873
Background
 Wild vs. Rest − 0.173 0.27 − 0.639 0.523
 Rehab vs. Zoo − 0.402 0.29 − 1.395 0.163
 Unknown vs. Rehab.Rest 0.073 0.20 0.367 0.714
  Human vs. Station  
(within rehabilitation station) − 0.479 0.48 − 1.008 0.314
 Mother vs. Hand (within zoo) 0.365 0.51 0.722 0.470
Accessibility (trend analysis)
 Linear 0.786 0.76 1.04 0.298
 Quadratic 0.228 0.89 0.257 0.797
 Cubic − 0.189 0.89 − 0.213 0.831
Sub-task (trend analysis)
 Linear − 4.969 0.74 − 6.737 <0.001***
 Quadratic 1.554 0.44 3.559 <0.001***
 Cubic − 0.205 0.33 − 0.626 0.531
Table 1.  Generalized Linear Mixed Model of overall performance in the honey tool-task. Note: The model 
is controlling for repeated observations on each facility and individual. The performance in the honey tool-task 
was binary measured. The Analysis included 88 individuals in 9 different zoos/rehab stations, totalling 352 
observations, χ2 = 226.27, P < 0.001, P-values below 0.05 appear in bold. Parameter estimates from a binomial 
GLMM, predicting the probability of an animal solving the task.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
4Scientific RepoRts | 7:40052 | DOI: 10.1038/srep40052
whereas exploration duration predicted 9% of the variation (Nobs = 94, Nlocation = 10, χ 2ML = 08.57, R2LMM(m) = 0.092, 
P = 0.005, Figs 3a and 4). However, the HOI only explained 5% of cognitive performance (χ 2ML = 6.21, P < 0.05).
The effect of human orientation on exploration. A Linear Mixed-Effects Model (LMM) analysis of 
the subjects’ exploration of the apparatus, which controlled for repeated measurements in each facility, showed 
that HOI accounted for 11% of the variation of the total exploration variety (Nobs = 94, Nlocation = 10, χ 2ML = 12.02, 
R2LMM(m) = 0.1113, P < 0.001, Figs 4 and 5b). In addition, there was a trend showing that individuals with a 
higher HOI explored the apparatus longer than those with a lower HOI (Nobs = 94, Nlocation = 10, χ 2ML = 3.53, 
R2LMM(m) = 0.025, P = 0.06, Fig. 5a), although the HOI explained a mere 2% of the variation in exploration dura-
tion (Fig. 4). This low proportion is not surprising, because the most successful orang-utans, and thus the ones 
with high HOI values, stopped exploring once they found the solution to the problem and spent their remaining 
time extracting honey.
Random exploration of the apparatus per se does not necessarily raise the chances of finding the solution. 
Individuals who can distinguish between relevant and irrelevant parts of the apparatus should be more successful 
(Supplementary Table S3). We therefore also investigated the separate effects of exploration variety directed at the 
relevant or irrelevant areas of the apparatus. We calculated marginal pseudo-R2 values to estimate the proportion 
of variation explained by the fixed effects in our model. The HOI explained 13% of the variation of relevant explo-
ration (χ 2ML = 13.67, P < 0.001, Fig. 4 and Supplementary Table S4), which subsequently accounted for 36% of the 
variation in cognitive performance. In contrast, HOI explained only 3% of the irrelevant exploration (χ 2ML = 2.93, 
P = 0.087, Fig. 4), which accounted for only 3% of performance in the task. The effect of a higher HOI was thus 
primarily on the amount of exploration and especially on the diversity of exploration on relevant parts of the task, 
with the latter explaining 36% of cognitive performance. Furthermore, neither housing- nor background/ rearing 
history had any effect on the exploration of the apparatus (Supplementary Table S4).
Additionally, using a Linear Mixed-Effect Model (LMM), controlling for each subject’s housing location, 
we compared the exploration style of the most successful individuals, the 10 subjects who solved the most dif-
ficult problem of ‘inserting the rope in the curved channel’ (‘ropers’), to the other non-successful individuals 
(‘non-ropers’). There was no difference in exploration duration between ropers and non-ropers. However, the 
ropers differed significantly from non-ropers in their exploration variety (P = 0.012). Ropers not only showed a 
Figure 3. The relationships between exploration behaviour and the overall cognitive performance. (a) Overall 
performance in relation to the exploration duration. Individuals that explored longer were significantly better 
problem solvers (Nobs = 94, Nlocation = 10, χ 2ML = 08.57, P = 0.005). (b) The overall task performance in relation to 
the total variety of exploration actions (Nobs = 103, Nlocation = 12, χ 2ML = 36.10, P < 0.001).
Figure 4. Graphical illustration of the relationship between the human orientation Index (HOI), the 
cognitive performance and exploration duration and variety, in context to each other. The total variety can 
be divided into relevant and irrelevant variety. The figure also indicates the percentage of variation estimated 
by the pseudo R2 for linear mixed effects margins that is explained by each factor. The thickness of the arrows 
accentuates the strength of the influence.
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greater diversity of explorative actions, but also a far greater diversity of exploration on relevant parts of the appa-
ratus (p < 0.001; note that solving the rope solution is itself not counted as relevant exploration). Moreover, the 
ropers’ HOI was 29.7% (and significantly) higher than that of non-ropers (χ 2ML = 4.06, P < 0.05).
Evaluating the human orientation index. Given the large effect of the HOI on exploration style, we 
examined whether the different background categories determined an individual’s human orientation index. 
‘Wild’ individuals strongly diverged from any other category in that they took longer or did not respond at 
all to the novel food and novel object (Supplementary Fig. 1) and by showing significantly lower HOI values 
(Kruskal-Wallis test: N = 95, P = 0.002, Fig. 6). However, pairwise comparisons of each background category 
(controlling for age, sex and species as well as repeated observations from each study location and correction of 
P-values for multiple comparisons using Tukey) revealed no significant differences in HOI between the back-
ground categories (Supplementary Table: S5).
The reaction toward novel humans might also be the result of several other factors, such as a response to any 
novelty or to social beings (human or orang-utan). Therefore, we also examined the links between HOI and the 
three novelty response experiments (concerning novel food, novel objects and novel conspecifics). Results of a 
Linear Mixed-Effects Model (LMM) evaluated the relation between the HOI and two other novelty response tasks, 
the novel-object and the novel-food task. The HOI was not explained by the latency to touch either the novel food 
(B ± SD = − 0.057 ± 1.12, df = 78.83, t = 6.401, P = 0.332; Table 2) or the novel toy (B ± SD = 0.008 ± 0.02, df = 81.9, 
t = 0.457, P = 0.649; Table 2), whereas the latter two were correlated (Spearman’s rho: r = 0.314, N = 98, P = 0.002, 
2-tailed). Neither did the exploration duration of the novel toy explain the variation in HOI (B ± SD = 0.006 ± 0.01, 
df = 81.99, t = 0.584, P = 0.561; Table 2). Thus, the HOI did not simply reflect a positive response to novelty per se. 
To test whether the HOI represents a general interest in social beings, and thereby a higher social motivation in gen-
eral or whether it describes the interest in humans specifically, we performed an additional social-interest-task with 
a subset of individuals of one rehabilitation station (N = 28, see Method section). The HOI did not seem to measure 
Figure 5. The relationships between the human orientation index (HOI) and exploration behaviour 
showed significant dependencies in Linear-Mixed-Effect-Models (LMM) that controlled for repeated 
observations in each facility. (a) Exploration duration in relation to HOI-index (Nobs = 94, Nlocation = 10,  
χ 2ML = 3.53, R2LMM(m) = 0.025, P = 0.06). (b) Total variety of exploration actions in relation to the HOI 
(Nobs = 94, Nlocation = 10, χ 2ML = 12.02, R2LMM(m) = 0.1113, P < 0.001).
Figure 6. The human orientation index (HOI) in relation to background history. Groups of individuals with 
different background histories differed slightly in their human orientation.
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a general social interest, since the duration spent in close proximity to a novel human did not correlate with the time 
spent in close proximity to novel conspecifics (Spearman’s rho: r = 0.198, N = 28, P = 0.312, two-tailed).
Discussion
This study represents one of the largest systematic individual-level comparisons of cognitive tool-using abilities 
in apes, involving 13 different captive groups in both zoos and rehabilitation stations in which none of the indi-
viduals were deprived or enculturated. As expected, the latency to touch novel food or objects, and thus reduced 
neophobia, was an important independent predictor of task performance (Table 1), as has been found in other 
studies28–31. However, we also found that variation in problem-solving skills in the honey tool-task was equally 
predicted by persistent and varied explorative behaviour, which in turn was highly influenced by the orang-utans’ 
psychological orientation as assessed with the human orientation index, HOI (Table 1). We suggest the following 
biologically most plausible causal cascade, backed up by a series of analyses: Human orientation mainly influ-
enced both the orang-utans’ motivation to explore and the nature of their exploration, and consequently affected 
their understanding of the problem-solving task, and thus their success in solving it.
The reaction towards humans could have several dimensions, other than the mere interest in humans, and 
our results allowed us to characterize the nature of the Human orientation Index (HOI) in more detail. A high 
HOI does not simply reflect the expectation of food that is provided regularly by humans, because HOI varied 
extensively and all these orang-utans depended on humans for their food. The different background categories 
also showed higher variability in their HOI than in their novelty response (Fig. 6 and Supplementary Fig. S1). 
Moreover, if it were mere food expectation, variation in HOI should be associated with caretakers that provide 
the daily food supply rather than random strangers. Finally, the HOI does not reflect general novelty response 
or general social interest, as it was not correlated with the approach latency to novel food nor objects (Table 2), 
nor with interest in novel conspecifics. Therefore the effect was human-specific and increased the motivation to 
explore, expressed as increased duration and variety of exploration (Fig. 5a and b).
The HOI thus captures a fundamental psychological change that is induced by human contact. The different 
background categories overlapped largely in their HOI (Supplementary Table S5), implying that each individu-
al’s specific nature and experience of human contact is more influential than the human exposure time per se. 
However, our sample included a few wild individuals who had spent their whole immature period in natural 
habitat and showed very low human orientation compared to most other conspecifics housed in zoos and reha-
bilitation stations, independent of the time they had spent at the station (Fig. 6). This indicates that the change 
caused by humans can only happen at an early age, suggesting a sensitive period for social inputs. Since this kind 
of psychological orientation is absent in nature32, we can ask which natural process is being mimicked or modified 
by human contact. The answer is remarkably simple: humans replace the role of the mother and other conspecific 
experts, and the rich variety of artefacts provided by humans enriches their physical environment. In their natural 
niche, orang-utans as well as other primates are prone to attend to their mother and other expert conspecifics and 
learn necessary skills socially40–45. Exploration plays a crucial role in skill acquisition in the wild, but virtually all 
exploration is socially facilitated, allowing orang-utans to overcome intrinsic neophobia32.
Given the identification of human orientation, rather than rearing conditions, as the key determinant of cog-
nitive ability in captive apes, it makes sense to revisit the role of deprivation and enculturation. Because depriva-
tion involves the complete loss of any role models, whereas enculturation involves the presence of far richer social 
inputs by more actively engaged role models than under normal conditions, one could argue that the degree of 
human orientation may largely explain the whole spectrum of cognitive performance among great apes. This 
perspective also explains why enculturated apes outperform others not just in socio-cognitive skills, but also in 
physical cognitive skills19,46.
The social triggering of the engagement with artefacts is highly influential in human child development47,48.
Studies within the field of comparative psychology have documented non-human primates’ tendency to attend 
to humans17,49 and acknowledged the improvement in learning cognitive tasks due to human contact in captive 
settings50,51. Systematic species comparisons of primates’ attention structure toward humans are rare. Nonetheless, 
in 1916, Yerkes52 already suggested that the qualitatively better cognitive performance of an orang-utan compared to 
monkeys was due to the ape’s social attention to human actions. Our results thus support previous suggestions39,53,54 
that early exposure to humans and human artefacts presents a broader range of opportunities for exploration result-
ing in increased innovativeness in captive apes. Over time, the accumulating experience resulting from attention to 
humans leads to improved problem-solving ability, provided the exposure to humans is early in life. In conclusion, 
 Estimate SE df t value p value
(Intercept) 7.155 1.12 58.15 6.401 < 0.001***
Novel food
 Latency touch − 0.057 0.06 78.83 − 0.977 0.332
Novel Object 
 Latency touch 0.001 0.02 81.9 0.457 0.649
 Exploration duration 0.006 0.01 81.99 0.584 0.561
Table 2.  Linear Mixed-Effects model of the Human Orientation Index controlling for repeated 
observations on each facility. Note: N observations = 85, N place = 9, X2ML = 3.556, P = 0.314, P-values below 
0.05 appear in bold.
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human orientation at least partly explains the phenomenon that captive primates that are exposed to both conspecific 
and human role models experience increased opportunities for socially induced exploration and learning (cf. ref. 55).
Our detailed analyses revealed that the HOI influenced an individual’s duration and especially its variety of 
exploration (Fig. 5a and b), which subsequently explained cognitive performance (Fig. 3a and b, Fig. 4). Previous 
studies on hyenas29 and birds56 have also reported that the diversity of exploration actions influences innovative-
ness and problem-solving skills. However, in our study, individuals with a strong human orientation were more 
successful in the task, not only through their exploration diversity, but also by focusing on the relevant parts of 
the apparatus (Fig. 4), implying that they were better at recognizing the actual challenge presented in the honey 
tool-task. Importantly, these parts were relevant not because they directly led to the solution, but rather because 
exploration of these parts improved the animals’ understanding of the physical properties of the problem. For 
example, individuals that traced the honey channel from the outside of the glass obviously understood that there 
is honey inside, but were at that time not searching at the correct part of the apparatus, the channel entrance. 
Similarly, individuals poking with their finger into the curved channel may have gathered information on its 
length. Exploration can therefore be viewed as latent learning: it allows an animal to gather knowledge of the tex-
ture, the material, and the problem itself. Over time, then, individuals with a high HOI will gain more experience, 
which contributes to their focus on relevant aspects of the problem and hence problem-solving success.
The effects of the HOI on problem-solving success may have been so strong that they masked the effects of 
other factors. Thus, we found no differences between the two orang-utan species (P. abelii and P. pygmaeus), even 
though these were found when orang-utans with very similar backgrounds (all mother-reared zoo individuals) 
were compared on a range of cognitive tasks57.
This study documented strong effects of human orientation on problem-solving abilities, through its effects 
on response to novelty, motivation to explore, exploration persistence and ultimately experience. This finding 
suggests that it is just as impossible to design culture-free cognitive tests for primates as it is for humans. In this 
sense, tests of primate cognition are inevitably deeply anthropomorphic. However, once we have controlled for 
the subjects’ human-related histories and given that problem-solving ability is about dealing with unknown, 
novel problems the variation captured in these tests nonetheless reflects variation in intrinsic cognitive abilities 
and should be comparable within and across species. Therefore, we suggest the HOI may be a useful tool in stand-
ardizing comparisons across primates, especially studies concerning ape subjects with various background and 
human-related experiences. In future work, we will further disentangle the exact nature and causes of the HOI 
and address additional problem-solving domains.
Methods
Subjects and study facilities. Our total sample size involved 103 orang-utans: 68 Pongo pygmaeus spp and 
35 Pongo abelii (Supplementary Table S6). Data collection on the zoo-housed sample took place at nine different 
European zoos between November 2012 and January 2015; all zoo data was collected by SF (Table 3). In total the 
zoo sample consisted of 41 individuals, of whom 31 were mother-reared and 10 whose own mother had either 
died or rejected the infant and were therefore hand-reared. They were cared for by human caretakers, within 
the zoo or partly within a human household, and subsequently returned to a group of zoo-living conspecifics 
(Table 4).
Data on 62 rehabilitation orang-utans were collected between June 2012 and June 2014 by LD and ZK, sup-
ported by a trained assistant, Andreas Wendl. In Borneo data collection took place at two rehabilitation stations, 
both situated in Central Kalimantan (Table 3). In Sumatra data collection took place at two sites of the same 
station: the quarantine station and at the release site (Table 3).
Depending on available background information the sample collected at the rehabilitation stations was further 
divided into the following groups: Wild, Station, Human and Unknown. Individuals were assigned to these four 
groups depending on the estimated age at arrival at a rehabilitation station (based on tooth eruption patterns) 
and their previous history with humans (Table 4). Table 4 shows that infants are usually caught when very young 
because then they are still easy to handle and thus most attractive as pets.
Study Facility N Species Age Range Social Housing Test Location Time Period
Zoo 1 6 P. pygmaeus 6–43 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Apr-May 2013
Zoo 2 8 P. pygmaeus 13–52 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Jan-Feb 2014
Zoo 3 4 P. abelii 5–13 Mixed-age group Smaller enclosure Nov 2013
Zoo 4 4 P. pygmaeus 13–31 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Jan 2015
Zoo 5 4 P. abelii 8–23 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Nov-Dec 2012
Zoo 6 5 P. abelii 9–49 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Mar 2013
Zoo 7 6 P. abelii 5–25 Mixed-age group Test enclosure Mar 2014
Zoo 8 2 P. pygmaeus 18–20 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Feb 2015
Zoo 9 2 P. pygmaeus 14–36 Mixed-age group Sleeping quarter Jan-Feb 2013
Rehab. Station 1 5 P. abelii 3–6 Solitary Home enclosure Apr-Jun 2013
Rehab. station 2 18 P. pygmaeus 6–17 Solitary Home enclosure May-Jun 2014
Rehab. station 3 28 P. pygmaeus 8–14.5 Peer group Test enclosure June-Sep 2012
Rehab. station 4 11 P. abelii 5–25 Solitary Home enclosure Oct 2012–Mar 2013
Table 3.  Overview of subjects and facilities.
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Housing conditions. In the zoos, individuals were housed in mixed-aged groups of conspecifics ranging 
from four to 12 individuals in standard indoor enclosures during the day, and mostly separated individually or in 
pairs into sleeping quarters for the night. Most zoos also provide the orang-utans with a larger outdoor enclosure. 
At each zoo, animal keepers are in daily close contact with the orang-utans, providing them with food but also 
with diverse enrichment activities. Zoo visitors were additionally in daily visual contact with the orang-utans.
In the rehabilitation stations the housing situations were more heterogeneous (see Table 3). They differed 
according to the standards and capabilities of each facility and the age, sex and background of the individuals. All 
orang-utans in this study were held in solitary enclosures at the time of the study, except for one station housing 
28 individuals socially in groups of 2–6 individuals. In general contact with humans was reduced to caretakers 
cleaning and feeding several times a day and veterinary care as needed. Each enclosure had simple enrichment 
devices, such as ropes, and several times a week the subjects received extra food-related enrichment or leafy 
branches. In some facilities, small infants lived in a nursery with other orang-utan infants and human caretakers 
serving as replacement mothers. These infants had daily extended contact with their foster-mothers and other 
human caretakers. Most individuals had access to forest vegetation at some stage during their time at the station.
Human Orientation Index. To capture any psychological variation caused by time in captivity and 
human-related experiences, we assessed the degree to which each individual reacted toward a novel human. 
The Human Orientation Index (HOI) contained the following components: reactions and proximity to a human 
stranger during two conditions. Each subject was tested individually, except for a few cases where the mother was 
tested with its dependent offspring to avoid inducing stress for both. In the zoos the test took place either in the 
home enclosure or in the sleeping quarters if individuals were more easily separated there. In the rehabilitation 
stations, individuals were either transported to single compartments for testing or were directly tested in their 
home enclosure. The test was performed by a local man, unknown to the orang-utans and dressed in black.
The total test lasted for one minute and was composed of two consecutive conditions, each lasting 30 seconds. 
In the first condition the man approached and positioned himself approximately one meter in front of the enclo-
sure where the subject was located and remained standing with his body oriented laterally (perpendicularly) 
to the subject. In the second condition the man turned around to face the orang-utan and tried to establish eye 
contact. The whole test was video recorded and during the entire test no other human was present.
Reactions and proximity to the man for the first two seconds of first sight were coded from the videos. For 
each condition we scored the proximity to the man in the following way: 0 = the orang-utan positioned itself as 
far away as possible; 1 = the orang-utan was more than one meter away from the human; 2 = the orang-utan was 
within one meter from the human; and 3 = the orang-utan placed itself as close to the human as possible.
We also scored the very first behavioural reaction of the orang-utan for each condition as follows: 0 = a neg-
ative reaction, defined as: retreat, stress vocalization, pilo-erection, nervous swinging or turning away from the 
human; 1 = a neutral reaction, defined as resting, moving calmly or play behaviour; 2 = a positive reaction, if 
the orang-utan approached the human; and 3 = an actively positive reaction, if the orang-utan begged (either by 
using lips or hands), tried in any other active way to contact the human or attempted to trade objects from the 
enclosure for food.
Furthermore, since the measurements listed above were based upon the first reaction of each condition only, 
we also scored whether any active contact behaviour occurred during the 30 seconds of each condition. This was 
to ensure catching the possible substantial interest in humans, when the surprise had waned.
Thus, in total HOI consisted of all the summed behavioural reactions combined with the proximity to a 
human stranger, with the eventual score ranging from zero to 14. In our sample, scores ranged from 2 to 14. 
Furthermore, we also measured the time in seconds a subject spent within one meter of the human stranger 
throughout the whole test and found that this independent time measurement of proximity was strongly corre-
lated with the HOI-index (Spearman’s correlation, two-tailed: rs = 0.600, N = 96, P < 0.001). Given that an indi-
vidual can be in close proximity and not move throughout the time of the test, but nevertheless not show any 
active response behaviour, we used the summarized index of both behavioural reactions and proximity scores, 
Background during 
early development N
Age Range 
(years) Current Housing
Years in 
Captivity Human Exposure Remark
Wild 5 10–25 Rehabilitation station 0–7 Minimal
Majority of life in natural habitat. Arrived at a rehabilitation 
center as adolescents or adults, eventually to be translocated to 
a new natural habitat.
Station 8 5–11 Rehabilitation station 4–10 Mainly human  raised.
Minimum 80% of life in rehabilitation station. Arrived at 
station as dependent offspring at the age of 1.5 year or younger.
Human 16 3.5–14 Rehabilitation station 0–9 Minimum 6 months  with humans
Arrived at rehabilitation station older than 1.5 years of 
age. Background history with human contact (minimum 6 
months), e.g. pet 
Unknown rehab 33 3–17 Rehabilitation station 0.5–14 Unknown before arrival  at station
No background information. Arrived at station between 
2 and 7 years of age and spent possibly large part of the 
developmental phase in captivity.
Mother-reared Zoo 31 5–52 Zoo Whole life All life within  human care
Nursed by own mother within a zoo. All life in captivity with 
exposure to human caretakers and visitors.
Hand-reared Zoo 10 13–43 Zoo Whole life Human hand nursing and all life within human care
Nursed by human caretakers either at the zoo or in human 
households. All life in captivity with exposure to human 
caretakers and visitors.
Table 4.  Categories of subjects and their background histories.
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which also generated more resolution to the various responses within our sample, than simply proximity latency 
data would.
The logistics in one of the rehabilitation stations allowed us to use a sub-sample of 28 individuals to test for 
social interest in unfamiliar conspecifics. In this sub-sample we measured the time of close proximity to two other 
unknown orang-utans of equal sex, when these were present in a neighbouring enclosure to the subject, which 
allowed us to disentangle social orientation per se to that from interest in humans.
Response to novelty. We performed two separate tests to assess individual variation in novelty response. 
First, we examined how each subject reacted to novel food. In the zoos, the novel food was blue mash potato 
served with black olives on top. Zoo orang-utans receive a broad diet with many types of human food, but blue 
items are not common and olives were new to all individuals. In the rehabilitation stations we used purple rice 
or purple mash potato with dried purple sweet potato pieces. Second, we introduced a novel toy in the form of 
a wooden board equipped with six differently coloured, rotatable tennis balls. For both tasks, we recorded the 
latency from task begin (when set up was completed and individual was in max. 1 m distance to the apparatus) 
until first touch, as well as exploration duration of the novel toy. Maximum test duration was two minutes for both 
tasks, and each subject was tested individually.
Experimental cognitive task – The honey tool-task. In order to evaluate cognitive performance we 
used a naturalistic task, which required no pre-training trials and could therefore easily be applied to all indi-
viduals. The honey tool-task allowed us to assess physical cognition of tool-use at multiple levels from very basic 
understanding of the apparatus and tools to high innovativeness. The task involved a wooden box measuring 
50 cm × 80 cm × 5 cm, whose front was covered by a transparent Plexiglas® or Macrolon® plate (Fig. 2). The 
upper part of the box contained a straight channel (30 cm × 5 cm) where a wooden stick (40 cm) with its tip 
dipped in honey had been inserted. Below the straight channel, the box had a L-shaped channel (15 cm × 10 cm) 
with its bottom part filled with honey. The honey was visible to the subjects through the glass, but both channels 
were too long to reach the honey with their fingers. Moreover, the wooden stick could not be used to reach the 
honey in the L-shaped channel. In addition, below the test apparatus we provided each subject with two more 
wooden sticks and three pieces of rope. The ropes were too short to reach the end of the straight channel but long 
enough to retrieve the honey at the bottom of the L-shaped channel.
We measured multiple aspects of the orang-utans’ responses to the apparatus, which was presented to them 
in the absence of any humans. To estimate cognitive ability, we measured the following actions: 1) removing the 
pre-inserted stick from the straight channel; 2) inserting any of the three available sticks into the straight channel 
during total test time; 3) tool manufacturing, defined as an attempt to modify the provided tools and/ or the use of 
any other item found by the subjects as a tool for the honey channels; 4) inserting the rope tool into the L-shaped 
channel. We coded each action separately as yes or no, depending on whether or not a subject performed it 
(Fig. 2).
We also recorded detailed data on any exploration actions during the problem-solving task. These were 
divided into two main categories: relevant and irrelevant. Relevant exploration concerned the channels, and thus 
the actual problem to be solved. Any other explorative acts directed toward the test apparatus itself, the board 
or table was coded as irrelevant exploration. For both categories of exploration, we measured the frequency, the 
duration, and the variety (see Supplementary Table S3 for definitions).
Experimental procedure. In all tasks (novelty response tests, the HOI test and the honey tool-task), only 
those individuals participated who could easily be separated without showing any signs of separation-induced 
stress. Accordingly, sample size across the different tests varied from 94 to 103. In the honey tool-task each 
orang-utan was tested individually, except for two mothers who were tested with their dependent offspring, in 
which case the offspring did not participate in the task. All subjects were naïve to this test apparatus and we per-
formed no training trials. All subjects were tested only once. Zoo individuals were tested in their smaller sleeping 
enclosures where they could be separated from the group. Testing in the rehabilitation stations took place in the 
home enclosures, since most individuals were housed alone. For the 28 socially housed individuals, additional 
testing enclosures were available. The individuals were brought to the testing enclosures separately and only 
stayed there for the time of testing. We therefore incorporated the identity of the rehabilitation station as one 
factor in our analyses. The problem-solving task lasted a maximum of 10 minutes. Because the individuals’ expe-
rience with humans was so variable, we conducted the problem-solving task without the presence of an experi-
menter to avoid possible effects on the subject’s participation and attention during cognitive testing (cf. ref. 58). 
The task was video recorded with one to two SONY HDR-CX200 handy cameras, depending on angle of the cam-
eras. None of the orang-utans were food-deprived for the task. In the rehabilitation stations, the honey tool-task 
was presented to the subjects on a large board right outside of their enclosure, and subjects could easily reach 
out toward the problem-solving task. In all but one zoo, the apparatus was also presented outside the enclosure. 
However due to the logistics and narrower mesh size in the zoos, we presented the apparatus closer to the mesh 
with a slight angle but less accessible to the orang-utans compared to the rehabilitation station setting. In one zoo, 
we presented the honey box within the test enclosure, with orang-utans having full access to the apparatus. We 
therefore incorporated accessibility of the test apparatus as one factor in our analyses.
Data extraction and statistical analyses. All videos were imported into Mangold interact 9.7, in which 
all detailed behaviours of both cognitive performance measurements as well as exploration acts were coded by SF 
and LD. We used IBM SPSS Statistics 20 to perform inter-observer reliability tests on every behavioural measure 
that occurred during the honey-tool task. For the zoo sample, 20% of the videos were coded by both observers 
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and yielded a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.842 (Nevents = 1020, P < 0.001), which is considered very good. From the rehabil-
itation sample, 16% of the videos were coded by both observers and yielded a good inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s 
Kappa: 0.721, Nevents = 1020, P < 0.001). Also the behavioural responses and the proximity measurements that 
generated the Human Orientation Index was coded in Mangold interact 9.7 by SF and a trained research assistant 
AS and reached a good inter-observer reliability value of 0.853 (Cohen’s Kappa: Nresponses = 52, P < 0.001). LD and 
SF reached an inter-observer reliability value (IOR) of 0.782 (Cohen’s Kappa: Nresponses = 66, P < 0.001) in a sample 
of over 26.6% of the zoo-videos. LD and and AS reached a substantial agreement within the sample of rehabilita-
tion orang-utans of 0.701 (Cohen’s Kappa: Nresponses = 185, P < 0.001).
Further statistical analyses were performed in R version 3.2.359,60 using the ‘lme4’61 and ‘MUMIn’62 packages. 
Individual scores on each of the four measures of cognitive performance (exhibit: Yes/No) were modeled by a 
binomial Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM). We incorporated each individual’s HOI-score, age, sex, 
species, accessibility of apparatus, and ontogenetic background (rearing and housing condition), along with the 
measure of cognitive performance (Table 1) as fixed factors, and controlled for repeated observations on each 
individual within its respective facility by specifying this as a nested random effect. For categorical predictor var-
iables with more than two levels, we manually specified planned contrasts. For accessibility of the test apparatus 
and the measure of cognitive performance (both ordinal predictor variables), we conducted polynomial trend 
analyses, while for ontogenetic background we set orthogonal contrasts to compare: 1) wild subjects against all 
other subjects, 2) subjects from rehabilitation centres against zoo subjects, 3) within rehabilitation centres, sub-
jects from unknown provenance against all other subjects, 4) within rehabilitation centres, human-reared subjects 
against centre-reared subjects, and finally 5) within zoos, hand-reared subjects against mother-reared subjects. 
To examine each individual’s relationship between the HOI scores, novelty response, exploration variables and 
performance, we used Linear-Mixed-Effect-Models (Figs 2, 3 and 4).
Ethical statement. All experiments fully complied with the ethical guidelines of each study facility (zoolog-
ical garden/ rehabilitation station) and were respectively approved by the research manager and/or head of each 
facility. We confirm that according to the Swiss Animal Welfare legislation our animal experiments are considered 
with the severity grade 0 (no harm). The experimental protocols for the rehabilitation stations were approved 
by the Animal Welfare office of the University of Zurich, the Scientific Advisory Board of the BOS Foundation 
(Bornean Orangutan Survival), the research managers and head of the stations of Sumatran Orangutan 
Conservation Programme (SOCP) and Orangutan Foundation International (OFI), and the Indonesian Ministry 
of Research and Technology (RISTEK). Moreover, all zoo experiments were supported by research committee of 
the British and Irish association for zoos and aquariums, BIAZA.
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